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Under the U.S. Constitution, as amended by the Sixteenth
Amendment, any federal tax that is a “direct tax” (which is not an
“income tax”) must be apportioned among the states in accordance
1
with the respective populations of the various states. The thesis of
this Article is that the category of “direct tax” (subject to the apportionment requirement) is limited to requisitions, capitation taxes,
and taxes on tangible property. (A “requisition” is a tax on the state,
payable by the state government by whatever means it chooses.) Apportionment among the states “works” for requisitions, because the
states themselves are the nominal taxpayers. A capitation tax is a tax
on a person because of the person’s existence. Thus, apportionment
among the states by population works easily for a capitation tax, at least
if such a tax is a fixed-amount-per-person tax with no exceptions. But
requisitions are a heavy-handed imposition on the states, and universal capitation taxes are (1) unpopular, (2) incapable of producing
significant revenue, and (3) inequitable (as bearing no relation to
ability to pay). In fact, the federal government has never imposed a
requisition or capitation tax, and for all practical purposes these are
“off the table.” But any “direct tax” other than a requisition or head
tax would also be off the table, because apportionment mandates varying tax rates among the states, which is a facial inequity that could
not be tolerated (except possibly in the case of dire national emergency).
The apportionment requirement (and the triggering category of
“direct tax”) is implicated by the recent surge of interest, at least on
1

U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 3. The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, states that any
tax on “incomes” is not subject to the apportionment requirement. U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI. For a discussion of the Sixteenth Amendment, see generally Joseph M. Dodge,
Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of Non-Excludable Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369 (2007), which addresses federal constitutional provisions
concerning taxation, interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment, and exclusionary theories.
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the part of legal academia, in wealth taxes and periodic taxes on a
2
person’s aggregate property net worth. There is also interest, at least
for economic and liberal political theory, in taxes on human-capital
3
endowment (earning capacity). Of course, an unapportioned federal wealth tax or endowment tax would be unconstitutional if either
4
is a “direct tax.” I argue here that both taxes, neither of which are
income taxes, would be unconstitutional, the first because a tax on
tangible property (especially real estate) is a direct tax, and the second because an endowment tax would be either a capitation tax or a
direct tax.
The view offered herein of what “direct tax” means in the Constitution differs from that offered by recent commentators. At one end
of the spectrum, Erik Jensen argues that “direct tax” means any tax
not capable of being shifted, which is deemed to encompass any tax
on the economic attributes of persons (including a tax on a person’s
5
aggregate consumption). At the other end of the spectrum, Bruce
Ackerman argues that that the Thirteenth Amendment (abolishing
slavery) effectively repealed the apportionment requirement, because
the clauses containing the apportionment requirement were invented
6
to effectuate a compromise over slavery. Calvin Johnson goes almost
as far in arguing that “direct tax” means only a tax capable (without
effort) of fair apportionment among the states in accordance with
population, thereby limiting that term to requisitions and universal
7
head taxes. My “middle of the road” position is that apportionment
2
3

4

5

6

7

The Spring and Summer 2000 issues of Tax Law Review are, in their entirety, devoted to
personal wealth taxes.
See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 162–66 (1986) (discussing
accrual income and consumption bases for taxation); see also other authorities cited infra
note 432.
See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax With a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 441–
42 (2000) (opining that a wealth tax might be upheld if it were cast as a low-rate tax on
the risk-free return from property).
See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,”
33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091–107 (2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Incomes] (arguing that a tax
on aggregate personal consumption would be subject to the apportionment requirement); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Consumption Taxes] (same).
Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28, 58 (1999) (“Given the Reconstructionist Amendments, there is no longer a constitutional point in enforcing a lapsed bargain with the slave power.”).
See Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 295, 297–99 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Apportionment] (arguing that
apportionment should not be a barrier to any federal tax); Calvin H. Johnson, The Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up at the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1, 71 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, Foul-Up] (“[T]he ‘direct tax’ should be construed
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is still alive, but (apart from requisitions and capitation taxes) is confined to federal taxes on real estate and tangible personal property.
This position differs from the apparent state of current doctrine,
which is that “direct tax” also encompasses taxes on intangible per8
sonal property.
My thesis is based upon (1) the constitutional text bearing on the
federal taxing power, (2) its early history, (3) the ideological basis of
the apportionment requirement, (4) the instrumental purposes and
effects of the apportionment requirement, (5) the doctrinal evolution of “direct tax,” and (6) the policy purposes that would be best
served by the apportionment requirement in the context of a federalist system.
Part I offers as background material an explanation of the operational effect of the apportionment requirement and the constitutional provisions bearing on the federal taxing power, as well as how
these provisions came to be in the Constitution. Part II rejects a
broad meaning of “direct tax.” Part III offers possible rationales and
purposes for the direct-tax apportionment requirement. Part IV rejects various theories that view the rule of apportionment as being
dead. Part V argues that “direct tax” should be interpreted so as to
exclude taxes on intangible personal property. Part VI offers applications of the analysis to issues of current interest.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE APPORTIONMENT REQUIREMENT
This Part describes how the apportionment requirement operates,
its place in the constitutional text, and how it came to be in the Constitution.
A. The Apportionment and Uniformity Requirements
In order to apportion a federal tax among the states according to
population, the following steps must be taken. First, the revenue target must be ascertained for the nation. Second, this target amount

8

functionally, but ahistorically, to refer to head taxes and requisitions from the several
states, but nothing else.”).
The last Supreme Court case that squarely faced the issue of the scope of “direct tax” was
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 480 (1895), which reaffirmed
that an non-apportioned federal tax on real estate would be unconstitutional. Upon rehearing the case, the Court held that a non-apportioned tax on personal property would
also be unconstitutional. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601,
627–28 (1895).
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must be allocated among the states according to population (as determined by the most recent census). The resulting “quota” for a
state can be collected from the state government if the tax is in the
form of a requisition, in which case the state could either pay the tax
out of its treasury or lay one or more state taxes for the purpose of
raising the quota. If the “direct tax” is not a requisition, the state quota must be collected (by federal officials) from people, property, or
transactions within the state, but any such tax would require a subject
matter (federal tax base definition) that can produce the quota
amount. The third step is to divide the state’s quota by the state’s aggregate tax base to produce a tax rate for the state. If the direct tax
takes the form of a universal capitation tax, the quota is divided by
the population of the state to yield the per-person tax. If the tax base
is determined in terms of some economic indicator (such as property
values), then the state’s quota is divided by the aggregate tax base located within the state to determine the rate, which is then applied
against the particular items constituting the tax base in order to determine the tax owed for each item.
Since the direct-tax apportionment formula is keyed to the population of the various states, apportionment of a universal capitation tax
9
will produce a uniform national rate. Apportionment of any other
kind of (non-requisition) direct tax will necessarily result in different
tax rates for different states because the specified tax base will not be
found among the states in the same proportion as population (except
by purest random chance). To illustrate this proposition, suppose
that Maryland and Louisiana have the same population but that the
aggregate amount of the subject of the direct tax (say, widget values)
is twice as much in Maryland as in Louisiana. The apportionment
requirement dictates that the tax quota allocable to each state must
be exactly the same, because the population is the same. It follows
inexorably that the tax rate (tax divided by aggregate widget values)
would be twice as high in Louisiana as in Maryland. This point is illustrated in Table 1.

9

Suppose the United States consisted of three states having populations of one million,
three million, and six million persons, respectively, for a total of ten million persons, and
suppose the federal government lays a universal capitation tax of $1 billion for the entire
country. The quotas for each state will be $100 million, $300 million, and $600 million,
respectively, and the per-person tax (quota divided by population) will be $100 per person in every state.
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TABLE 1: OPERATION OF THE APPORTIONMENT REQUIREMENT

Maryland
Louisiana

POPULATION
5 million
5 million

QUOTA (FIXED)
10 billion
10 billion

AGGREGATE
WIDGET VALUES
100 billion
50 billion

TAX RATE
10%
20%

From the perspective of individuals across the nation, every conceivable kind of (non-requisition) apportioned tax (other than a universal head tax) must necessarily operate in an inequitable manner.
As Table 1 illustrates, if the subject of tax is the value of widgets, then
taxpayers in the poorer state (Louisiana) will pay tax at twice the rate
as taxpayers in Maryland. This produces a form of inequity that nowadays would be seen as perverse, in that the higher rate is imposed
on taxpayers holding the lower per-capita values.
Any federal tax not subject to the apportionment requirement is
subject to the uniformity requirement. The uniformity requirement
is satisfied if the same tax (same tax base, same rate schedule) is applicable, as a matter of law, throughout the United States. Thus, the
federal government cannot impose a salt tax only on salt extracted
within a named salt formation that exists only in Michigan and Ohio.
However, the uniformity requirement is satisfied if the federal government imposes a tax on salt extracted anywhere in the United
States, even though it happens that salt extraction is concentrated in
a narrow geographical area.
B. Constitutional Provisions Relating to the Validity of Federal Taxes
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, of the Constitution (hereinafter referred to as the “Taxing Power Clause”), Congress is granted authority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises,” without limitation as to subject matter or taxpayer. It is probable that
10
“requisitions” on states are included within “Taxes,” although the
10

The Constitution does not expressly mention requisitions, and the Framers sometimes
used “requisitions” in opposition to the word “taxes,” suggesting that “taxes” might exclude requisitions. See, e.g., The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Governor Randolph, June 7, 1788)
[hereinafter Virginia Debates], in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 114–15 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES], reprinted in Appendix C. (Elliot’s Debates is a five-volume
compilation, initially made in 1830, of Framing-period materials, including Madison’s
Notes of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and notes of various state ratifying conven-
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issue has never squarely arisen (as no requisition has been enacted by
Congress under the Constitution).
The aforementioned Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 goes on to state
that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States.” This uniformity requirement has been construed by
the courts to prohibit only patent or intentional discrimination based
11
on geography. Uniformity does not require flat rates without ex12
emptions. The uniformity requirement has been extended by judicial decision to all federal levies (including “taxes”) not subject to the
13
apportionment requirement.
The “direct tax” concept appears in Article I, Section 2, clause 3
(hereinafter referred to as the “Representation Clause”), which provides that both representation in the House of Representatives and
direct taxes are to be apportioned among the states in accordance
14
with population (“numbers”) as determined by a periodic census.
In tallying population, slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a
15
person. The three-fifths rule became meaningless after slavery was
abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1866.
Article I, Section 9, clause 4 (hereinafter referred to as the “Capitation Tax Clause”), states in full: “No capitation, or other direct,

11

12
13

14

15

tions.) There are persuasive arguments that requisitions are within the federal taxing
power: (1) the term “requisitions” is a subcategory of “taxes,” (2) the power to lay requisitions was assumed to be so obvious as not to require explicit statement, and (3) requisitions were considered to be a viable federal taxing option in 1796. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 36, at 213–20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003), reprinted in Appendix B; Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the
Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 355,
357 (1998); Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to CLIO: The Historical Continuity from the Articles of
Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 486–89 (2004).
See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983) (allowing even geographical classifications to stand if based on neutral principles); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359
(1945) (reciting the test that a tax is uniform if it is applied the same way wherever the
subject is located).
See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83–92 (1900) (rejecting the notion that uniformity
requires equal taxes or uniform rates).
See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11 (1916) (holding that the Sixteenth
Amendment frees income taxes from the apportionment requirement); Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173, 176, 181 (1796) (holding that all non-direct taxes avoid
the apportionment requirement).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Prior to the census, which was to be taken within three years
of the first meeting of Congress, representation was apportioned according to a fixed allocation. See infra note 288.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration
16
herein before directed to be taken.”
There is no definition of “direct tax” in the Constitution, and
none was offered to the delegates in the 1787 Constitutional Conven17
tion. Thus, the matter has been left to judicial construction. To
make a long story short, early Supreme Court cases upheld various
unapportioned federal taxes as “excises,” but the 1895 case of Pollock
18
v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. invalidated the unapportioned 1894 income tax. Pollock was (to say the least) highly controversial both politically and legally, and two responses emerged. First, the Supreme
Court reverted to its earlier propensity of holding contested unapportioned federal taxes to be excises. Second, political developments
eventually resulted in the Sixteenth Amendment (proposed by Congress in 1909, and ratified in 1913), which states:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
19
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Congress enacted a personal (individual) income tax in 1913, which
has continued (with numerous alterations) to the present. The Supreme Court upheld the 1913 income tax in 1916, stating that the
purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was merely to remove the apportionment requirement from federal income taxes, rather than to
20
affect the definition of “direct tax.”
Thus, viewing the various tax-related provisions of the Constitution together, the apportionment requirement currently applies only to a fed21
eral direct tax that is not an income tax. All other federal taxes are sub22
ject only to the uniformity requirement.
Since 1913, the “direct tax” issue has largely lain dormant, as the
federal government has been able to satisfy its wants from taxes and
duties that are not viewed as being subject to the apportionment requirement.
16
17

18
19
20
21

22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
Rufus King of Massachusetts asked the 1787 Convention for the meaning of “direct tax,”
but no reply was given. James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Aug.
20) [hereinafter Madison’s Notes], in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 451.
157 U.S. 429 (1895).
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
See Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 109 (1916) (noting that the Sixteenth
Amendment “exceptionally authorized” only the income tax to be free from the apportionment requirement).
See Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18–19 (holding that the post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax,
no longer having to be apportioned, is subject to the uniformity requirement).
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C. How Apportionment Found Its Way Into the Constitution

Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government had
only the power to lay requisitions on its constituent members, the
states themselves, in proportion to the value of land and improve24
25
ments thereon. The states could, and did, refuse to comply, and,
26
as a result of an ineffectual taxing power, the Confederation government was feeble. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 largely
resulted from an effort (led by Virginia) to create a national govern27
ment with a meaningful taxing power. The Convention was held in
Philadelphia on May 25, 1787 without a delegation from Rhode Is28
29
land. No official history was taken of the deliberations. The ac-

23

24
25

26

27

28

29

A more elaborate history of the taxation clauses is found in Charles J. Bullock, The Origin,
Purpose and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of the Constitution (pts. 1 & 2), 15 POL. SCI. Q. 217
(1900) [hereinafter Bullock, Part I], 15 POL. SCI. Q. 452 (1900) [hereinafter Bullock,
Part II].
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 103 (noting that the
states treated requisitions as “mere recommendations”); Virginia Debates, supra note 10,
at 114–18, 121 (noting that a system of voluntary requisitions would be ineffective); Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 13 (noting the difficulty of states undertaking honest realestate appraisals when their self-interest commanded systematic undervaluation).
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (allowing amendment of the Articles only by a
unanimous vote of the states); 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 92–106 (chronicling
that the Articles authorized only requisitions, and a 1783 proposal to authorize import
duties was vetoed by Rhode Island).
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 388 (1821) (“That [the requisitions of
Congress] were habitually disregarded, is a fact of universal notoriety. With the knowledge of this fact, and under its full pressure, a convention was assembled to change the
system.”); Madison’s Notes, supra note 17, at 112 (stating that the “radical infirmity” in
the Confederation was the voluntary requisition system). See generally ROGER H. BROWN,
REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC:
FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1993) (arguing that the power of federal taxation was central to the constitutional enterprise); ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 26
(2006) (discussing the states’ failure to collect federal requisitions); CALVIN H. JOHNSON,
RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES 1–2, 43–45 (2005) (stating that one of the most
important reasons for the need of the Constitution was to allow the federal government a
source of revenue).
See Gordon Lloyd, TeachingAmericanHistory.org, Introduction to the Constitutional Convention, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/intro.html (last visited March 26,
2009) (providing a brief pre-history of the convention).
See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 126 (noting that there was to be no official secretary at the Convention). Nevertheless, a journal was kept of the motions and
votes on those motions. The journal is published as Journal of the Federal Convention,
in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 139–318.
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counts that have come down to us, principally James Madison’s
30
notes, are sketchy and mainly of a narrative quality.
Governor Randolph of Virginia opened the substantive proceedings on May 29 by offering the so-called Virginia Plan (drawn up by
31
32
James Madison), which was strongly nationalist/federalist, but
which expressly mentioned taxes only in the following item:
2. Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the
number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in
33
different cases.

The foregoing only states that representation (in each of the two houses
of the national legislature) should be proportional to either the requisition quotas (which, according to the Confederation rule, were then
based on real property values) or population (excluding slaves). This
provision assumes that significant federal taxes under the new gov34
ernment are to be apportioned among the states, as was the case
under the Confederation. The power to tax is not specifically mentioned, but is implicit in Article 6 of the Virginia Plan providing for
the broad categorical grant of federal powers, including powers to invalidate state laws and to compel states to fulfill their duties (pre35
sumably including requisition quotas). The Virginia Plan was re30

31
32

33
34

35

See supra text accompanying note 10. For an account of Madison’s role in the convention,
ratification, and Federalist periods, see IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800 (1950).
See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 126–28.
The term “Federalist” is commonly used to refer to advocates of a strong federal government (but without abolition of the states), and “Anti-Federalist” is used to refer to those
who opposed ratification of the proposed Constitution.
See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127.
Another plan submitted by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina has been lost, but it apparently would have given the federal government the power to lay import duties and
compulsory requisitions on the states. See Am. Hist. Ass’n, Sketch of Pinckney’s Plan for a
Constitution, 1787, 9 AM. HIST. REV. 735, 739 (1904) (noting that Pinckney’s plan also included the power to levy duties on imports and regulate commerce more broadly). Although a plan supposedly authored by Pinckney appears in the May 29 entry to the Journal of the Federal Convention, Mr. Pinckney’s Draft of a Federal Government, in 1 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 145–50, Madison later expressed doubt as to its authenticity.
See Note of Mr. Madison to the Plan of Charles Pinckney, May 29, 1787, in 5 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 578–79.
In addition to the against-the-state powers mentioned in the text, three general types of
powers were listed: (1) powers vested in Congress by the Confederation, (2) powers to
legislate where the states were incompetent, and (3) powers to achieve harmony among
the states. At this point, the doctrine of enumerated powers had not emerged, but it surfaced on July 16, see Madison’s Notes, supra note 17, at 317, and came into the open with
the Report of the Committee on Detail of August 6, see id. at 378–79 (listing the powers
over states that were to be vested in the legislature). On July 17, the Convention removed
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ferred to the Committee of the Whole, which reported on June 13,
1787, a plan that again made no specific mention of taxes but provided for a bicameral legislature, with representation in both houses
being apportioned according to population, with slaves counting as
36
three-fifths.
At this point, the nationalist agenda began to succumb in part to
assaults first from the small states and then from the hard-core slave
states, Georgia and the Carolinas. Both assaults were bottomed on a
states-rights (but not Anti-Federalist) stance: the small-states agenda
37
was to have equal representation for states, and the deep-South
38
agenda was to preserve slavery. The small-state agenda was embodied in the New Jersey Plan, which would have (among other things)
limited the federal taxing power to the levying of customs duties and
stamp taxes, as well as to the laying of quasi-mandatory requisitions to
be apportioned among the states according to population (including
39
slaves as three-fifths). The New Jersey Plan was rejected on June
40
19, with Alexander Hamilton denouncing the idea of apportioning
41
a major revenue source (requisitions) according to population, but
the small-states faction persisted until it was agreed that the Senate

36

37

38
39

40
41

the power, advocated by Madison, to invalidate state laws. See id. at 321–22. The power of
taxation might have been thought to fall into category (2), because the states would not
be competent to lay a federal tax. See id. at 257 (stating that the new government would
have the power to tax the people themselves).
On June 11, John Rutledge of South Carolina had proposed that representation be by
quotas of contribution, but this motion was amended by James Wilson of Pennsylvania
and Pinckney to read as described in the text. See id. (June 6, 7, 11, 13) at 164, 170, 178,
181.
A subsidiary states-rights issue was appointment of representatives and senators by state
legislatures rather than election by the people, a point of view that prevailed for the Senate. See id. (June 6) at 160–64. Another point advanced by the states-rights faction is that
the Convention only had the authority to amend the Articles of Confederation, which was
a compact among the states. Id. (June 16) at 193–94.
Slaveholding interests needed a national government to protect property, including
slaves, and to force the return of escaped slaves. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
A passage in the New Jersey Plan stated “that, if such requisitions be not complied with in
the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non-complying states,
and for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the same—
provided, that none of the powers hereby vested in the United States in Congress shall be
exercised without the consent of at least ___ states.” Madison’s Notes (June 15), supra
note 17, at 192.
See id. (June 19) at 211–12 (postponing decision on the New Jersey Plan).
See id. (June 18) at 201 (noting that direct revenue would not be sufficient, and an attempt to acquire the balance from requisitions would fail).
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would be constituted on the basis of equality among states, with the
43
Senators to be appointed by the state legislatures.
As to representation in the House, the item on the table from the
modified Virginia Plan still left open the issue of whether representa44
tion was to be by wealth or population. The notion of representation according to wealth inevitably conjured up the notion that rep45
resentation should be linked to taxation, or vice versa. The wealth
standard for representation was favored by the South, because slaves
were wealth. The alternative possibility of linking representation to
46
population raised the issue of how slaves should be counted. However, on July 11, motions to count slaves in any future census to be
47
taken to adjust representation were defeated. At that point, the issues of wealth versus numbers and the role of slaves in each were up
in the air.
This logjam was broken on July 12 by a move that formally linked
48
representation and the taxing power. Gouverneur Morris of Penn49
sylvania opened with a motion “to add to the [Virginia Plan] clause
empowering the Legislature to vary the representation according to
the principles of wealth and number of inhabitants, a proviso ‘that
50
taxation shall be in proportion to representation.’” At this point,
the Morris proposal only amounted to placing all taxes under the
same principle of apportionment as governed representation, but the
roles of population and wealth in both were still unresolved. George
Mason of Virginia, a states’ rights advocate, “admitted the justice of
the principle [of linking taxation and representation], but was afraid
embarrassments might be occasioned to the legislature by it. It might
42

43
44
45

46

47
48
49
50

See id. (June 25, July 7) at 240, 285–86 (recording discussion of Senate representation).
The issue was not finally put to rest until July 16. See id. (July 16) at 316–17 (recording
the passage of a resolution providing for the states to have an equal vote in the second
branch of the legislature).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
Madison’s Notes (July 9), supra note 17, at 288–89.
John Rutledge moved that representation be apportioned according to the actual tax
yield from the various states. Id. (July 5) at 279. Although the motion was defeated, further discussion of the difficulty of valuing wealth under the Confederation requisition system again linked the topics of representation and taxation. See id. (July 6) at 281.
See id. (noting the difficulty of valuing the contribution of non-commercial states); id. (July 9) at 289 (arguing that slaves should be counted as property for apportionment); id.
(July 11) at 296–302 (recounting argument over the “three-fifths” clause). For another
account of the run-up to July 12, 1787, see Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 92–101.
Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 295–301.
See id. (July 12) at 302–06, reprinted in Appendix A.
Not to be confused with Robert Morris, also of Pennsylvania.
Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302, reprinted in Appendix A.
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drive the legislature to the plan of requisitions.” Mason’s remark
indicated an awareness that apportionment of certain non-requisition
taxes would be impractical, so that apportionment of all federal taxes
could be accomplished only through a requisition system; yet, a compulsory requisition system would bring the federal government into
52
potential armed conflict with state governments. Morris picked up
Mason’s challenge by offering an acknowledgement:
that some objections lay against his motion, but supposed they would be
removed by restraining the rule to direct taxation. With regard to indirect
taxes on exports and imports, and on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had been said to the contrary, he was
persuaded that the imports and consumption were pretty nearly equal
53
throughout the Union.

The statement that non-direct taxes would likely fall proportionally among the states slipped by unchallenged. Insofar as taxes on
imports (imposts) were levied at the point of import—with some
states having few, if any, deep-water ports—and insofar as excises on
particular items (like salt and distilled spirits) were levied at the point
of production, the non-direct taxes would be laid (in the formal
sense) non-proportionally among the states. Thus, the reference to
equality (meaning “proportionality”) must have been based on the
notion that such taxes would be passed on to ultimate consumers,
and that consumption would be roughly proportionate to popula54
tion.
However, even assuming that such taxes would be wholly
passed on, Morris’s prediction of de facto apportionment would occur only if consumption were taxed generally, but in fact the duties,
imposts, and excises of the period were only imposed selectively (and
at varying rates). In any event, the amended Morris resolution (“provided always that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to repre55
sentation”) passed.
The remainder of the July 12 session dealt with the formula for
apportioning direct taxes and representatives. It was urged that pop56
ulation (including slaves) was a reasonable proxy for wealth. James
51
52

53
54
55
56

Id.
This danger had already been stressed by Governor Randolph. See id. (June 16) at 197–98
(recounting Randolph’s argument that Congress was a body too inadequate to take on
such powers, given the amount of distrust rooted in the public of a federal government).
Id. (July 12) at 302, reprinted in Appendix A.
See id. (July 11) at 299 (explaining how freedom of internal commerce would tend to
equalize wealth and industry).
Id. (July 12) at 302, reprinted in Appendix A.
The shift from real estate values to population as the basis of apportionment of requisitions had almost been adopted in the Confederation period, after it had become appar-
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Wilson suggested that the North’s objection to including slaves in representation would be ameliorated if the same rule governed taxa57
tion. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts pointed out that this change
would be cosmetic, because “the states were not to be taxed as
58
states,” presumably because the federal government could now lay
taxes on foreign trade and consumption without apportionment and
lay apportioned taxes on individuals, obviating the need for requisitions. At the end of the July 12 session, a resolution was passed that
stated: “provided always that representation [in the House] ought to
59
be proportioned to direct taxation,” which in turn would be proportioned on the basis of numbers (with slaves counting as three-fifths),
60
with the population being determined by a federal census.
On July 26 the agreed-upon portions of the Constitution, as well
as other yet-to-be-decided matters, were submitted to the Committee
on Detail, which reported back on August 6 with several additional
61
provisions relating to taxation. Since the tide had shifted from a nationalist government having general powers to a government possessing only enumerated powers, it was necessary to provide expressly
that the new government would have the plenary power to lay and
62
collect taxes. Also added was a clause requiring capitation taxes to
63
be apportioned according to the census. This provision, discussed
64
later, appears initially to have been intended as a kind of insurance
against the possibility of a federal slave tax. A proposal to limit the
power of direct taxation to instances of failed requisitions was round-

57
58
59
60

61

62
63
64

ent that a system based on real estate appraisals controlled by the states did not work. An
anti-abuse amendment was proposed to the Articles to base apportionment on the population, counting slaves as three-fifths. This amendment was supported by twelve of the
states, it being generally thought that population was a reasonable index of aggregate
state wealth, but the amendment failed for lack of the required unanimity. See Letter
from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Oct. 10,
1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 482, 484; Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at
33–35.
Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 304, reprinted in Appendix A.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 302-05.
The reference to “wealth” in the first sentence of the Virginia Plan clause empowering
the legislature to vary the representation according to the principles of wealth and number of inhabitants was taken out the next day. Id. (July 13) at 309.
The Committee on Detail had (inadvertently?) dropped the link between representation
and direct taxes, but that problem was immediately fixed by amending the draft of the
Representation Clause so as to refer to the direct-taxation apportionment rule, located in
a different clause. See id. (Aug. 8) at 391.
The Convention approved this provision without debate. See id. (Aug. 16) at 434.
Id. (Aug. 6) at 378–79.
See infra text accompanying notes 285–303.
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ly defeated on August 21, while the provision barring a federal tax on
65
exports was approved. A proposal concerning the ports, which provided that “[a]ll duties, imposts, and excises, prohibitions or restraints, laid or made by the legislature of the United States, shall be
66
uniform and equal throughout the United States,” was referred to
an ad hoc committee, which fashioned the present version of the Uniformity Clause, approved on August 25.
On September 12, the Committee on Style and Arrangement presented a final draft of the Constitution which merged the drafts of
separate direct-tax and representation provisions into the Representation Clause, because both contained the same rule of apportion67
ment. The separate provision requiring apportionment of capita68
tion taxes was expanded by adding the reference to direct taxes.
Finally, the uniformity requirement for duties, imposts, and excises
was merged with the clause empowering Congress to lay and collect
69
taxes.
Although the foregoing account is meant to be as objective as possible, I will offer a tentative interpretation. What started off as a na70
tionalist project to overcome the “wicked states” was compromised
by efforts from states righters, small states, and slave-importing
71
states. In the area of taxation, this tension played out over the issue
of apportionment of taxes. The events of July 12 resulted from a confluence of three trends: (1) the inertia of apportionment as the default rule for allocating taxes under the Confederation and the Virginia Plan, (2) a realization that requisitions could create conflict
between the federal government and the states, and (3) a growing
awareness that apportionment would not work for certain non-

65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453, 456.
See id. (Aug. 25) at 479.
Id. (Sept. 12) at 536. For a discussion of what preceded this move, see infra notes 292,
294, 300 and accompanying text.
This change is discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 300–02.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 154–55 (noting that the Anti-Federalists were particularly
opposed to a direct tax).
Small states, slave-holding states, and states as states prevailed in the following respects,
apart from taxation, relative to the Virginia Plan: (1) deleting the power to negate state
laws, (2) limiting federal powers to those enumerated, (3) constituting the Senate on an
equal-representation basis, (4) electing senators by state legislatures, (5) including slaves
in the representation formula, (6) prohibiting a ban on the import of slaves until 1808,
(7) limiting any import tax on slaves to $10 per slave, (8) providing for the election of the
President, (9) requiring all states to return fugitive slaves, and (10) providing for amending the Constitution.
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requisition taxes. Thus, apportionment was not invented on July 12 (or
during the Convention), and the concept of “direct tax” was pulled out of a
hat to limit, in the interests of practicality, the scope of the apportionment requirement. At no point was apportionment, as a political principle, seriously
questioned on the merits. The principle of apportionment was not generated by
the institution of slavery. Instead, slaves, as both wealth and persons, had to
be accommodated into any apportionment formula based on wealth or population.
Politically, apportionment of taxes was embraced by states-rights
Federalists because it has the effect of treating the peoples of states as
independent tax-paying communities. For slaveholding interests, apportionment of representation and taxation (counting slaves as threefifths) was a good deal because representation was a more important
issue than taxation. Apportionment was tolerated by the nationalists
because the federal government ended up with a taxing power immune from state interference, and direct taxation was expected to be
the rare federal practice rather than the norm; in addition, apportionment—as an acknowledgement of the role of states—would serve
the cause of ratification.
II. “DIRECT TAX” CANNOT BE BROADLY CONSTRUED
The text and history demonstrate that the apportionment requirement deserves to be taken seriously, but they do not (so far) indicate the scope of its application, which depends on the meaning of
“direct tax.” Here, it is argued that “direct tax” is not to be construed
broadly to encompass virtually every federal tax other than imposts.
Actually, it cannot seriously be claimed that “direct tax” refers to any
tax other than a property tax. An expansive view of apportionment is
either not supported by, or is contrary to, the full range of approaches to constitutional interpretation: textualism, Framers’ intent, contemporaneous understanding, doctrine, functionalism, and
policy. Therefore, it is not necessary to pick and choose among interpretative approaches.
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A. The Constitutional Text
The text of the Constitution states that duties, imposts, and ex72
cises are subject to the uniformity requirement. The uniformity requirement is incompatible with apportionment, because apportionment, in the case of any tax other than a requisition or universal head
tax, must necessarily impose different tax rates with respect to different states. A tax in which the rate structures change at state lines
73
cannot be uniform among the states. The only logical conclusion to
be drawn is that duties, imposts, and excises cannot be subject to the
apportionment requirement.
This difficulty can be overcome only if (1) the uniformity re74
quirement tolerates different rates based on geography or (2) the
apportionment requirement trumps the uniformity requirement in
75
case of overlap. Neither of these propositions can be supported by
logic or the text itself. Nobody in the aftermath of the 1787 Convention thought that apportionment applied to external taxes (imposts).
Since duties, for example stamp taxes, and excises are subject to the
same rule of uniformity under the text of the Constitution as imposts,
it would be illogical to suppose that duties and excises could have
been intended (or thought) to be subject to the different rule of ap76
portionment.
72
73

74

75
76

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
This interpretation of “uniformity,” discussed in text accompanying supra note 11, was
not made up of whole cloth by the courts. The Convention history clearly shows that the
uniformity requirement arose over a concern that imposts not vary from port to port. See
Madison’s Notes (Aug. 28), supra note 17, at 483–84 (reporting a motion explicitly prohibiting that preference be given “to the ports of one state over those of another”).
James Madison alone appears to have viewed apportionment and uniformity as being capable of harmonization: if a uniform tax on an article, such as tobacco, operated unevenly on the states, then the Constitution would require that other articles also be taxed
(uniformly), so that the whole package would satisfy the apportionment requirement. See
Virginia Debates (James Madison, June 12, 1788), supra note 10, at 306–07, reprinted in
Appendix C (“[T]here is a proportion to be laid on each state, according to its population. . . . This is a constitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar against disproportion . . . .”). Others contemplated that this scenario of an apportioned tax on bundled
subjects would be only a maxim of practical politics: apportioned bundled taxes would
be politically more palatable than single-item uniform taxes that would operate unevenly.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 213–20, reprinted in
Appendix B; Virginia Debates (Governor Randolph, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 121–
22, reprinted in Appendix C (stating that a tax must be laid on the most productive article
in each state).
The possible overlap issue is discussed in the text accompanying infra note 424.
Apart from confusion as to what fell into the categories of “duty” or “excise,” and apart
from those who thought that apportionment was a more equitable principle than the uniformity principle, it is not clear that any of the Framers actually thought that a single-
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Both uniformity and apportionment serve the same constitutional
value of preventing geographical discrimination, but do so by different means. Uniformity prohibits geographical discrimination by reason of the location of the subject of taxation within one state as opposed to being within another state. Apportionment prohibits
discrimination against states as political communities. Since the subject-oriented rule is inconsistent with the community-oriented rule,
the two rules must apply to different taxes.
B. The Legislative History
Apportionment of taxes to political subdivisions of a superior government was an institution that existed in various times in England,
77
the continent, and American colonies prior to the 1787 Convention.
Apportioned requisitions were the sole revenue source of the Confederation. The 1787 Convention, which was formally charged with
revising the Articles of Confederation, conducted its proceedings under the rubric of considering and revising the Virginia Plan, which
assumed, in its reference to “quotas of contributions,” the continuation of an apportionment system. To be sure, it is unclear if “quotas

subject duty or excise had to be apportioned. The July 12 colloquy clearly excepts taxes
on consumption—duties and excises—from apportionment on the grounds that apportionment of them is impractical. See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06,
reprinted in Appendix A. Although Madison might appear to have been somewhat confused on this point, see supra note 74, he did not object to the non-apportionment of the
whiskey tax being considered in 1791. See infra note 109. When the carriage tax was debated in 1794 in the House of Representatives, Madison thought it was a property tax subject to apportionment, but Fisher Ames explained that it was an excise as a tax on use.
Madison voted against the tax in any event, but it could have been on the ground that the
tax was against Virginia interests. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1794). Madison did not
raise the same point in connection with other excises and stamp duties considered at the
same time. In light of the foregoing, it is puzzling that Calvin Johnson insists that “direct
tax” in the Constitution was understood to mean all internal taxes. See Johnson, Foul-Up,
supra note 7, at 47–66.
77

As to the colonies, see EINHORN, supra note 27, at 65 (discussing Massachusetts), and id.
at 92 (discussing Pennsylvania). See also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 363 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1952) (1776) (describing the English land tax as a fixed levy on districts based on a
one-time valuation); id. at 376 (describing the French taille as of 1775 as one apportioned
among provinces). A fourteenth-century English tax on tangible personal property was
apportioned among districts. See WILLIAM KENNEDY, ENGLISH TAXATION 1640–1799: AN
ESSAY ON POLICY AND OPINION 16–18 (1913). Taxes enacted in 1642, 1643, and 1649 were
also apportioned among districts. See id. at 39–40. The land tax of 1689 abandoned district quotas, but rates still varied among districts, and district quotas were revived in 1692.
See id. at 44–45. This is the tax mentioned by Smith, and it appears that this tax lasted
through the eighteenth century.
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of contributions” was meant to refer not only to requisitions, but also
to non-requisition taxes. Nevertheless, it is clear that apportionment
of taxes among the states (or the collective populations of states) was
assumed to be a significant feature of the landscape. The New Jersey
Plan provided for only unapportioned imposts and apportioned req78
Thus, apportionment was the dominant background
uisitions.
color. On July 12, apportionment was formally approved as the norm
for all federal levies, but almost immediately was then restricted to direct taxes (and, presumably, requisitions). This move can be viewed
either as an “extension” of apportionment relative to a requisitiononly system, or as a “cut-back” of apportionment relative to taxes in
general.
In any event, in the July 12 colloquy it was explained that the term
“direct tax” (subject to apportionment) was exclusive of taxes on international trade (external taxes) and internal taxes on “consump79
tion.” As a matter of legislative intent, it cannot be contended that
“direct tax” as used in the Constitution means “all taxes” or “all internal
taxes” (i.e., excluding only taxes on international trade). The July 12
motion that the Convention delegations finally voted on was clearly
explained to them by the proponents as being intended to exclude at
least imposts and taxes on consumption, subsequently denoted as
80
“duties” (stamp taxes) and “excises.”
C. Apportionment Is Impossible for Taxes on Transactions
The mechanics of apportionment, described earlier, are simply
incompatible with a tax on transactions, such as imposts, stamp du81
ties, and sales taxes. A transactional tax requires application of a
known tax rate to the tax base, which, in a transaction, exists at a giv82
en point in time. The tax rate under an apportioned tax requires
that the aggregate tax base for a given state be known. However, the
78
79
80
81
82

See supra text accompanying note 39.
Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06, reprinted in Appendix A.
Id.
Remarks by George Mason of Virginia and Rufus King of Massachusetts appear to recognize this point. See id.
To a very modest extent, this problem can be finessed by the mechanism of the “bonded
warehouse,” whereby a taxable item is stored in a warehouse, with the unpaid tax becoming due when the item is removed. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1615 (8th ed. 2004).
However, bonding did not exist during the Framing period, and it would delay reckoning
of the tax only so long as the manufacturer, merchant, importer, etc. retained custody of
the item. Bonding is now standard practice in the case of excise taxes on the production
of distilled spirits.

Apr. 2009]

FEDERAL TAXES SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT RULE

859

aggregate tax base for a state in the case of a transactional tax cannot
be known until the end of some period of time (say, a year), at which
point the sum of the relevant transactions within the state can be aggregated. By the time the tax rate can be ascertained, the taxable
transaction will have become a thing of the past. Hence, the tax
would not be extractable from the transaction itself or its proceeds,
83
which is the whole point of a transaction-type tax.
The foregoing analysis obviously does not apply to non84
transaction taxes, such as poll (head) taxes and property taxes, both
of which were then common at the state level and were undoubtedly
85
understood as being direct taxes. In addition, it would not apply to
a personal tax on the aggregate transactions attributable to a person
that occur over a specified time period (say, a year), such as income
taxes, wage taxes, and personal consumption taxes. These taxes are
mechanically capable of apportionment because rates can be set after
all the relevant facts for the taxable year are in. However, it does not
follow that such taxes are direct taxes in the legal sense, as it could be
claimed that aggregation does not overcome the fact that such taxes
are basically imposed with respect to transactions. Aggregation does
not alter the subject of the tax nor, ultimately, who pays it.
In any event, the impossibility of apportioning a transactional tax
is compelling proof that internal stamp taxes and other purely transactional internal taxes could not be considered direct taxes. To im-

83

Transaction-type taxes were the easiest of all taxes to lay and collect until modern times.
See SMITH, supra note 77, at 383 (“The impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to
their revenue, by any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes
upon consumable commodities. The state not knowing how to tax, directly and proportionably, the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which, it is supposed, will in most cases be nearly in proportion to their revenue.”);
see also James Madison, et al., Address to the States, By the United States in Congress Assembled: To Accompany the Act of April 18, 1783 (Apr. 26), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 96–97 (advocating that the Confederation be allowed to levy import duties
on the ground that taxes on consumption, especially imported consumer items, are the
“least burdensome, because they are least felt, and are borne too by those who are both
willing and able to pay them”).

84

Although the meaning of the term “poll tax” after the Framing period eventually evolved
towards that of a fee for the privilege of voting, during the Framing period, it simply
meant a head tax or capitation tax. See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 30, 74.

85

Statements by some key players in the Framing period are consistent with this view. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 215, reprinted in Appendix B (explaining that taxes classified as “internal” may be described as direct or indirect); Virginia Debates (John Marshall, June 10, 1788), supra note 10, at 229, reprinted in
Appendix C (stating that there are few “objects of direct taxes,” including lands, slaves,
and stock).
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pose an apportionment requirement on such taxes would have been
embarrassing indeed!
D. The Impracticality of Delegation in a Federal System
Apportionment to “lower” political units was a feature of property
and capitation tax administration in England (and perhaps the con86
Apportionment
tinent), some colonies, and the Confederation.
makes some practical sense as a delegation of authority to local units
as collection agents in cases where the local units have a superior capability of ascertaining the relevant facts than the central government. Apportionment (delegation) also makes sense under a confederation-type scenario, where the central government is merely an
agent of sovereign governments. Delegation as a collection mechanism might have had initial appeal in 1787 for a fledgling federal government with no tax-collection bureaucracy.
However, the principle of delegation to local authorities makes little sense in the United States where both the federal government and
the state governments are sovereign because delegation could create
conflict between the federal governments and the states. This potential for conflict was recognized in the case of requisitions on state
governments, but the problems of non-requisition apportionment
appear to have been under-appreciated. In that setting, delegation
would entail either the commandeering of local officials by the federal government (which would also raise the potential for conflict
with the states) or the hiring of local officials as part-time federal tax
collectors, in which case the same people would be serving two masters. If the federal government would instead be seen as having to resort to hiring local persons who were not state or local government
officials, then a duplicative bureaucracy would be created, but, at the
same time, apportionment (state quotas) would be pointless as part
of the collection machinery.
E. Contemporary Understanding
An advocate of a broad meaning of “direct tax” might argue either
that the meaning is (1) clear on its face or (2) ambiguous but with a
meaning that emerges from contemporary understanding. Both of
these attempts fizzle.

86

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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1. Does “Direct Tax” Have a Clear Meaning as Text?
Initially, the term “direct tax” is incomplete, as it raises the question, “Directly on what?” It is not a term used in common, everyday
speech. The term appears to have no legal relevance in the United
States apart from the issue considered herein. The closest thing to a
colloquial meaning of “direct tax” is that of a tax imposed directly on
87
taxpayers, rather than intermediaries. However, in order to avoid
the useless proposition that a “direct tax” is a “tax on the payer of the
tax,” it must be the case that “taxpayers” in the definition must refer
to those who bear the ultimate burden of the tax, rather than those
who actually pay it. This meaning accords with the only plausible literal meaning of “direct tax” as a tax paid by the same taxpayer as
bears the burden of the tax. Thus, an “indirect tax” would be a tax
paid by X that is actually suffered by Y, i.e., a tax that is “shifted” from
one taxpayer to another, as where a sales tax that is “paid” by a merchant is “passed on” to the ultimate consumer by means of a pro tanto
price increase. This meaning is constitutionally plausible, because
the “indirect tax” categories of duties, imposts, and excises were (and
88
are) often viewed as being taxes that are shifted.
However, the notion of a shifted tax relies upon the discipline of
89
economics, and the Supreme Court, in both its textualist and originalist modes, tends to avoid ascribing term-of-art meanings to constitutional text on the theory that the Constitution and its Amendments
were ratified by the people and speak to the people. Persons of ordi90
nary comprehension would be more likely to grasp “direct tax” as

87
88

89
90

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (8th ed. 2004) (“A direct tax is presumed to be borne
by the person upon whom it is assessed, and not ‘passed on’ to some other person.”).
The notion that import duties and taxes on consumption are “passed on” was part of the
intellectual climate of the Framing period, leaving traces in the July 12 colloquy. See
OLIVER WOLCOTT, JR., DIRECT TAXES, H.R. DOC. NO. 4-100, 2d Sess. (1796), in 5
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLASS III FINANCE 414–41 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair
Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS],
available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html (providing an overview of the taxation systems in various states); accord James Madison, Embargoes (May 6), in
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 433 (recording Mr. Sedgwick’s remarks that characterized luxury taxes as indirect because they “created an indirect charge on others besides
the owners”); see also supra text accompanying notes 52–53.
A formalistic notion of “shifted”—that is, the amount of the tax being added on to the
selling price—does not work, as imposts and some excises are not added to selling prices.
See Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 515 (1921) (discussing the
“common understanding” of the term “income”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206–
07 (1920) (construing the Sixteenth Amendment according to common usage); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188–92 (1824) (construing “commerce” similarly).

862

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4

referring to certain subject matters rather than in empirical cause
and effect terms. Furthermore, legal categories can only function
properly if their meaning is reasonably clear and stable. A definition
of “direct tax” in terms of subject-matter categories would be far more
workable than one based on empirical economics, where new research can show that accepted notions of how the world works can be
incorrect.
On the merits, the “non-shifted” meaning of “direct tax” sinks into
quicksand, because even “add-on” taxes might not be shifted but ra91
ther absorbed by the seller, and, at the other end of the spectrum,
taxes “directly” on persons, property, or income might be shifted if it
92
Indeed, a
is (realistically) assumed that markets are imperfect.
comprehensive Treasury Department study of taxes undertaken
shortly after ratification of the Constitution concluded that head taxes would increase the price of labor, taxes on investment would increase the cost of capital, and taxes on factors of production might be
93
passed on in either direction. Of course, the degree (if any) of shifting is not knowable with any certainty. No legal (much less constitutional) rule can rest on so insecure a foundation. Indeed, the proponents of a broad construction of “direct tax” are well-advised to
abandon the “shifting” test, because it undermines their position:
since virtually any tax might be shifted, all taxes must be indirect!
Another problem with the “non-shifted” meaning of direct tax is
that it does not relate to any constitutional concerns, especially of the
kind to which the concept of apportionment pertains, namely, fed94
eral-state power allocations.
In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court, after once flirting with the “no-shifting” definition of direct

91

92

93
94

See The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (James Wilson, Dec. 11, 1787) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Debates],
in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 519 (expressing doubt as to whether import duties were typically borne by the consumers). The burden of excise taxes, in theory, depends on supply and demand curves. See Raymond J. Ring, Jr., Consumers’ Share and Producers’ Share of the General Sales Tax, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 79 (1999) (reporting estimates of the
percentage of the general sales tax that is levied on residents’ consumption spending).
See George R. Zodrow, The Property Tax as a Capital Tax: A Room with Three Views, 54 NAT’L
TAX J. 139 (2001) (stating the current view that property taxes are borne by all investments); WILLIAM M. GENTRY, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2007), http://www.treas.gov/
offices/tax-policy/library/ota101.pdf (finding that the corporate income tax is passed on
in part to labor).
WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 438–39.
This point is considered infra in the text accompanying notes 393–401.
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96

tax, has explicitly rejected it. At best, it can only be concluded that
a tax paid by an intermediary is a per se indirect tax, but it cannot be
concluded on the basis of the “non-shifted” notion that a tax on a
non-intermediary is per se a direct tax in the legal sense.
Another possible meaning for direct tax might be a tax on the
thing that is the real object of a tax, as opposed to a tax on one thing
as a way of taxing another thing that is hard to reach directly. This
appears to be the meaning of direct tax that can be gleaned from the
writings of Adam Smith, the leading authority on taxation during the
period as a result of the publication in 1776 of Wealth of Nations.
Smith’s sporadic use of the notion of “direct” was as an adverb (“di97
rectly”), not as an adjective or part of a compound noun. Thus,
stamp duties on parchment and registration of deeds are “indirect”
98
taxes on transferred property, and excise taxes on consumable
commodities, as taxes on expense, are “indirect” taxes on personal
99
revenue. This usage is not very helpful even as a description, because it again appears to be mired in the tangle of incidence analysis.
Thus, a capitation tax on the lower ranks of people is described by
100
Smith as a direct tax on the wages of labor, although it would seem
to be indirect in the same way that an excise tax on consumption is
an indirect tax on income. To Smith, the concept of direct tax cannot have been important: (1) the term is not defined, (2) the term is
used only occasionally, and (3) the term is not given any normative
101
significance. It appears that Smith’s use of “direct” was not invoked
in the Convention or ratification debates on the taxing power. Although Smith was occasionally invoked on other issues, it is hard to
gauge his influence even among educated elites, and his influence on
the rest of the population would have been negligible.

95

96

97
98
99
100
101

See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 158 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding that an
unapportioned tax on the rents or income of real estate is a direct tax and unconstitutional).
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 82 (1900); see Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515, 520
(1899) (emphasizing the importance of considering the “practical nature” of the tax rather than a theoretical examination of the tax).
See SMITH, supra note 77, at 381, 383.
See id. at 379 (discussing stamp duties on deeds as taxing property “indirectly”).
See id. at 383 (discussing taxes on consumable commodities).
See id. (discussing capitation taxes).
Smith’s normative framework was fourfold: (1) equity, (2) certainty (as opposed to leaving matters to administrative discretion), (3) convenience, and (4) administrative efficiency. See id. at 361–62. Smith spent a good deal of time analyzing incidence with respect to various kinds of taxes, but incidence was not what distinguished direct taxes from
indirect taxes.
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In sum, the meaning of “direct tax” is not clear on its face. Therefore, other interpretive methods are required to discern its meaning.
2. Contemporary Usage
A common technique for interpreting ambiguous text is to undertake a historical inquiry into how the term was understood at the time
102
Because “direct tax” possesses only an “inside the
of enactment.
103
Constitution” meaning, its construction cannot avoid reference to
historical sources emanating from the Framing/ratification period.
But historicism has its problems. The principal one is that it is
104
susceptible to the charge of cherry-picking, a “sin” of which the
main (if lonely) proponents of an expansive scope for the apportionment requirement (the Pollock majorities and Erik Jensen) are
105
the more guilty. Statements positing a broad scope for apportion102

103

104

105

The original-understanding version of originalism looks to the audience receiving the
text, as opposed to statements of those creating the text. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Supermajoritarianism: Defending the Nexus, 101 NW.
U. L. REV. 1919, 1928–30 (2007) (describing how “Original Methods Originalism” looks
to the “consensus about the consitutional provisions at the time of their enactment”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 857–60 (1989) (examining the meaning of “the executive power” in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution using
originalism). Since the authors of The Federalist Papers and principal players in the ratification debates included Framers, the distinction between subjective and objective originalism is somewhat attenuated in this case.
Since “direct tax” lacks any clear contemporary legal usage, it is not claimed herein that
the meaning of this term has evolved over time either on account of the evolution of language or of social practices that inform language.
The view that historical investigation can be objective has long been under attack. See H.
Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 698 (1987) (“[T]he belief that
history deals with objective ‘facts’ is itself a hotly disputed issue among contemporary historians.”). See generally Andrew B. Coan, Text as Truce: A Peace Proposal for the Supreme
Court’s Costly War over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2006) (arguing
against competing, politically-motivated, originalist interpretations of the Eleventh
Amendment).
The majority opinion in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601
(1895), is especially guilty of cherry-picking. It downgrades the Hylton case on the basis
that it was badly reported. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 626. Yet, it cites Hamilton’s private view
as expressed in a compilation of letters published in 1851, Madison stating his opinion
that the carriage tax was subject to apportionment, see supra note 76, a statement by the
Anti-Federalist Gallatin (made twenty years after the fact) effectively equating “direct tax”
with any tax used by the states, and usage in England but not the more limited Continental usages. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 623–30; see EINHORN, supra note 27, at 273. None of
these sources arise from the Convention or ratification debates. Similarly, Jensen downgrades the Hylton opinion on the grounds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction and that the judges were Federalists (even though Paterson authored the New
Jersey plan), but he fails to note Madison’s (post-1789) anti-Federalist politics. Jensen,
Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2351. Johnson suffers from the opposite tendency of
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ment made well after ratification by supporters of Jefferson (including Madison) cannot be used as evidence of original understand106
ing, as an anti-tax posture helped define the Jeffersonian Republi107
can party, and a pro-apportionment stance aligned that party with
108
states-rights sentiments, as well as provided additional political cov109
er for opposing federal excise taxes. Although the anti-tax rhetoric
of the Republicans was genuine, the accompanying proapportionment rhetoric should be taken with a grain of salt because
their words were contradicted by their deeds. No apportioned fed-

citing sources indiscriminately, his point being that a term that can mean almost anything
must mean nothing. See Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 46–56. Ackerman’s view is that
modern history trumps older history. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 51 (advising that
older teachings “should be dispatched into the dustbin of constitutional history”).
106

See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 5–8, 130–38 (arguing that the Federalists, as the winners of
the major constitutional struggle over taxes, are the more reliable sources). The Republican Party that became dominant after Jefferson acceded to the presidency in 1801 included—if it was not limited to—those who opposed ratification of the Constitution. On
the other hand, winning the struggle over the power to lay direct taxes does not tell us
much about the scope of the apportionment requirement, because the apportionment
requirement might have been part of the price to be paid for obtaining the power.

107

Madison and Jefferson began to gravitate away from Hamilton as early as 1791. Hamilton
favored commercial interests while Jefferson and Madison favored landowning and agricultural interests. The Republicans opposed naval construction, a standing army, and internal improvements, and any other program that would occasion the imposition of significant federal taxes. For a brief discussion, see Norman Schofield, Madison and the
Founding of the Two-Party System, in JAMES MADISON: THE PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT 302, 322–24 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2005) [hereinafter JAMES MADISON].
Immediate points of difference were the Bank of the United States and the federal assumption of state debts incurred in the Revolutionary War.

108

Madison, contrary to his earlier position in the Convention, warmly supported the doctrine of enumerated powers as early as 1792, as it offered a principle with which to oppose Hamilton’s nationalistic program. James Madison, Cod Fishery Bill (James Madison,
Feb. 7, 1792), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 427–28.

109

Madison’s position with respect to apportionment is not entirely clear. Despite a suggestion that uniformity and apportionment might have been compatible under some circumstances, see supra note 74 and accompanying text, Madison elsewhere appears to have
recognized that uniformity is basically incompatible with apportionment, while preferring
apportionment as the higher principle. See Virginia Debates (James Madison, June 15,
1788), supra note 10, at 458–59, reprinted in Appendix C. In the House, Madison appears
to prefer apportioned taxes to single-item excises, seemingly as a policy matter, but accepted the non-apportioned excise on whiskey. See Gazette of the United States, 8 January 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 2791, at 229–30 (William Charles
diGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS]; see also supra
note 76 and accompanying text, which notes Madison’s position on the carriage tax that
was upheld in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). It would appear that
Madison’s increasing embrace of apportionment during the Federalist period was simply
an aspect of the overall Republican agenda. See infra note 110.
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eral tax was seriously advanced by them except a tax on land. After
they took power in the election of 1800, they essentially allowed all
taxes other than imposts to lapse, but in connection with the War of
1812, the Madison administration basically caused Congress to renew
the Federalist tax program of the 1790s, as augmented by additional
111
Even
excises, with again only a real estate tax being apportioned.
an annual “duty” on household goods, furniture, and personal effects
112
by reason of ownership was not apportioned.
An originalist approach to constitutional interpretation has difficulty accommodating social phenomena that did not exist during the
Framing period and its immediate aftermath. Here, those phenomena would be annual personal taxes on income, aggregate consump113
tion, or aggregate wealth, which did not then meaningfully exist,
114
although they were talked about to some extent. Insofar as the originalist position leads to the conclusion that the term “direct tax”
could only encompass taxes that people in the relevant period had
experienced, then it would appear to be limited to the kinds of property and capitation taxes that people were then familiar with. However, perhaps the more widely-followed view is that of Chief Justice
Marshall, to the effect that terms in the Constitution are broad
enough to admit of applications not specifically contemplated by the
115
Framers.
Even so, it does not follow that the term “direct tax” in-

110

111
112
113

114

115

The chief financial spokesman of the Republicans in Congress during the second half of
the decade of the 1790s, Albert Gallatin, actively pushed an apportioned land tax as a
ploy to alienate northern farmers, who would be subject to higher rates than southern
landowners. However, the apportioned tax enacted in 1798 on slaves, homes, and land
was designed along lines favorable to the Federalist Party. See EINHORN, supra note 27, at
189–94.
The early history of apportioned taxes is given at supra Part I.C.
Act of Jan. 18, 1815, ch. 23, 3 Stat. 186, 186–87, repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 41, 3
Stat. 264, 264.
The income tax first appeared in England in 1798 as a temporary measure to help finance continental wars. A short history of taxation from feudal times through the first
English income tax is found in EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 41–114
(1911).
Adam Smith classified a comprehensive personal income or wealth tax as a “capitation
tax” but assumed that it was not practical because the taxing authorities could not obtain
the necessary information without intolerable invasions of privacy. SMITH, supra note 77,
at 382.
See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819) (“It
is not enough to say, that this particular case was not in the mind of the Convention,
when the article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was adopted. It is necessary to go further, and to say that, had this particular case been suggested, the language
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cludes personal income, consumption, and perhaps wealth taxes, especially since the competing term—“excises”—is similarly opentextured. Where two categories are in competition with respect to
“new facts,” the matter is likely to be settled by analogy. Once “shifting” is eliminated as the distinguishing characteristic of “direct tax,”
personal income and consumption taxes, being a function of transactional outcomes, more closely resemble excises than property or capi116
tation taxes. Another possibility is that both terms cover the same
tax. In that case, it has to be decided whether apportionment or uniformity is the better operative rule.
3. The Illusion of the Pseudo-Requisition
The attempt to find the Rosetta Stone that will unlock the code to
117
The prethe meaning of “direct tax” is fundamentally misguided.
sent issue is not about divining the meaning of a stand-alone term,
like “cruel and unusual punishment” or “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Direct taxes are subject to the apportionment requirement, whereas non-direct taxes are subject to the incompatible uniformity requirement. Therefore, the taxing provisions are a package,
and Framing-period statements that show a basic misunderstanding
118
of the package are not helpful. Furthermore, courts, in attributing

116

117

118

would have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception.”).
Courts have never adopted the view that personal income and consumption taxes are per
se direct taxes on account of being imposed on individuals. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
Originalism can tempt judges to subordinate precedent to the judge’s own view of the
original sources, at least where the precedent does not itself have an originalist flavor. In
the present case, however, the precedents from Hylton forward are themselves steeped in
historicism: the Justices in Hylton (decided in 1796) were Framers, and later Supreme
Court cases relied on Hylton and early practice by Congress and the Executive. See generally John McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the Core of
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007) (developing a theory for the compatibility
of precedent and originalism). Thus, a judicial construction of “direct tax” based on a
court’s reading of historical materials at variance with doctrine would be arrogant indeed! Additionally, judges, even with staff assistance, lack the time to do comprehensive
original historical research.
Some statements are simply opaque. See The Debates in the Convention of the State of
New York, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Chancellor Livingston, June 17,
1788) [hereinafter New York Debates], in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 341
(“[D]irect taxes; that is, taxes on land, and specific duties.”). Others appear to assume
that apportionment applies to all taxes, or to all internal taxes. See The Debates in the
Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (Mr. Dawes, Jan. 9, 1788) [hereinafter Massachusetts Debates], in 2 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 59–60; Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to the
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rationality to the package, would, and as it turned out, did, construe
119
it in instrumental terms rather than in linguistic terms.
Rampant confusion over the package appears to have been common during the Framing/ratification period, as evidenced by statements to the effect that the federal government would impose “general” apportioned taxes without any universal subject matter. Rather,
it was supposed that the federal government would tax subject matters that varied from state to state according to existing state laws and
practices (or federally-determined subject matters that would be tai120
lored to the economic characteristics of various states). Such a system is referred to herein as a “pseudo-requisition”: almost everything
about it smells like a requisition, except that it would be collected by
federal officials from persons rather than from states and that the
federal government would ultimately control the determination of
the subject matters to be specified in each state. The pseudorequisition is illogical insofar as it incorporates duties and excises, because the uniformity of such taxes required by the Constitution
would be defeated twice over, first by employing such modes of taxation in some states but not others, and second by apportionment (re121
sulting in non-uniform rates).
It is also significant that the pseudo-requisition idea was casually
thrown out without any consistency among speakers and without specifics. The only way that a pseudo-requisition that contained duties,

119

120

121

Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 491–
92; New York Debates (John Jay, June 17, 1788), supra, at 380–81.
Thus the Supreme Court, contrary to the constitutional text, has extended the uniformity
requirement beyond duties, imposts, and excises to “taxes” and even to direct taxes that
do not have to be apportioned on account of the Sixteenth Amendment, resulting in a
situation wherein all federal taxes must be either apportioned or made uniform. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
Such a scenario was raised by Oliver Ellsworth in the July 12 Convention colloquy: “[any]
sum allotted to a state [under a direct tax that was not a requisition] may be levied without difficulty according to the plan used by the state in raising its own supplies.” Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix A. It was also a theme
often trotted out by the pro-ratification faction in the Virginia Ratifying Convention. See
materials infra Appendix C. John Jay, who was not at the 1787 Convention, also might
have held this view. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 36, stated that “[t]he method of laying
and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government,” but he seemed to be referring to real estate taxes involving appraisals. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 216,
reprinted in Appendix B.
This legal issue was never decided, as no such tax was ever enacted by the federal government. The tax was seen as impractical by all the Justices writing opinions in the 1796
case of Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), as well as by WOLCOTT, supra
note 88.
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imposts, and/or excises could satisfy both the apportionment and uniformity requirements would be as a tax on multiple subject matters
(each subject being taxed at a uniform rate in all states) that somehow produces aggregate state yields approximating the respective
state quotas. Designing such a system would be quite a feat of tax engineering, because the subjects and rates for transactional taxes
would have to be set in advance on the basis of yield estimates. The
estimates would often be substantially off-target, raising the problem
of what to do about unfulfilled state quotas and yields in excess of
state quotas. More generally, it is not clear how the federal government could adopt state laws, practices, and perhaps collection devices
without becoming entangled with state institutions and politics. Finally, the incorporation of indirect (passed-on) taxes into the pseudorequisition would undermine the purpose of apportionment to allo122
cate the tax burden proportionately among political communities.
The pseudo-requisition concept ends up being essentially one
where “direct tax” means “a tax that is in fact apportioned,” an inter123
pretation proposed by Johnson.
The resulting constitutional rule
would then be the nonsensical “apportioned taxes shall be appor124
tioned according to population.”
It would have been easy for the
Framers to use language conforming to the Johnson interpretation,
but they did not, and instead the text states that “direct taxes” and
“capitation taxes” are the taxes that are required to be apportioned
according to population, whereas imposts, duties, and excises are subject to the uniformity requirement. The consequence of the Johnson
view is the untenable position that Congress could avoid apportionment of capitation taxes and real estate taxes simply by deciding not
125
to apportion them. That interpretation would amount to a delega-

122

123

124

125

See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1842–43 (1791) (statements of Rep. Jackson) (complaining that a
distilled spirits tax imposed on Northern producers would be borne mainly by Southern
consumers).
See Calvin H. Johnson, The Four Good Dissenters in Pollock, 32 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 162, 168
(2007) (“The inclusion of excise and duties in ‘direct tax’ and the later exclusion of excises and duties from ‘direct taxes’ show that apportionability was a necessary element of
a direct tax under the original meaning.”).
The idea of a pseudo-requisition would have made some sense going into the 1787 Convention, when the objective was to enable the federal government to bypass state governments, and apportionment might have been assumed to be required for all federal taxes,
in which case there would have been no conflicting uniformity requirement.
Capitation taxes must be apportioned pursuant to Article I, Section 9, Clause 4, where
“capitation tax” is understood to be a subcategory of “direct tax.” If “direct tax” means
nothing other than requisitions, capitation taxes, and other apportioned taxes, it would
be easy enough to so state. But it is clear from the historical record that everybody

870

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4

tion to Congress of the power to determine what “direct tax” means,
but such a delegation would invert the hierarchy of the Constitution
being supreme law. Moreover, because apportioned taxes fall inequitably on persons, are cumbersome to administer, and entail delays in
126
collection, they would rarely, if ever, be laid, and the apportionment requirement would have amounted to a deception.
In contrast, apportionment of poll taxes and property taxes can be
implemented on an ex-post basis: the tax rates would be determined
after the state-by-state inventory (and valuation, if relevant) of persons or property, and the appropriate tax bills would then be presented to the taxpayers.
4. Federalist No. 36
Perhaps the most often-used window into original understanding
127
is The Federalist. The one essay that bears specifically on the distinction between direct and indirect taxation is Federalist No. 36, authored by Hamilton, and set forth as Appendix B of this Article.
Hamilton specifically refers only to taxes on real estate in connection

126

127

thought that at least real estate taxes were direct taxes. Johnson’s position is that Congress would not apportion a tax unless the apportionment was fair and reasonable, so that
any tax that Congress in fact apportioned would satisfy this standard. This interpretation
is attacked at infra notes 336–42. Since Congress enacted apportioned real estate taxes
on three occasions, the Johnson position must be that real estate taxes were direct taxes
up through the Civil War, but at some point thereafter they ceased to be direct taxes. At
a more abstract level, the proposition that apportioned taxes are direct taxes does not
imply that all non-apportioned taxes pass constitutional muster, because Congress might
simply decide that it is inconvenient to apportion a tax of the type that could be reasonably apportioned. See Johnson, supra note 123, at 164.
An apportioned tax has to be administered on a state-by-state basis, even though it might
be more convenient and efficient to administer the tax on a district (local) basis, as is
possible with uniform taxes.
The Federalist is a collection of pro-ratification essays written by Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay to influence public opinion in the New York ratification effort. Whether statements
from the ratification debates, including The Federalist itself, should be “admitted” is not
without controversy. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998) (questioning textualists’ reliance on The Federalist but not on legislative history in constitutional decisions); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337 (1998) (suggesting that nondelegation concerns
do not preclude interpretive use of The Federalist). A defense of using The Federalist as legislative history is found in Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1498 (1987). For a view that rejects the use of The Federalist as legislative history, but
accepts it as representing the consensus understanding of the ratifiers, see Dan T.
Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist and Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 538–42 (2006).
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128

with his discussion of direct taxes. Hamilton’s larger objective is to
rebut the claim of the Anti-Federalists that all internal taxes are best
129
left to the states, which have knowledge of local conditions. He argues that the selection of subjects for duties and excises by federal offi130
cials requires only a general knowledge of the economy of the state.
In the case of direct taxes on real estate, the administration can be carried out by using the systems in place in the various states for laying
and collecting real estate taxes, and any appraisers that are necessary
131
can be hired locally.
Hamilton was not alone in equating “direct tax” with real estate
132
tax.
Nevertheless, this was not the only view expressed during the
ratification period. The conclusion that best matches the historical
data is that there was no clear consensus view of “direct tax,” except
that said term definitely included “real estate taxes” as well as requisitions and head taxes. Views differed on the issue of what (if any133
thing) might be included other than real estate taxes. This uncertainty is not surprising, as no definition of direct tax emerged from
the 1787 Convention, and the link (if any) between the idea of apportionment and the concept of “direct tax” is not apparent on its
face.
5. Early Practice
Another source sometimes consulted as evidence of original understanding is the early (non-judicial) practice of the federal gov134
135
ernment. The earliest federal tax was on imports, and no faction

128
129
130
131
132

133

134

THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 213–20, reprinted in Appendix B.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 216–17.
Id. at 217.
See Virginia Debates (John Marshall, June 10, 1788), supra note 10, at 229–31, reprinted in
Appendix C (identifying that the objects of direct taxes include domestic property); see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
See New York Debates (Chancellor Livingston, June 17, 1788), supra note 118, at 341
(identifying direct taxes as “taxes on land, and specific duties”); Massachusetts Debates
(Mr. Dawes, Jan. 18, 1788, Jan. 21, 1788), supra note 118, at 42, 57 (identifying direct taxes as all taxes, including those on lands, exclusive of imposts and excises); id. (Mr. King,
Jan. 21, 1788) at 57 (“The first revenue will be raised from the impost . . . the next from
the excise; and if these are not sufficient, direct taxes must be laid.”).
The early history of federal taxation is described in Henry Carter Adams, Taxation in the
United States, 1789–1816, in 2 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE: INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMICS pts. V–VI (New York, Johnson Reprint
Corp. 1973) (1884). The “early practice” interpretive approach was followed in Myers v.
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thought that imposts had to be apportioned. Non-apportioned ton136
nage duties on ships were also an early revenue source. A tonnage
duty, which must be paid to release the ship from port, looks like a
tax on tangible personal property or the use thereof.
137
The whiskey tax of 1792 was not apportioned. That tax reached
not only the production of distilled spirits, but also the stills themselves according to their capacity. A tax on the consumer goods output of a business falls within conventional definitions of “excise,” but
a tax on an asset used in the production process can also be characterized as a tax on capital investment. In contrast to ships, stills could
perhaps be attributed to states for purposes of apportionment. Nevertheless, the tax on stills was not apportioned, perhaps on the theory
that the cost of stills would be passed on to consumers, but that theory would also apply to real estate used in a business. In any event,
the whiskey tax was not seriously enforced, and it appears not to have
been challenged in court for lack of apportionment.
138
The carriage tax of 1794, which also straddled the categories of
excise tax and tangible personal property tax, was likewise not apportioned. This tax was challenged on the basis of non-apportionment,
but was upheld by the Supreme Court in the March, 1796 case of Hyl139
ton v. United States, which will be discussed shortly.
Shortly after the Hylton decision, the House Ways and Means
Committee, fearing that indirect taxes would be insufficient for future needs, asked Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott to prepare a re140
141
port on direct taxes. The Wolcott Report, issued in December of
1796, offered three possible approaches to apportioned taxation: (1)
a requisition on the states coupled with a pseudo-requisition back-up
142
for delinquent states, (2) an apportioned pseudo-requisition, and

135

136
137
138
139
140
141
142

United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926), and cases cited therein, and in at least one Supreme
Court case construing “direct tax.” Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
The first such Act—the second law passed by Congress—was the Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2,
1 Stat. 24, repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1790, ch. 39, 1 Stat. 180. Customs duty rates varied
from item to item.
See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 (imposing duties on ships and vessels).
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 267.
Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 373, ch. 45, repealed by the Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat.
148.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
5 ANNALS OF CONG. 793 (1796).
WOLCOTT, supra note 88.
A pseudo-requisition is described in the Wolcott Report as an apportioned federal tax
“upon the same objects of taxation, and pursuant to the rules of collection by which taxes
are collected in the States, respectively.” WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 436.
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(3) apportioned subject-specific taxes. Wolcott rejected the first two
possibilities on grounds of equity, economic efficiency, and practical143
ity. Although the Report offers no comprehensive definition of “direct tax” and does not purport to be a legal opinion, it states that “[a]
direct tax in the sense of the constitution, must necessarily include a
144
tax on lands.”
Otherwise, there are some surprises. Taxes on
homes are stated to be taxes on expenses (and, therefore, indirect
taxes), and taxes on the profits of professions, merchants, and manufacture are said to be “presumed” not to be of the type required to be
apportioned. The status, if any, of taxes on invested capital is un145
clear.
The Report is non-committal on the issue of whether such
unpopular taxes as capitation taxes and taxes on the stock and produce of farms need to be apportioned.
The Wolcott Report ended up recommending an apportioned tax
on slaves, homes, and lands. It is curious that the (progressive-rate)
tax on homes, which the Wolcott Report opined to be not subject to
apportionment, ended up being a component of an apportioned tax,
but apparently there was no move to have the tax on homes invalidated on the grounds that it violated the uniformity requirement.
Another possible hypothesis is that the tax on homes, as a tax on a
kind of real estate, was a direct tax.
There was much subsequent debate in Congress over the general
issue of whether direct (i.e., apportioned) taxes should be resorted
146
to, or whether indirect taxation should be expanded.
Meanwhile,
143

144
145

146

Wolcott recognized that apportioned taxes were inequitable from a national perspective,
and sought a route that would both minimize the inequity and create as few economic
distortions as possible, while still being capable of administration. The first option, requisition coupled with pseudo-requisition, was considered to be unreliable and capable of
creating state-federal conflicts. As to pseudo-requisitions, Wolcott had included a detailed survey of state tax systems in his Report, and what he saw was chaos, inequity within
states, and rampant economic distortions. Even taxes on lands were imposed according
to varying principles: by acre, by category, by quality, and by value. These objections
outweighed, in Wolcott’s view, the tailoring of the pseudo-requisition approach to “local
conditions.” See generally WOLCOTT, supra note 88.
See id. at 439.

See id. at 440 (homes); id. at 439 (profits of profession and business); id. at 439 (invested
capital, referred to as “stock employed in trade and manufactures, and on moneys loaned
on interest”). The passage referring to invested capital starts off with the phrase, “[i]t is
believed that direct taxes on these objects,” but this phrase does not necessarily mean that
such taxes are legally subject to apportionment, and later on it is said that such taxes may
end up being taxes on consumption by reason of being passed on. See id.
The debate in the House is recorded in 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1850–72, 1874–1913,
1915–42 (1797). On the direct tax side, it was claimed that an increase in indirect taxation would be fruitless, because it would drive people to smuggling or evasion. Also, indirect tax revenue would dry up in time of war. Moreover, land (agriculture) was not bear-
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the import of the Hylton decision was sinking in. The plan advanced
by the Wolcott Report eventually bore fruit in the apportioned real
147
148
property tax of 1798, reaching lands, slaves, and dwelling houses.
The Republicans under Jefferson took control in 1801 and repealed (or declined to renew) all of the Federalist-period internal
149
taxes, including the apportioned tax. However, when the Republicans finally had to impose internal taxes to finance the War of 1812,
150
the only tax that was apportioned was again a real estate tax. This
tax, unlike the tax of 1798, allowed a state to satisfy its quota out of its
own treasury in lieu of direct enforcement by the federal government
151
152
against the state’s citizens or property. As previously mentioned,
and undoubtedly with Hylton in mind, an 1815 tax on household
goods, furniture, and personal effects was not apportioned.
On the question of whether taxes on a person’s annual aggregate
income were considered to be direct taxes, the evidence, although
scanty, is that they were not. An income tax, to the extent that any153
body was even conscious of such a thing, was thought in the Framing period to be impractical because of accounting and collection
154
problems. Nevertheless, some U.S. states had taxes on professions,
merchants, and producers of goods, sometimes called “faculty” taxes,
but the Wolcott Report of 1796 opined that such taxes (which were
not directly implicated by the Hylton decision) were not subject to the

147

148
149
150
151
152

153

154

ing its fair share. On the other, there was worry that a land tax would be apportioned
unequally within a state (as would occur under a per-acre tax); the alternative of resorting
to appraisals would be expensive and crude. The debaters assumed that window taxes
and hearth taxes (taxes on homes) were indirect. Fairness (ability to pay) claims were
made on both sides.
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597; see also Patrick J. Furlong, The Origins of the House
Committee of Ways and Means, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 587, 593–94 (1968) (noting that an apportioned land tax proposed by Madison was defeated in the House in 1794).
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597. For a discussion of federal tax politics of the
time, see EINHORN, supra note 27, at 188–94.
Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 148.
Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, 3 Stat. 22, repealed by Act of Jan. 9, 1815, 3 Stat. 164, ch. 21, § 2;
Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, 3 Stat. 53.
Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, § 7, 3 Stat. 53, 71. This feature was anticipated by Madison in
Federalist No. 45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
See supra note 112. Here, the Treasury and Congress would have assumed that the 1796
Hylton case, discussed in the text immediately below, and which held that a tax on carriages was not a direct tax, controlled.
Justice Paterson mentioned taxes on income in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171,
180 (1796): “Indirect taxes are circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of individuals,
who generally live according to their income.”
See supra text accompanying note 83, which quotes SMITH, supra note 77, at 383.
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155

apportionment requirement. In 1815, Republican Treasury Secretary Alexander Dallas submitted a proposal for an income tax to
156
Significantly, the proposed
Congress that was never acted upon.
income tax was not to be apportioned.
To conclude, the apportionment requirement was narrowly construed by Congress and the Executive, with help from the Supreme
Court, from the very beginning. It cannot be seriously maintained
that this narrow-construction consensus was partisan, as it has continued through the present day. Except for another apportioned real
157
estate tax laid to help finance the Civil War, no other apportioned
tax has ever been enacted by Congress. The fact is that no party or
faction wanted to be responsible for a tax that came to be universally
158
viewed as inequitable, but that also proved to be cumbersome and
159
inefficient.
To conclude this section, the original-understanding approach reveals no consensus other than that real estate taxes were considered
to be the core, and possibly the exclusive, embodiment of “direct tax”
(excluding requisitions and capitation taxes).
F. Supreme Court Construction of “Direct Tax”
This Part discusses the doctrinal evolution of “direct tax” in the
Supreme Court.
1. “Direct Tax” Goes to Court in 1796: The Hylton Case
The first case addressing the scope of the apportionment re160
quirement, decided in 1796, was Hylton v. United States, which in161
volved a non-apportioned annual tax on carriages owned for personal or commercial use. The tax was a fixed dollar amount per
155
156

157
158

159
160
161

WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 439. The quote by Adam Smith in supra note 83 suggests that
excise taxes and income taxes are closely related.
See DEP’T OF TREASURY, STATE OF THE TREASURY, H.R. DOC. NO. 4-438, 3d Sess. (1796), in
2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 88, at 885–87; Tax History Museum, 1777–1815:
The Revolutionary War to the War of 1812, http://www.tax.org/Museum/1777-1815.htm
(last visited March 26, 2009) (“Dallas assumed that such an income tax constituted an indirect tax, and would not require apportionment.”).
Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292.
The Hylton case had the effect of publicizing the inequitable effect of apportioned taxes,
and the Republicans in the 1790s attempted to saddle the Federalists with an apportioned
land tax that would alienate northern farmers. See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 189–94.
See Adams, supra note 134, at 67–68 (noting delayed collections and low net yield).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 373, repealed by Act of May 28, 1796, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 478.
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carriage. The judgment was unanimous that the tax was not required
162
to be apportioned. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, having just taken
163
Justice William Cushing,
office that morning, did not participate.
being ill for the oral arguments, voted, but did not write an opinion.
Justice James Wilson, who had voted to uphold the tax in the pro164
ceeding below, wrote only to join the judgment of the Court. That
left Justices Samuel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell to
write separate opinions, as was then the custom. Three of the Justices
165
were prominent Framers, and four of them played significant roles
166
in the ratification effort.
One Justice, Chase, expressed some deference to the Congress on
167
the ground that it must have considered the constitutional issue.
Although the Court had not yet promulgated the doctrine of judicial

162
163
164
165

166

167

The taxpayer conceded that the uniformity requirement was satisfied. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 171, 172.
Id. at 172 n.*.
The proceeding below, of which no report exists, was divided. Id. at 172.
Paterson, of New Jersey, had presented the New Jersey Plan to the 1787 Convention.
Ellsworth, of Connecticut, who is often credited with the great compromise involving the
composition of the House and Senate, floated the idea of a pseudo-requisition during the
July 12 debate. Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06, reprinted in Appendix
A. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, stated in the July 12 debate that apportionment would not
work unless it was confined to direct taxes. Wilson was a member of the “Committee of
Five” (the Committee on Detail) that played a crucial role in drafting the Constitution.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Wilson presented the case for ratification at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention. See
Pennsylvania Debates, supra note 91, at 418–517, 518–29. Ellsworth (of Connecticut),
Cushing (of Massachusetts), and Iredell (of North Carolina) favored ratification in their
respective state conventions. See Fragment of the Debates in the Convention of the State
of Connecticut, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution [hereinafter Connecticut
Debates], in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 185–97 (Oliver Ellsworth, Jan. 4, 1788)
(speaking in support of ratification); Massachusetts Debates, supra note 118, at 180
(“Hon. William Cushing, Yea.”); The Debates in the Convention of the State of North
Carolina, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution [hereinafter North Carolina Debates], in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at v–vi (listing numerous statements of Iredell). Chase was a delegate from Maryland to the Continental Congress of 1775–77, but
does not appear to have played a major role in 1787–89. See Address to the People of
Maryland, 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 547–56.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 173 (opinion of Chase, J.). Chase was factually correct on this
point. See supra text accompanying note 76. Chase’s opinion here can be said to be an
early example of the judiciary looking to the actions of the post-ratification Congress as
being evidence of the contemporaneous understanding of constitutional text. See also
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (“This Court has repeatedly laid down the
principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating
in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given
its provisions.”).
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168

review, there appears to be little foundation for the claim that the
Court would then have balked at overturning an unconstitutional sta169
tute.
All three judges agreed on the following points: (1) apportionment and uniformity were incompatible principles, and only one of
170
them could govern any tax; (2) a tax could be a direct tax only if it
were reasonably capable of apportionment (thereby ruling out taxes
with subjects that might be uncommon or non-existent in one or
171
more states); (3) it was unlikely that apportionment was required
for anything other than real estate taxes, capitation taxes, and requi172
173
sitions; and (4) the pseudo-requisition idea made no sense.
Jus168

169

170

171

172

Chase’s opinion pointed out that, by holding the tax to be constitutional, it was not necessary to face the as-yet undecided issue of whether the federal courts had the power to
hold an act of Congress unconstitutional. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (opinion of
Chase, J.).
None of the other Justices commented on this aspect of the case, but Justice Iredell was
an advocate of judicial review. See William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of
Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329, 339–48 (1995) (explaining that Iredell, like many of
his contemporaries, accepted the Court’s power of judicial review and based it upon the
sovereignty of the people, although he believed that judicial review should only be used if
a statute was “unconstitutional beyond dispute”).
See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (explaining that duties, imposts,
and excises are governed by uniformity and that capitation and other direct taxes are governed by apportionment); id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (discussing whether certain types of taxes should be laid uniformly or apportionately); id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (noting that certain taxes must be apportioned and certain taxes must be
uniform).
See id. at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (explaining that it would be unreasonable to say that
Congress intended a tax to be laid by apportionment if it would “create great inequality
and injustice”); id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“As all direct taxes must be apportioned,
it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be apportioned.”). Chase gives an example in which “[t]he owners of carriages in one state would
pay ten times the tax of owners in the other.” Id. at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.). Paterson
was more circumspect on this point, stating that apportionment may “perhaps” be “proper” not only for capitation and land taxes but also for taxes on subjects which, “in the aggregate or mass, . . . generally pervade all the states in the Union.” Id. at 177 (opinion of
Paterson, J.). But Paterson thought this was an issue of difficulty, and declined to give an
opinion on whether any tax other than a land or capitation tax could be a direct tax. Id.
(“Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than
a capitation tax, and tax on land, is a questionable point.”).
This holding of the Court raised the possibility that a tax on slaves, which were scarce
in the northern states, might avoid the requirement of apportionment. However, in my
view, the Supreme Court would have treated the slave tax as a “capitation tax” subject to
apportionment.
All three judges expressed this view as explicit dictum. Chase, while stating “I do not give
a judicial opinion” on the issue of what is a direct tax, opined that even personal property
taxes were excluded. Id. at 175. Paterson stated:
[B]oth in theory and practice, a tax on land is deemed to be a direct tax. . . . It is
not necessary to determine, whether a tax on the product of land be a direct or
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tice Paterson went on to attack the apportionment requirement on
the merits:
I never entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling within
the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land. Local considerations, and the particular circumstances, and relative situation of the states, naturally lead to this view of the subject. The provision
was made in favor of the southern States. . . . Congress . . . might tax
slaves . . . and land in every part of the Union after the same rate or
measure: so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre in
the second. To guard them against imposition in these particulars, was
the reason of introducing the clause to the Constitution . . . .
. . . [The apportionment principle] is radically wrong; it cannot be
supported by any solid reasoning. . . .
. . . [N]umbers do not afford a just estimate or rule of wealth.
The counsel . . . have further urged, that an equal participation of
the expense or burden by the several states in the Union, was the primary
object . . . ; and that this object will be effected by the principle of apportionment, which is an operation upon states, and not on individuals . . . . This
brings
it
to
the
old
system
of
requisitions. . . . [I]ndividuals . . . are the objects of taxation, without reference
to states . . . . The fiscal power is exerted certainly, equally, and effectually
174
on individuals; it cannot be exerted on states.

If the carriage tax was not a direct tax, what was it? Iredell offered
no opinion, and Chase equivocated, calling it variously a “duty,” a tax
on “expense,” or an indirect tax that was not a duty, impost, or ex-

173

174

indirect tax. Perhaps, the immediate product of land, in its original and crude
state, ought to be considered as the land itself . . . . Whether direct taxes, in the
sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, and tax
on land, is a questionable point.
Id. at 176–77. Iredell stated:
There is no necessity, or propriety, in determining what is or is not, a direct,
or indirect, tax in all cases.
Some difficulties may occur which we do not at present foresee. Perhaps a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably annexed to the soil: Something capable of apportionment under all such circumstances.
A land or a poll tax may be considered of this description.
....
Either of these is capable of apportionment.
In regard to other articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt.
Id. at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
See id. at 174–75 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“a tax on carriages cannot be laid by the rule of
apportionment, without very great inequality”); id. at 179–80 (opinion of Paterson, J.)
(“The thing would be absurd . . . .”); id. at 182 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“This mode is too
manifestly absurd . . . .”).
Id. at 177–78 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
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175

cise. Paterson opined that “[a]ll taxes on expences or consumption
are indirect taxes,” and that “[a] tax on carriages is of this kind,” cit176
ing a passage from Adam Smith.
2. Doctrinal Development Through Pollock I
After Hylton, the direct-tax issue was not considered by the courts,
as the federal government relied mostly on imposts. The Civil War
spawned various taxes that were challenged in court as being direct
taxes. In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, a non-apportioned tax on insurance company gross premiums was upheld on the authority of Hylton, with the Court noting the irrational consequences of apportionment that would occur if insurance companies were not dispersed
177
Veazie Bank v. Fenno upheld a non-apportioned
among the states.
178
tax on notes of state banks issued for circulation as currency. Here,
the Court noted that attempts to locate the meaning of “direct tax” in
the writings of political economists were futile, and that the best
179
source was early practice plus Hylton.
The Court concluded that
taxes on personal property, financial instruments, and occupations
were not considered to be subject to the apportionment requirement,
whereas taxes on slaves were either capitation taxes or taxes on real
180
estate.
A non-apportioned tax on the inheritance of land was up181
held as a duty or excise in Scholey v. Rew. Finally, an individual income tax enacted in 1861 and lasting until 1872 was upheld in
175

176

177
178
179
180
181

See id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) (considering both the fact that the annual tax on carriages is “within the power granted to Congress to lay duties,” and also the fact that the tax
on carriages is a tax on expense and thus indirect).
See id. at 180–81 (opinion of Paterson, J.). Justice Paterson quotes Smith as follows:
Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two
different ways; the consumer may either pay an annual sum on account of his using or consuming goods of a certain kind, or the goods may be taxed while they
remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer.
The consumable goods, which last a considerable time before they are consumed
altogether, are most properly taxed in the one way; those of which the consumption is immediate, or more speedy, in the other: the coach tax and plate tax are
examples of the former method of imposing; the greater part of the other duties
of excise and customs of the latter.
Id. at 180–81 (citing SMITH, supra note 77, at 386).
Taxes on consumption were considered by Smith to be “indirect” taxes on income.
For further comments on Smith’s literalist notion of direct tax, see supra notes 99–101,
and accompanying text.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868).
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
Id. at 541–46.
Id. at 548–49.
90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874).
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182

Springer v. United States, where the Supreme Court opined that “di183
rect tax” referred only to capitation taxes and taxes on real estate.
An income tax was enacted in 1894, and this time the Supreme
Court, in the first Pollock decision (Pollock I), held (in a 7-2 decision)
that the portion of the 1894 income tax that treated rents as income
was a direct tax and that such portion was invalid for want of appor184
tionment. After culling numerous quotes from the early history slyly intimating that an income tax may be a direct tax as such, the majority opinion abruptly aborts that tack and goes off on a different
one: from the non-controversial premise that a tax on real estate was
a direct tax, the majority concocted the novel rationale that a tax on
rents from real estate was “in substance” a tax on the real estate itself
185
and, therefore, also a direct tax. It appears that the government actually conceded that a tax on rents could be a tax on the underlying
real estate. It might have been better to argue, on the basis of Scholey
v. Rew, that if the receipt of real estate itself by inheritance was an indirect tax, surely, a tax on rents would also be non-direct. Springer was
distinguished by Pollock I on the ground that the taxpayer there had
186
no income from property.
Apart from the tax on rents, the 1894
187
tax passed muster.
Even apart from the Sixteenth Amendment (providing that a tax
on incomes is not subject to apportionment), Pollock I is no longer of
any significance on the income tax issue, as its rationale has been

182
183

184
185

186
187

102 U.S. 586 (1880).
The Court here gave great weight to early practice and interpretation. It mentioned a
casual statement by Hamilton in a paper he prepared for the Hylton litigation that a tax
on a person’s entire estate—real and/or personal—might be subject to apportionment,
but the Court said that an income tax was distinguishable. Id. at 597–98.
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
The Court stated:
An annual tax upon the annual value or annual user of real estate appears to us
the same in substance as an annual tax on the real estate, which would be paid out
of the rent or income. This law taxes the income received from land and the
growth or produce of the land.
Id. at 581. The Court then characterized this rationale as one of elevating substance over
form. Id.
See id. at 578–79 (explaining that the income was derived from the taxpayer’s job as an
attorney and from interest on U.S. government bonds).
Id. at 586. If taxes on wages (as well as incomes from professions and gross receipts of
business) are conceded to be “excises,” then a tax on investment receipts would also appear to be an excise. But if a tax on rents is also a direct tax, then there would be overlap
between the two categories. However, the Constitution provides no tie-breaker. In Hylton, if there was indeed a tie in that case, it was broken by a realization that the apportionment principle suffered from numerous defects. The different outcome in Pollock I
results from an unexplained move to treating apportionment as the dominant value.
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clearly repudiated by subsequent cases. In Stanton v. Baltic Mining
188
Co., the reasoning of Pollock was flatly rejected in general terms. In
New York ex rel. Cohen v. Graves, the Supreme Court held that New
York could tax a New York resident on rents from New Jersey property, although New York could not impose a property tax on New Jer189
sey real estate.
In other words, a tax on rents is not a tax on the
underlying property. Reinforcing that conclusion is South Carolina v.
Baker, where the Court overruled that portion of Pollock I that held
that a tax on state bond interest was a tax on the state itself, in viola190
tion of the Tenth Amendment. Pollock I has also been rendered obsolete on the income tax issue by numerous post-Pollock cases that
have established that a tax on gross receipts is an indirect (i.e., ex191
cise) tax, not subject to apportionment. Since (apart from timing
issues) an income tax is a tax on receipts, repeal of the Sixteenth
Amendment (which removed the apportionment requirement from
192
income taxes) would not invalidate an income tax.
The post-Pollock excise tax cases effectively hold that characterization of a tax as an excise removes it from the “direct tax” category.
The implicit attitude underlying these holdings is that apportion193
ment is a weak constitutional value.

188

189
190
191

192
193

240 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1916). The court stated:
[T]he provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income
taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the
category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed in
the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the
sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it
was—a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or
source of the income taxed.
Id.
300 U.S. 308, 314 (1937).
485 U.S. 505 (1988).
There are several major post-Pollock cases. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107
(1911) (holding that a corporation income tax was not a direct tax but an excise);
Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904) (upholding a gross receipts
tax); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 616–22 (1902) (containing perhaps the most elaborate discussion of “excise”); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding the validity of the non-apportioned federal inheritance tax of 1898 as an indirect tax on the transmission of property); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899) (upholding stamp taxes on
activities of a commodities exchange).
See, e.g., Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Comm’r,
277 F.2d 16, 19–20 (3d Cir. 1960).
In Bromley v. McCaughn, the Court upheld the federal gift tax, noting:
While taxes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general ownership of property may be taken to be direct . . . this Court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a particu-
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3. Pollock II Expands “Direct Tax” to a Tax on Personal Property
What’s left of Pollock I on the direct tax issue is nothing more than
an affirmation of the accepted rule that a tax on real estate is a direct
tax subject to apportionment. On rehearing, a bare 5-4 majority of
the Supreme Court held in Pollock II that a tax on personal property
194
was a direct tax. That holding laid the basis for the further holding
that income from personal property was a direct tax that had to be
195
apportioned.
The second holding concerning tax on investment
income has been overturned both by the Sixteenth Amendment and
by the post-Pollock excise cases referenced previously. Nevertheless,
the first holding, to the effect that a tax on personal property is a di196
rect tax, broke new ground, and has not been expressly overruled.
But, since the federal government has not laid a tax on personal
property, it has not been tested either.
In Part V it is argued that Pollock II should be reversed on the personal property tax issue, at least insofar as intangibles are concerned.
***
To summarize this Part, the apportionment requirement cannot
be broadly construed for numerous reasons: (1) apportionment is
incompatible with uniformity, and “direct tax” must therefore be exclusive of the specific exceptions for imposts, duties, and excises; (2)
“direct tax” had no clear meaning apart from taxes on real estate and
capitation taxes; (3) apportionment cannot work for taxes on transactions; (4) apportionment, in a federal system, only makes practical
sense for requisitions; (5) apportionment is inequitable at the individual level; and (6) doctrine and early practice, recognizing the
problems of apportionment, gave it a narrow scope.

194
195

196

lar use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to
ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned . . . .
280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (citation omitted).
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
Id. Faced with a tax that was unconstitutional insofar as it encompassed virtually all investment income, the Court held that the entire 1894 income tax was fatally infected, given that the whole point of the income tax was to reach income from property. See generally Jensen, Incomes, supra note 5, at 1091–107 (providing a detailed history of the 1894
income tax and presenting the arguments that were put forward in favor of and against
the tax).
See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding that a tax on a pro rata stock
dividend was an unapportioned direct tax on intangible property that was not an income
tax).
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III. RATIONALES AND PURPOSES OF APPORTIONMENT
A provision in the Constitution might be approached by discerning its rationales and purposes. In this case, the issue would be what
the Framers were attempting to accomplish through the apportion197
ment requirement for direct taxes. Apportionment was part of the
larger compromise over the relationships among the federal government, the states, and the people. As such, apportionment can be
viewed from the angles of politics, ideology, and instrumental purposes. Economic and tax policies were not factors, however.
A. The Politics of Apportionment
The salient background feature of the constitutional project relating to the federal taxing power was the failure of the Confederation
system, due largely to the exclusive reliance on voluntary requisitions.
Although the initial impetus at the Convention was the pronationalist Virginia plan, the deck was somewhat stacked against any
total triumph by the nationalist faction. First, there was no significant
constituency for obliterating the states entirely or for the federal government to assert a taxing power that would preempt that of the
states. In addition, the state-government orientation at the beginning
was overwhelming: (1) the delegations to the 1787 Convention were
198
selected by the state governments, (2) the delegations in the Con199
vention each had one vote, (3) the “charge” to the Convention was
to improve the Confederation system, and (4) the Convention prod200
This system
uct would have to be agreed to by the several states.
gave blocs of states (first small states and later slave-importing states)
virtual veto power: the threat to pick up their marbles and go

197

198

199

200

A classic example of the functional approach is Justice Holmes’s dissent in Eisner v. Macomber, where he states that the purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was “to get rid of
nice questions” relating to apportionment. Id. at 219–20 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The delegates were mostly picked by the legislatures of the various states. See Credentials
of Members of the Federal Convention, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 126–39
(setting forth the delegates’ credentials). Rhode Island did not appoint a delegation.
If a delegation from a state was evenly split, the state’s vote was recorded as “divided.” See,
e.g., Report of Proceedings, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 119–20. The proposed constitution contains a “signature clause,” which recites that it was “Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the states present,” followed by the individual signatures grouped by states. Madison’s Notes (Sept. 17), supra note 17, at 558–65.
See Report of Proceedings, supra note 199, at 119–20 (calling for a “convention of delegates”
appointed by the states to assemble in Philadelphia, revise the Articles of Confederation,
and then confirm the changes); Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127 (calling
for the Articles of Confederation to be “corrected and enlarged”).
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201

home. In contrast, the nationalist state delegations were willing to
compromise because they badly wanted a united national government. The final product retained a strong “compact-of-states” flavor
that was weakened (if not interred) by the Civil War and its endless
202
aftermath.
Those who sought a balance between the federal government and
the states (the “moderates”) were put somewhat in a bind when it
came to taxes. In principle, the pure state-power (and AntiFederalist) position is to favor the Confederation principle of volun203
tary requisitions, but that was a proven path to impotence. A mandatory requisition system would continue to give the states the ulti201

See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–03, reprinted in Appendix A (recording Mr. Davie’s statement that North Carolina “would never confederate” on the basis of any rule that did not count slaves as three-fifths for representation purposes); id. at
213 (noting Luther Martin of Maryland’s statement that “he could never accede” to a
plan not based on equal representation of states). Martin eventually left the Convention,
as did Yates and Lansing of New York (which was aligned with the small states and whose
governor, George Clinton, was Anti-Federalist). See Letter from Luther Martin to State of
Maryland Legislature (Jan. 27, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 344–45,
358. Davie also left the Convention, but probably for personal or business reasons, as he
supported ratification. See North Carolina Debates (July 31, 1788), supra note 166, at 236.

202

States, in their role as states, were given a prominent constitutive role in the federal government: (1) members of the House were to be elected by citizens of states, (2) members
of the Senate were to be elected by state legislatures, (3) the President was to be elected
by electors appointed by state legislatures or—if no majority vote materialized—by the
state delegations in the House, each delegation having one vote, (4) the Constitution was
to be ratified by the people of the states by convention, and (5) amendments would require approval by three-fourths of the state legislatures or by convention. There was even
strong sentiment for placing the election of House members under the control of the
state legislatures, but a motion to that effect narrowly failed. Madison’s Notes (June 21),
supra note 17, at 223–24. The phrase “We the people of the United States” in the Preamble is ambiguous because it could refer to all the people of the nation or to the collective
peoples of the various states. Even the official name of the nation, “United States of
America,” is ambiguous in a way that is similar to the uniting of two individuals in a marriage that can be severed by divorce. It is not necessary here to take sides on the debate
whether an initial nationalist impetus at the 1789 Convention was sabotaged by state and
regional interests or whether the nationalist Virginia Plan was offered as an opening bid
with the expectation that it would be compromised by states-rights interests. See LANCE
BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1995) (suggesting, with support from Federalist Nos. 45, 46, and 47,
that Madison had states-rights inclinations all along); Rick K. Wilson, Madison at the First
Congress: Institutional Design and Lessons from the Continental Congress, 1780–1783, in JAMES
MADISON, supra note 107, at 243, 261 (suggesting that Madison was a “less than enthusiastic” nationalist). A third view is that Madison was a “selective” (economic) nationalist. See
David Brian Robertson, Constituting a National Interest: Madison Against the States’ Autonomy, in JAMES MADISON, supra note 107, at 184.

203

See Virginia Debates (Mr. Henry, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 148–49, 166–68 (arguing
that voluntary requisitions prevent the “arbitrary deprivation of . . . property” and “danger of the abuse of implied power”).
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mate power over tax system design and on-the-ground enforcement.
Yet it was recognized that a mandatory requisition system would undermine the states in the long run because of the potential for out204
right (armed) conflict between the federal government and the
state governments, in which the states would probably lose. Since
control by the states through either voluntary or mandatory requisitions was not acceptable, a system had to be devised that would give
the federal government control without wholly eliminating the states
from the picture. Both the uniformity and apportionment principles
give due recognition to the states, the first by prohibiting explicit discrimination against states as tax-base locations, and the second by view205
ing the collective citizens of states as “corporate” taxpayers.
Despite these concessions to state interests, the nationalist faction
prevailed to the extent that the federal government was empowered
to lay any kind of tax whatsoever on persons and things without having to rely on state governments—although requisitions continued to
be a possible option.
What the political-compromise story does not resolve is the precise scope of the apportionment requirement. Nevertheless, the express exceptions for duties, imposts, and excises was clearly understood to mean that the taxes most likely to be used by the federal
government (on account of their inherent ease and convenience of
collection) could be imposed without apportionment so long as they
206
were uniform.
Therefore, the compromise regarding the role of
the states in the federal taxing power is one in which the nationalists
got most of what they wanted, while allowing the states-rights advo-

204

See, e.g., Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302, reprinted in Appendix A (recalling Mr. Mason’s argument that the addition of a provision making taxation proportional
to representation “might drive the legislature to the plan of requisitions”); Virginia Debates (Governor Randolph, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 121–22 (stating that requisitions could lead to “the dissolution of the Union”).

205

See Madison’s Notes (June 19), supra note 17, at 206 (arguing that a federal—as opposed
to national—plan was one in which the federal power was exercised “on the people collectively, on the states”). In Federalist No. 46, Madison posits that state sovereignty resides in
the people of the states, not state governments. Thus, the people of the states simultaneously operate with two agents. Apportionment had sometimes been used within states according to the same principle. See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 53–78 (describing Massachusetts taxes apportioned among towns, which had elected governments;
apportionment was politically negotiated and not according to any fixed formula).

206

For an exposition of the ease and revenue-yielding potential of indirect taxes, see Connecticut Debates (Oliver Ellsworth, Jan. 7, 1788), supra note 166, at 190, 192–94.
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cates to save face. Nevertheless, saving face can be important politi207
cally.
B. The (Defective) Ideology of Apportionment
The link between representation and taxation was a core theme of
208
British political history long before the Enlightenment period, and
that link was enhanced further under Enlightenment political theory,
which is based on the notion of contract or constructive consent.
Taxation is legitimized by representation. Indeed, it can be said that
taxation creates the need for representation, through which consent
is obtained. Otherwise, taxation would be robbery under the threat
of force. British taxation in the colonies without colonial representa209
tion in Parliament was a fuel that stoked the Revolution. This link
between taxation and representation was so ingrained that its expres210
sion in the Constitution was inevitable.
Under the Confederation system, the constituents of the federal
government, as well as its taxpayers, were clearly the state governments as such. The Constitution of 1787 had to deal with conflicting
views of the future status for the “sovereign” states. This issue was
“solved” by giving the states a range of roles to be exercised simultaneously. Thus, on the operations (spending) side, the federal government would act independently rather than through the states, but
on the constitutive side (such as the Senate, the electoral college, and
requisitions) the state governments would be the primary agents. To
bridge the gap between the people of the nation and the governments of states, the Convention offered up the romantic notion that
agency (often) resided in the peoples of the states, as collective bod211
ies.
The apportionment idea exactly reflects this “collectivity” notion of sovereignty: in the case of (non-requisition) apportioned tax-

207

208

209
210

211

The apportionment requirement saves face for those appearing to balance state and federal interests, but really accomplishes little for the states other than discouraging the federal government from laying real estate taxes.
Historically, from the thirteenth century, the King’s Council and its successor, the British
Parliament, originated as a body to obtain the consent of the community of the realm to
be taxed. See John Gillingham, The Early Middle Ages (1066–1290), in THE OXFORD
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BRITAIN 104, 148–49 (Kenneth O. Morgan ed., 1984).
See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 18–19.
See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 7, 13), supra note 17, at 386, 416 (quoting Mr. Ellsworth insisting that “[t]axation and representation ought to go together,” and Mr. Gerry stating that
“[t]axation and representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people”).
See U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. V, art. VII (identifying the constituents, the amenders, and the
ratifiers).
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es and the House of Representatives the collective people of the state
212
interact directly with the federal government.
Combining the link between taxation and representation with the
notion that the constituents/taxpayers of the federal government are
the collective peoples of the various states yields the principle of apportionment among states according to a common formula, because
burdens should be proportional to benefits (power). That taxation
and representation should be apportioned under the same formula
was so self-evident that it was accepted with whole-hearted approval
and without debate upon Gouverneur Morris’s initial motion on July
213
12.
The only debate was over the details of the formula, not the
principle of apportionment and not with the idea that the same formula should govern both.
In addition, apportionment was probably thought by many to be
fair compared to selective excises subject to the rule of uniformity. In
a world without general (i.e., broad-based) excise (sales) taxes, and
conceding that there was no objection to sumptuary taxes (like the
tax on carriages), uniform excise taxes on region-specific items would
result in geographical discrimination. Thus, if cardamom is consumed disproportionately by Georgians, a uniform tax thereon would
be seen as punishing Georgians as a collectivity. Apportionment of a
cardamom tax would moderate the discriminatory effect from a state
perspective. This analysis is, of course, wholly superficial if the tax is

212

See Madison’s Notes (June 6), supra note 17, at 161 (discussing the benefits of directly
electing the House of Representatives); Virginia Debates (Mr. Madison, June 15, 1787),
supra note 10, at 458–59, reprinted in Appendix C (referring to equity of burdens imposed
on state communities by reason of apportionment); text accompanying note 204. The
Constitution does not require districts; thus, all representatives of a state could be, and
sometimes were, elected at large. JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 224 (1996). Districts could not spill over state
lines. It was expected that House Members from a given state would share a commonality
of interest based on state culture and interests and vote as a bloc for state interests. See
Madison’s Notes (June 19, 25), supra note 17, at 211, 238–39 (suggesting that the states
were culturally dissimilar).

213

Morris’s motion was to amend the modified Virginia Plan (providing that representation
was to be based on the principles of wealth and numbers) by adding a proviso that “taxation shall be in proportion to representation.” Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17,
at 302, reprinted in Appendix A. Various personalities across the political spectrum
agreed: George Mason (states-rights advocate), General Pinckney (champion of the slaveholding deep-South aristocracy), and James Wilson (ardent nationalist). See id. at 302–
03. The original Morris motion was amended so that only direct taxes were to be in proportion to representation, with further amendments relating to counting slaves as threefifths and the census, and as so amended the motion passed 6-2 (with two states divided).
Id. at 305–06. It was only on July 13 that “wealth” was deleted from the formula. Madison’s Notes (July 13), supra note 17, at 309.
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on individual consumers, because the few Rhode Islanders who purchase cardamom would be taxed at very high rates. But appeals to
the notion of discrimination against states could still play well in the
214
Framing/ratification period.
The cardamom tax example exposes the weakness of requiring an
apportionment of taxes to be paid by individual taxpayers. The “general” linkage between taxation and representation only makes sense
in the case of requisitions, where the state governments, as agents of
the corporate body, can spread out the tax within that body on a fair
(or unfair) basis. In the case of non-requisition apportioned taxes,
the corporate sovereign loses control of such allocation, and the tax
rates on affected individuals can be much higher or lower than similarly-situated individuals in other states. The strong post-convention
push to allow non-requisition direct taxes to be imposed only if a
215
state failed to meet its requisition quota can be seen (if taken at
face value) as a last ditch effort to allow (if not to require) states to
216
assert corporate control. The pseudo-requisition notion is an even
more watered-down mechanism for ceding corporate control to the
states, at least to the extent that the apportioned tax would incorporate state tax rules. But neither option came to pass, in large part
(and ironically) precisely because the agency of the states was seen as
undermining equity at the individual taxpayer level in relation to per217
sonal ability to pay, the dominant tax fairness norm of the late eigh218
teenth century. The emerging perception that tax fairness is prop-

214
215
216

217

218

See infra text accompanying note 223.
See infra text accompanying note 215.
In the ratifying conventions, especially Virginia’s, the power of direct taxation was
stressed in the arguments of the Anti-Federalists. That this was a cover for general antipathy to the Constitution is suggested by the fact that this power sailed through the Convention with virtually no opposition. Anything resembling a requisition system had virtually
no support in the Convention. See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453 (recounting how a requisition proposal was defeated by a vote of 1-8-1). After ratification, it
was proposed as part of the proposed Bill of Rights that direct taxes be permitted only if
states were allowed to satisfy the state quota, but the proposal was soundly defeated in the
House by a vote of 9-39. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 773–78 (1787).
The Wolcott Report of 1796, rejected requisitions and pseudo-requisitions because the tax
systems of states were internally inequitable and inequitable in relation to each other. See
WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 436–41. Capitation (poll) taxes were rather widespread in
the colonies and states. See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 55, 80–81, 98, 107.
Smith and Montesquieu favored the ability-to-pay principle of apportioning the tax burden within a polity. See SMITH, supra note 77, at 361; CHARLES DE SECONDAT
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 216–17 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
1989) (1748); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at
219, reprinted in Appendix B (noting that he would “lament to see [poll taxes] introduced
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erly determined on an individual, rather than collective, basis un219
dermined the ideological basis of tax apportionment among states.
It was inevitable that representation (of states) and taxation (of individuals) would be divorced, and the brief marriage would fail to produce any viable progeny. The notion that citizens of states constitute
a collective body turns out to be a myth when it comes to taxation.
The method of apportionment, according to population, is a reasonable standard for apportioning representation among corporate
bodies, but it is not a plausible standard for apportioning taxes among
corporate bodies (other than, perhaps, economic units, such as families). Nobody would seriously entertain the notion that the tax burden on business corporations be apportioned according to the number of shareholders or number of outstanding shares.
Yet
apportionment by population is the same mechanism applied to
states. In the Confederation period, the relative ability to pay of
states was conceived of in wealth terms, but apportionment according
to wealth proved to be impractical, and apportionment of taxes by
population came about only because of a confluence of these four factors: (1) the decision that representation and taxes were to be apportioned under the same formula, (2) the priority of the representation
issue—where population was the natural index—over that of direct
taxes (which would rarely be used), (3) the relative ease of taking a
census (as opposed to appraisals), and (4) claims that the population
220
of states was a plausible index of the wealth of states. To the extent
221
that this last claim was inaccurate, inequity among the states and
their peoples would inevitably follow.

into practice under the national government”). See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 113, at
4 (claiming an evolutionary trend in history towards the notion of ability to pay).
219

See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178–80 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.)
(arguing that apportioned taxes were unfair because they lead to different tax rates between similarly situated individuals). The Wolcott Report rejected the pseudo-requisition
in large part on account of the unfairness of state systems. WOLCOTT, supra note 88.

220

See Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 299–300 (explaining why population was a
good enough proxy for wealth in a nation where labor and capital could move freely); id.
at 309 (July 13) (quoting a statement by Wilson that representation by population, or the
“rule of numbers,” “does not differ much from the combined rule of numbers and
wealth”).

221

There were doubters. See Madison’s Notes, supra note 17, at 201 (noting that Hamilton
argued that any apportionment formula will produce inequities); id. at 297 (July 11) (recalling Gouverneur Morris’s argument that “the number of inhabitants was not a proper
standard of wealth”).
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C. Instrumental Aims of Apportionment
This Section considers some claimed instrumental aims (effects)
that might have been served by a requirement that direct taxes be
apportioned among the states according to population. In many cases, the historical evidence that these effects were actually intended by
222
the Framers is spotty. It is probably fair to say that apportionment
was primarily based on (motivated by) political compromise and an
ideological principle (the linking of taxation with representation)
that emerged in the early-to-mid eighteenth century, and that the
ramifications of apportionment clearly emerged only after July 12,
1787. Moreover, apportionment of taxes could, at best, serve relatively minor purposes, as it was confined to taxes that were not expected to be used by the federal government except in case of emergency.
Nevertheless, the various possible effects are worth
examining.
1. A Prophylactic Against Regional Oppression
The theory has been advanced that the apportionment and uniformity rules were designed to prevent some states from using a ma223
jority in Congress to oppress other states. This theory has been given a strong regional flavor: the opinion of Justice Paterson (a major
player at the 1787 Convention) in the Hylton case states that the ap224
portionment requirement was meant to placate the South.
How-

222

223

224

Of course, the claim that the effects of apportionment must have been intended can be
true only if the Framers had a crystal ball. It would be more accurate to say that some of
the effects might have been intended. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock
I), 157 U.S. 429, 582–83 (1895) (stating that the inequalities of a system of taxation based
on apportionment “must . . . have been contemplated”).
See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 89 (1900) (stating that the purpose of the apportionment requirement was to prevent the states from being called upon to bear more
than their fair share of the tax burden).
See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 171, 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (noting that the apportionment requirement “was made in favor of the southern States,” because, for example,
if Congress passed a tax on slaves, who were found in large numbers in the South but not
in the North, the southern States “would have been wholly at the mercy of the other
states”). In 1787, the North—even excluding Delaware and Maryland—would have narrowly controlled both the House and the Senate, as it included seven of the original thirteen states, and a clear majority of the population. See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra
note 17, at 456 (recording George Mason’s observation that the North, with interests different from those of the South, would have had control in both branches of the legislature). Going forward, the balance would be affected by the admission of new states,
which itself was to be up to Congress. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. The first three states ad-
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ever, it could be claimed with equal plausibility that apportionment
would protect small states from large states. Indeed, it would conceivably protect any minority state grouping from any majority state
grouping. However, apportionment can only prevent discrimination
against states as collective bodies, as opposed to discrimination
against economic classes, economic interest groups, industries, and
so on. Also, apportionment can operate only on direct taxes, which
were not expected to be used except in a national emergency. At the
same time, non-apportioned uniform excises (such as a tax on cotton
225
or tobacco production) could adversely impact a particular region.
Thus, the “regional oppression” rationale is too general to fit the nar226
row reach of the apportionment requirement, and is elsewhere
served by such “process” features as a bicameral legislature, the composition of the Senate, and other aspects of the checks-and-balances
system.
The question should be framed as, “What specific (Southern) interests would be served by an apportionment requirement confined

mitted were Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1792), and Tennessee (1796), which created an
even North-South balance that lasted until about 1820.
225

That the uniformity requirement is a feeble protection against geographical discrimination was recognized by William Grayson at the Virginia Ratifying Convention. Virginia
Debates (Mr. Grayson, June 12, 1788), supra note 10, at 285. Madison noted that the impost would burden the South more than the North because the South did little manufacturing. Id. (Mr. Madison, June 11, 1788) at 252. Insofar as excises were taxes on manufacture, they were sometimes perceived as disproportionately burdening the North. See
id. (Mr. George Nicholas, June 10, 1788) at 243 (stating that an excise tax on manufactures would not heavily burden Virginia because of the few manufactures in that state).

226

Geographical equity is too amorphous to be a workable legal standard in the abstract.
Thus, a federal tax that by its terms is imposed on only the production of smoke-cured
hams would not violate the uniformity requirement, even if this activity occurs only in
Virginia. Yet it is not clear that such a tax would result in discrimination against Virginia
as a state. If smoke-cured hams are consumed over a wide geographical area, the burden
of the tax may be diffused. Even if it does operate to discriminate against Virginia, it
would be improper to invalidate a tax on a narrowly-defined subject without considering
the entire array of existing federal taxes. See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 64
(1904) (holding that Congress had the power to impose a tax on oleomargarine even
though it was an “oppressive” tax); State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 612 (1875)
(stating that equality of taxation is unattainable, given the number and variety of possible
subjects); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869) (stating that oppressive
taxation of a particular thing is not unconstitutional if there is a plausible basis for the
tax, which in this case was regulation of the currency). On the other hand, even the
broadest-based taxes might discriminate on a geographical basis. Thus, income per capita could be three times as high in Connecticut as in Mississippi. In that case, geographical discrimination would be justified on the basis of the independent norm of ability to
pay.
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to direct taxes?” Two such interests were identified early on. One
228
was to prevent an oppressive federal tax on slaves, which would be
viewed either as a tax on real property (and therefore as a direct tax)
or as a capitation tax. The Capitation Tax Clause, which emerged
later in the Convention, was clearly part of a package aimed to pre229
vent oppressive taxation of slaves.
Apportionment of direct taxes
and capitation taxes would have required quotas for all states in proportion to population. Under a pseudo-requisition scenario, the
Northern states would have had to fulfill their quotas from a tax on
one or more subjects common in these states, thereby neutralizing
the impact of a slave tax. Under a slave-only-tax scenario, the full quota would have had to be borne by the handful of slave owners in
Northern states, who would have strenuously opposed the tax.
(However, it is equally plausible that the North would have been willing to enact such a tax either in spite of minor local opposition or in
the knowledge that its quotas would go unsatisfied precisely because
230
of the scarcity of the taxed item.) Despite the fact that apportionment was not an airtight guarantee against a slave tax, it seemed to
have worked well enough: slaves were taxed only as part of a general
apportioned federal real estate tax. Without the apportionment requirement, a selective tax on slaves would have been quite feasible.
The other alleged Southern concern was to prevent a fixed-sum231
In the case of a state with a large area
per-acre federal land tax.
combined with a small population, a non-apportioned per-acre tax
would fall heavily on the few. With apportionment, the state quota
for such a state would be so low that it could easily be satisfied by the
few. But again apportionment was not an airtight prophylactic
against a per-acre tax, because an apportioned federal land tax could
be laid on a per-acre basis within the states. Ironically, per-acre land

227
228

229
230

231

These concerns were identified by Justice Paterson in Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 at 177
(opinion of Paterson, J.).
See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21, 22), supra note 17, at 457–61 (recording a proposed “prohibition or tax on the import of slaves” and the ensuing discussion of the attendees). The
deep South did not attempt to immunize slaves from taxation entirely, but only a tax that
would have caused the institution of slavery to wither.
See infra text accompanying notes 287–99.
If only a handful of slave-owners lived in New York, they might have no political clout,
especially if slavery were locally unpopular. If there were no slaves in New York, New York
would not be able to satisfy its quota.
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, George Mason cited a letter from Robert Morris to
Congress suggesting that a per-acre land tax, a notion that Mason abhorred, was allowed
under the proposed constitution. Virginia Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788),
supra note 10, at 264–65.
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taxes were the norm in the Southern states and were a device to shift
tax burdens from highly-cultivated lands near the coast to lands on
232
the frontier.
In any event, note that both of these two “Southern” concerns
were limited to taxes on real property—defined to include slaves.
Apportionment would have hurt the South if “direct tax” were broadly
construed to extend beyond real estate. Apportionment according to
population requires that poorer per-capita (i.e., Southern) states be discrimi233
nated against. This effect would have been compounded by the fact
that slaves counted as three-fifths, resulting in an increase in the quotas of the slave states without any accompanying increase in any likely
tax base (except a property tax in which slaves were counted). In
sum, the regional-oppression rationale for apportionment actually favors a narrow concept of “direct tax” that is limited to taxes on real estate, plus capitation taxes and requisitions.
2. Preserving the Taxing Jurisdiction of the States
It is also claimed that the apportionment requirement operated to
preserve the taxing jurisdiction of states against encroachment by the
234
federal government. However, no such theory was advanced in the
Convention itself. The only motion made to limit the federal taxing
power during the Convention was made by Luther Martin to the effect that the only allowable federal direct taxes would be requisitions,
on the grounds that other direct taxes would be unpopular and that

232

233
234

See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 40–41, 81, 93 (discussing the Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina tax systems). George Mason was correct in thinking (or assuming) that
the apportionment requirement would not bar such a tax. See supra text accompanying
note 231.
See Table 1 supra p. 5.
The majority opinions in both Pollock decisions claimed that the apportionment requirement was the result of a compromise in which the states surrendered their respective
power to lay duties on imports or exports in return for allowing the federal government
to “conditionally” lay direct taxes. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I),
157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895) (noting that approval of the rule of apportionment helped create the dual form of the United States government and helped ensure the ratification of
the Constitution by the states); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158
U.S. 601, 620–21 (1895) (holding that the states granted apportionment as the way for
the federal government to use direct taxation). However, there is no evidence that any
interest bargained for the apportionment requirement at the Convention. Moreover, the
formation of a national government necessarily implied that the states would no longer
possess external powers. Under the Constitution, the states lost not only the power to lay
external taxes, but also the power to make treaties, maintain troops in peacetime, wage
war, or grant letters of marqué and reprisal. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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“states would be the best judges of the mode.” This motion elicited
235
no debate and was defeated overwhelmingly.
In the ratification period the Anti-Federalists attacked the federal
power to lay non-requisition direct taxes on the grounds that it
usurped state power. The Federalists responded by insisting that no
revenue source (apart from export taxes) should be denied the federal government in case of emergency. Hamilton, in Federalists 30 to
236
36, pointed out that state and federal taxing powers are concurrent,
and argued that tax-subject duplication would be self-defeating, either by rendering the underlying activity unprofitable or else by trig237
gering evasion and cheating.
A move to condition ratification on
an amendment that would have allowed apportioned taxes to be laid
on individuals only if a state failed to meet its requisition quota failed,
and the same proposal failed in the First Congress as a proposed con238
stitutional amendment. Thus, the Federalist position on the scope
of the taxing power triumphed totally. Since the Constitution expressly gave the federal government the full taxing power, there is no
room for any claim of implied limitations based on reserved state
239
powers.

235
236

237

238
239

Only 1 and 1/2 delegations voted for it. Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453.
The Federalist No. 30 argues that the federal government should possess a taxing power
that extends beyond imposts and requisitions, pointing to the failure of requisitions in
the Confederation period. The Federalist No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) argues that a
federal taxing power would not usurp that of the states, which have concurrent taxing jurisdiction. The Federalist Nos. 32 and 33 demonstrate that the Constitution does not
take away the state taxing power except for external taxes. The Federalist No. 34 argues
that the power of federal taxation should not be limited, because the future exigencies of
the federal government cannot be limited. The Federalist Nos. 35, 36 argue against limiting the federal taxing power to imposts, which would fall unequally among the states, and
also argue that the plenary taxing power will not be abused, because Congress will represent the interests of landholders and commerce. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 30–36 (Alexander
Hamilton).
George Mason argued that the federal government had no particular interest in accommodating the states. See supra text accompanying note 230. The formal aspect of Hamilton’s argument is not wholly convincing: since federal indirect taxes must be uniform, a
federal excise on, say, salt cannot have an exemption for Delaware-produced salt just because Delaware happens to also tax salt production.
See Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 311–15; supra note 215 (describing the fate of
the constitutional amendment).
The Tenth Amendment states that powers not expressly granted to the federal government are reserved to the states. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424
(1819) (noting the concurrent power of taxation, but holding invalid a state tax that interfered with a non-tax federal power). Contrary to the position taken in Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2345–50, I would not consider possible limitations on the
spending and regulatory power to be restrictions on the taxing power as such, since taxation is a means rather than an end.
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The apportionment requirement was produced by a Convention
in which the Anti-Federalists had little say. In the ratification debates,
the Anti-Federalists claimed no credit for extracting the apportionment requirement as a concession for giving the federal government
the full taxation power. Anti-Federalists opposing ratification obviously did not view the apportionment requirement as a meaningful
240
limitation on the direct-taxation power.
More moderate Anti241
Federalists might have settled on a broad definition of direct tax
coupled with a requirement that direct taxes be in the form of requisitions. But, with the resounding failure of the requisition prong of
their agenda, the other prong—a broad definition of “direct tax”—
became meaningless.
It was only in the 1790s—as a result of the Hylton case, the Wolcott
Report, and the experience with the 1798 apportioned real estate
tax—that the apportionment requirement was widely revealed to be a
mild impediment to the laying of direct taxes, other than taxes on
242
slaves.
There is no evidence to support the proposition that the
apportionment requirement was consciously advanced as a general
limitation on the federal taxing power or as a subtle mechanism for
accommodating state tax systems. It only turned out that way, and
only with respect to real estate taxes. The rhetoric of the AntiFederalists, who had no meaningful influence on the taxation clauses, cannot be attributed to the Framers.
Even if apportionment could be viewed as having had a statepower purpose, such purpose could relate only to the notion of duplication, and that suggests limitation to federal real estate taxes:

240

Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 312; Johnson, supra note 123, at 164–65, 168. For
example, George Mason railed against the full taxing power, citing poll taxes and peracre land taxes, without conceding that the apportionment requirement imposed any limitation. Virginia Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788), supra note 10, at 265.

241

See Letter from Brutus V to the People of the State of New York (Nov. 27, 1787), reprinted
in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 422, 427 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (defining direct tax to include “poll taxes, land taxes,
excises, duties on written instruments, on every thing we eat, drink, or wear”).

242

See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 181–94 (stating that the implications of apportionment
were revealed after ratification). However, those who pushed for the Capitation Clause in
the Convention must have understood that apportionment of a tax on slaves was a killer.
But since it was widely thought that population and wealth were correlated, apportionment would not have been seen as much of a problem for real estate taxes, as shown by
the fact that apportioned real estate taxes were enacted three times in the early history of
the republic.
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since real estate was universally taxed by the states, any federal real
estate tax would necessarily be duplicative. Other kinds of taxes would
be duplicative only haphazardly. A person seriously concerned about
the mere possible duplication of a federal tax with a state tax would—
as the Anti-Federalists did—oppose all federal internal taxing powers.
3. Protection for Accumulated Wealth
The general presumption is that federal powers granted by the
Constitution are to be broadly construed and limitations thereon are
244
not to be implied.
To flip this presumption, the Pollock majority
opinions came up with an argument that the apportionment requirement served important policy purposes. One of these was to
protect “accumulated property”—property being assumed to be the
245
subject of any direct tax that was not a requisition or capitation tax.
Leaving aside an examination of the possible motives of a Gilded
Age Supreme Court to protect wealth against the radical and populist
246
movements of the time, there is no merit to the wealth-protection
247
rationale, which is really a variation of the anti-discrimination ra248
tionale.
Apportionment only imposes state quotas for direct taxes
and is not a supermajority rule, a rule limiting the subjects of federal
243

244

245
246

247
248

Every state had some form of real estate tax. See WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 418–37 (describing taxes in each state, and summarizing what states have taxes on land); Adams, supra note 134, at 52. An even more detailed look at some state tax systems (especially Virginia and Massachusetts) is found in EINHORN, supra note 27, at 29–109.
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816) (“[W]here a power is
expressly given [by the Constitution] in general terms, it is not to be restrained to particular cases . . . .”).
See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 582–83 (1895) (intending to protect “accumulated property”).
See OWEN M. FISS, 8 TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 48–49,
92–93 (1993) (noting the crudeness of using the apportionment requirement as a weapon against economic class politics).
The protection-of-property rationale is extensively critiqued in Johnson, Foul-Up, supra
note 7, at 28–34, and Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 337–38.
The crucial passage from Pollock I is:
Nothing can be clearer than that what the Constitution intended to guard against
was the exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons
and property within any State through a majority made up from the other
States. . . . [The] inequality [resulting from apportionment] must be held to have
been contemplated, and was manifestly designed to operate to restrain the exercise of the power of direct taxation to extraordinary emergencies, and to prevent
an attack upon accumulated property by mere force of numbers.
157 U.S. at 582–83. This argument misfires. It is the uniformity principle that prevents
discrimination against persons and property because of what state they are located in.
The apportionment principle enables discrimination against persons and property in
poorer states.
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249

taxation, or a rule preventing progressive rates.
The federal government could not only tax the wealth of individuals but it could also
250
The Supreme Court would
target such wealth within each state.
have stated the matter more accurately if it had stated that the purpose of the apportionment requirement was to allow a majority of
rich states to shift the tax burden to the poor states!
There was no particular concern in the Framing period with an
“attack” on accumulated property by way of taxation or otherwise.
251
Property was then taxed in all of the states. The Framers universally
252
deplored taxing the poor and small farmers disproportionately.
253
The prevailing tax fairness norm was ability to pay.
Sumptuary
taxes, like the carriage tax, including most imposts, were broadly favored. Consumption taxes generally were thought of as an indirect
254
255
way of reaching income.
Head taxes were widely disfavored.
Wealth was dropped from the apportionment formula not because
the Framers did not want to tax wealth but only because the Conven-

249
250

251

252

253
254
255

The 1798 apportioned real estate tax imposed a progressive rate schedule on homes.
The implication in Pollock I that taxes are inherently oppressive with respect to property is
a veiled reference to the famous phrase from McCulloch v. Maryland: “[T]he power to tax
involves the power to destroy.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). The holding in that
case is that a state has no power at all to tax an instrumentality of the federal government
(the Bank of the United States), because the natural constraint against oppressive taxation
(that the legislature that enacts the tax requires the consent of the taxpayers) is absent
when one government taxes another. Id. at 428–36.
The Pollock II majority conceded as much. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co.
(Pollock II) 158 U.S. 601, 621 (1895) (noting the founders expected that states would fund
their operations by taxing accumulated property). The Wolcott Report is cited in Pollock
I, 157 U.S. at 559.
See FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B (expressing the
view that the burden of taxation should accord with the general maxim of ability to pay,
and should not be thrown upon the poor); see also New York Debates (Mr. Hamilton,
June 28, 1788), supra note 118, at 360, 365; sources cited supra note 232.
See supra text accompanying note 217.
See supra text accompanying note 84.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B (expressing
distaste for poll taxes); Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix A (recounting Ellsworth’s prediction that there would be no federal poll tax);
Massachusetts Debates (Hon. Judge Dana, Jan. 17, 1788), supra note 118, at 43 (“A capitation tax is abhorrent to the feelings of human nature . . . .”); New York Debates (Mr. Williams, June 27, 1788), supra note 118, at 340 (“[A] poll tax upon the person is indicative
of despotism . . . .”); Virginia Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788), supra note 10,
at 264–65 “[A] poll tax . . . is of all taxes the most grievous. . . . It is most oppressive . . . .”).
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tion was persuaded that population was a reasonable proxy for
256
wealth, which then was mostly in the form of real property.
In the Framing period, the poor were in no position to exploit the
rich. The members of the Senate were not popularly elected. Apportionment of representation in the House according to population
had nothing to do with suffrage. The states could—and, from the
257
beginning, did—limit the franchise to white male property owners,
and the move to broaden the franchise coincided with the Republi258
can ascendancy after 1801. At the time of the Framing, the expectation was that property owners would control politics and, corre259
spondingly, would be the appropriate class to bear the tax burden.
Concern with the political abuse of the rich by the poor emerged only in the late nineteenth century.
It is true that direct (property) taxes were expected to be used by
260
the federal government only as a last resort, but it was not the apportionment requirement that created this expectation; rather it was
261
the high transaction costs of collecting such taxes and the political
risks deriving from the inconvenience and hardships occasioned by
262
laying them. Apportionment was not invented in 1787 to erect an
256

257

258

259
260

261

262

See Pennsylvania Debates (Mr. Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787), supra note 91, at 483 (noting that
population is a good substitute for wealth in assessing taxes); supra note 59 and accompanying text. See generally Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 30–34.
The states, subject to certain constraints imposed by the Fifteenth Amendment and federal statute, prescribed the qualifications for voters, even in federal elections. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
See Virginia Debates (Mr. Corbin, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 110–11 (stating that
Virginia and most other states required the “possession of a freehold” to vote). The Convention of 1787 rejected a proposal that would have imposed a property requirement for
the federal suffrage. Massachusetts Debates (Mr. King, Jan. 17, 1788), supra note 118, at
35–36. It was only with the admission of new states to the Union that the suffrage was expanded to all white males. See Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies, 3 Economia 41, 73–
74 (2002).
Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 29–39.
See Virginia Debates (Mr. Corbin, June 7, 1788), supra note 10, at 109 (giving figures to
the effect that the impost would exceed the basic requirements of the federal government in peacetime).
See Pennsylvania Debates (Mr. Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787), supra note 91, at 476 (stating that
tax appraisers and collectors in Pennsylvania alone numbered in excess of one thousand).
Property taxes are inconvenient because they have to be paid in cash out of the taxpayer’s
own pocket, rather than out of the proceeds of a transaction. In the case of nonproductive property, property taxes can create liquidity problems. See id. at 467 (explaining that imposts are preferable to property taxes because “[t]he price of the commodity is
blended with the tax”). In addition, excises and imposts on particular items could be laid
more efficiently by the federal government than the states, because state excise taxes and
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obstacle to taxing property and the fruits thereof. The Convention
on July 12, 1787, restricted the pre-existing rule of apportionment so
that it would apply to the taxes that were least likely to be used by the federal government for reasons unrelated to the operation of the apportionment
requirement itself.
4. Did the Framers Want to Embed a Policy Preference for Indirect Taxes?
Erik Jensen argues that the Framers had a policy preference for
imposts and excises, so that the apportionment requirement was
263
erected as an obstacle to the enactment of other kinds of taxes.
Once again it is necessary to point out that apportionment was the
inherited norm based on a conception of a relationship of the states
to the federal government that far transcended taxation, and that
there is no evidence that the Framers thought that apportionment itself was a significant obstacle to the laying of direct taxes. Apportionment was eliminated for excises and imposts because it was seen
264
to be impractical (or in some cases impossible), not because of any
policy preference. Indeed, non-sumptuary excises were disliked more
265
than property taxes.
The policy preference is alleged to be based on the observation
that many of the indirect taxes were imposed on luxuries (like carriages), so that the taxes could be avoided by taxpayers willing to
266
modify their spending choices. For starters, avoidability cannot be

263

264
265

266

imposts could be evaded by smuggling. James Madison, Madison on the Tariff: Letter I
(Sept. 18, 1828), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 604–05.
See Jensen, Incomes, supra note 5, at 1075–79. Jensen misreads Adam Smith to have had a
policy preference for indirect taxes. See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2392.
As previously mentioned, see supra text accompanying notes 97–101, Smith’s use of the direct versus indirect terminology was descriptive, not normative. In fact, Smith favored
free trade, and therefore was suspicious of imposts, the anticipated core of federal finance in the United States. See SMITH, supra note 77, at 287–88, 387–89 (discussing taxes
upon consumable commodities).
See supra text accompanying notes 81–83.
Not all excises are transactional and easy to collect. Excises could also be laid on inventory and equipment, such as distilled liquors and stills. The enforcement of excises of
this type was seen as oppressive by reason of violating the privacy of the home. Virginia
Debates (Mr. George Mason, June 11, 1788), supra note 10, at 265. (The actual laying of
the so-called whiskey tax by the Federalist Congress turned out very badly for their political fortunes.) Yet unpopular excises were not subject to apportionment. In contrast, real
estate taxes could be assessed by inspection of the exterior (acreage, use, building footprint, number of windows or chimneys). Moreover, a high proportion of real estate produced an economic yield that could provide funds to pay the tax.
See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2337, 2405 (discussing how indirect taxes
give consumers a choice, and how they adjust their buying habits accordingly).
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a viable legal litmus test, as all taxes on things or activities (including
267
taxes on land) can be avoided by foregoing the subject of the tax.
On the merits, the point cannot be that a “good” tax is a tax that can
be avoided because such a tax would be pointless. Also, not all excises were on luxuries, and those that were not lay precisely on those
268
items that were considered to be inelastic necessities, so as to mini269
mize avoidance.
Rather, the point of the observation was that excise taxes on luxuries would be a popular tax, because it would be a
tax on the few, and the few that purchased luxuries with knowledge
270
of the tax would essentially be taxing themselves.
It was not news
even in 1787 that, in general, it is politically easier to enact a tax
271
whose incidence is concealed than one whose incidence is salient.
The rationale offered by Jensen smacks of post-Federalist historical revisionism, reading the anti-federal-tax agenda of Jefferson and
272
his successors back into the Framing period, where the anti-tax faction in fact lost out. Jensen actually has it upside-down when he
claims that the apportionment requirement was designed as an in273
centive for the federal government to use avoidable taxes. Instead,
the Framers anticipated (correctly) that imposts, duties, and excises
would be naturally favored because they are more convenient to both
274
taxpayers and the government. There would be no point to impos-

267
268

269

270

271

272
273
274

See Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 839 (1999) (criticizing the concept of avoidability).
Early excises were laid on distilled spirits, snuff, and refined sugar, as well as on auction
sales on certain documents and licenses. For a discussion of early federal excises, see Adams, supra note 134, at 45–90. Adam Smith states that excises are usually on luxuries or
such necessities as salt, soap, leather, and candles. SMITH, supra note 77, at 383–85.
See Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Eric M. Zolt, Inequality and Taxation: Evidence from the Americas
on How Inequality May Influence Tax Institutions, 59 TAX L. REV. 167, 186–191 (2006) (comparing Latin and North American taxation, noting their similar emphasis on inelastic
taxes like tariffs).
See Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527, repealed by Act of Dec. 15, 1797, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 536
(enacting stamp duties on documents and licenses); Act of June 9, 1794, ch. 65, 1 Stat.
397, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (enacting duties on property sold at
auction); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 373, repealed by Act of May 28, 1796, ch. 37, 1
Stat. 478 (carriages); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51, 1 Stat. 384, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1802,
ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (snuff and refined sugar); Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 267, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (distilled spirits).
See Madison’s Notes (Jan. 27), supra note 17, at 32 (recounting James Wilson’s statement
which contrasted the direct manner in which taxes were laid in the United States with the
manner of other countries, where taxes were felt less).
See supra text accompanying note 107.
See Zelenak, supra note 267, at 838–40 (discussing the avoidability notion).
See Connecticut Debates (Oliver Ellsworth, Jan. 7, 1788), supra note 166, at 191–94 (discussing how the easiest taxes to enforce are those that can be collected when money is
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ing a constitutional barrier to the laying of taxes that Congress would
275
put on the bottom shelf for political and administrative reasons.
5. Apportionment as a “Talking Point” for Ratification
The Framers’ version of federalism, i.e., that states (or the collective citizenries of states) were both the subjects of representation and
the subjects of taxation, as manifested in the proposed constitution of
276
1787, is theoretically incoherent, and makes sense only as a political
document that was thought to be capable of being “sold” to at least
277
nine state ratifying conventions, where the strongest opposition to
the nationalist features of the Constitution would (and did) come
278
from those desiring to preserve the power of state governments. In
such a context, the apportionment and uniformity requirements
served the instrumental purpose of pacifying the moderate Federalists. For one thing, apportionment achieved continuity with the Confederation system. This continuity was of some concern to the legal-

275

276

277

278

spent); Virginia Debates (George Nicholas, June 16, 1788), supra note 10, at 99–100 (noting the difficulties of creating and enforcing direct taxes).
Gouverneur Morris, who opposed the apportionment requirement, strongly disliked real
estate taxes as a policy matter, on the ground that taxes on unproductive property (which
was abundant in the United States) were unfair, caused economic distortions, and elicited
strong taxpayer resistance. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Rufus King (June 4,
1800), in 3 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM
HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS 128 (Boston, Gray & Bowen 1832),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=AuQEAAAAYAAJ&printsec=titlepage&
source=gbs_summary_r&cad=0 (bemoaning the difficulty for owners of wild land, should
they be taxed); Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Moss Kent (Jan. 10, 1815), SPARKS, supra, at 327 (“[D]irect taxes fall heavily on great land-holders.”).
The prominent political theorists of the era (Locke, Montesquieu, Kant) mostly dealt
with the larger issue of whether taxation in a liberal state based on individual autonomy
was justified at all. Liberal theory locates sovereignty in the citizens, not political entities,
and the idea of different levels of government creates a problem for the theory. At least
by implication, liberal theory undercuts states-rights theories, which are based on a notion of community (or, in its most watered down version, agency).
See, e.g.,
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 218.
The Framers “rigged” the ratification procedure by (1) submitting the Constitution to
state ratifying conventions (representing the peoples of the states) rather than the state
legislatures (whose members would have a vested interest in resisting federal power) and
(2) imposing (with difficulty) an “up or down” outcome in each state that avoided the
problem of conditional ratifications. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
It is worth noting that the opposition was neither regional nor attributable to the size of
the state. Georgia and South Carolina ratified early. The hold-outs were North Carolina
(1789) and Rhode Island (1790). The problem states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia) might be characterized as having
an attitude of relative self-sufficiency. Five of the six had deepwater ports, and North
Carolina was an insular state of small farmers.
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ists, who insisted that the 1787 Convention only had the authority to
279
Second, apportionment
“revise” the Articles of Confederation.
strongly appealed to the bedrock fairness principle of linking representation and taxation. Third, it acknowledged the states as constitu280
ent entities.
Fourth, apportionment of direct and capitation taxes
had some positive appeal to interests that opposed slave-only and peracre taxes.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the scope of “direct tax” was
undefined and perhaps even obfuscated. Four of the ratifying Conventions—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia—
281
were very closely contested. The pro-ratification forces parried the
opposition’s thrusts with the somewhat contradictory claims that: (1)
direct taxes (on land and slaves) would be rarely laid, and (2) pseudo-requisitions (involving combinations of excises) would be the
usual mode of internal taxation on non-luxuries. Thus, direct-tax
apportionment was touted as a way of accomodating unpopular taxes
282
with both anti-tax sentiment and a kind of equity among states. It is
not necessary to decide whether the Framers’ coyness in defining “direct tax” manifested confusion, cynicism, astute politics, or simply a

279

Actually, the Annapolis resolution to call the Convention ambiguously stated that the
Convention was “to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to
render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union,” although it went on to suggest that such revisions would be adopted through existing Confederation procedures. See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of
the Federal Government (Sep. 14, 1786, Feb. 21, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra
note 10, at 118, 120. The Virginia Resolution stated that “the Articles of Confederation
ought to be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution.” Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127. However, Governor Randolph immediately substituted more nationalist language for this provision, which carried
in the Committee of the Whole. See id. (May 30) at 132–34.

280

See Massachusetts Debates (Mr. King, Jan. 17, 1787), supra note 118, at 36; New York Debates (Alexander Hamilton, June 20, 1788), supra note 118, at 237, 365; Virginia Debates,
supra note 10, at 41, 121–22, 243–44, 300–01 (discussing the apportionments of representation and taxation). Additional materials from the Virginia Ratifying Convention are
collected in infra Appendix C. See also Madison’s Notes (Aug. 13), supra note 17, at 416
(noting Eldridge Gerry’s argument that since the people strongly associated taxation with
representation, all revenue bills should originate in the House of Representatives). In
contrast, the uniformity requirement was rarely mentioned in the ratification debates.

281

The final votes: Virginia (89-78), Massachusetts (187-168), New York (30-27), and New
Hampshire (57-47). See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 178–81; 2 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 413; 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 654.

282

Statements by some of the leading Virginia Federalists relating to pseudo-requisitions imply (if they do not state) that apportionment would govern all internal taxes. See infra
Appendix C.
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283

desire to postpone resolution of a non-urgent issue. The notion of
“apportionment of direct taxes” was all things to all people.
To sum up this part, the apportionment requirement is not without rationales and purposes, but many of them seem to have been
concocted after the fact, and none of them suggest that the scope of
apportionment truly reaches beyond taxes on real estate, slaves, and
states.
IV. IS APPORTIONMENT DEAD?
Below are various (incorrect) theories holding that the apportionment requirement should be treated as no longer having any
force or effect whatsoever.
A. The Capitation Tax Clause Has Expired, and the Representation Clause
Was Repealed by the Fourteenth Amendment
The 1789 Representation Clause stated:
Representives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Per284
sons.

(This sentence is followed by a requirement that a census, to determine numbers, shall be taken within three years of the meeting of the
285
first Congress, and every ten years thereafter.)
Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment (1868) states: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, ex286
It can be argued that, because of the
cluding Indians not taxed.”
parallel language, this sentence replaces the entirety of the equivalent sentence in the original Representation Clause, including the
reference to direct taxes.

283

284
285
286

Rakove cites the unanswered query by Rufus King as to the meaning of direct tax, see supra text accompanying note 17, as evidence that the ambiguity of “direct tax” was deliberate. RAKOVE, supra note 212, at 179.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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1. Has the Capitation Tax Clause Expired?
The Fourteenth Amendment repeal theory would be insufficient
to support the abolition of apportionment, as the Capitation Tax
Clause (“No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, except in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to
287
be taken.”) would still be left standing even if the reference to direct tax apportionment in the Representation Clause were deemed to
have been repealed. The apparent redundancy of the Capitation Tax
Clause to the Representation Clause is puzzling and is a likely reason
for the neglect of the Capitation Tax Clause in the literature. Another reason is that the Convention narrative with respect to it is relatively bare.
The germ of the Capitation Tax Clause was a motion by Eldridge
Gerry at the beginning of the July 13 session of the 1787 Convention
to amend the Representation Clause so that, prior to the first census,
direct taxes would be laid on the inhabitants of the states in propor288
tion to the allotment of representation fixed for the interim period.
The Gerry motion provoked a discussion in which the accuracy of the
interim representation allocation was challenged, and the motion
failed to pass on a tie vote. Gerry then responded to the claim that
289
his proposal might lead to a capitation tax (which was universally
290
disfavored) by amending his own motion so that only a requisition
on states could be laid according to the same rule during the interim
291
292
period. This motion passed 5-4, with one state divided. The final
resolution concerning the Representation Clause, passed on July 16
293
(and submitted to the Committee of Detail on July 26), was rather
287
288

289

290
291
292
293

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
Federal Convention, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 203. This allotment (New
Hampshire, 3; Massachusetts, 8; Rhode Island, 1; Connecticut, 5; New York, 6; New Jersey,
4; Pennsylvania, 8; Delaware, 1; Maryland, 6; Virginia, 10; North Carolina, 5; South Carolina, 5; Georgia, 3) had been agreed to on July 10. Id. at 197–99.
A tax “on” persons just means a non-requisition. See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note
17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix A (recording Gerry’s statement that apportionment
“could not be carried into execution, as the states were not to be taxed as states”).
See id. (recounting Ellsworth’s response that there probably would be no federal head tax,
but that such a tax could be apportioned, as could a pseudo-requisition).
Id. (July 13) at 306–07.
Id.
Federal Convention, supra note 288, at 221–22. That version of the Representation
Clause began with the interim allocation of representation and then authorized the Congress to thereafter apportion representation according to numbers, but that representation was to be “proportioned to direct taxation,” and to accomplish the latter a census was
to be taken (presumably counting slaves as three-fifths), and the Congress was to propor-
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convoluted, but it did not explicitly incorporate the Gerry amendment.
294
The
The Committee on Detail issued its Report on August 6.
most conspicuous feature of the Report is its adoption of the notion
that the federal government possessed only enumerated powers, including “the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and ex295
cises.” The Report stripped the Representation Clause of any reference to direct taxes, and created a separate clause apportioning
direct taxes according to population, with the population being determined by a census (to be taken within six years), with slaves counting as three-fifths. The Report also contained a provision stating:
“No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census
296
hereinbefore directed to be taken.”
There is little doubt that this
297
clause referred to a possible tax on slaves, and it appears to have
been non-controversial, as it was approved without discussion on Au-

294

295
296

297

tion “the direct taxation accordingly.” Id. Thus, there was no explicit language addressing the status of direct taxation prior to the census. See Madison’s Notes (July 24), supra
note 17, at 362 (noting Daniel Carroll’s statement that he reserved the right to oppose
any “direct taxation on the states” prior to the census).
Sometimes known as the “Committee of Five,” the members were Oliver Ellsworth
(Conn.), Nathaniel Gorham (Mass.), Gov. Randolph (Va.), John Rutledge (S.C.), and
James Wilson (Pa.). See Madison’s Notes (July 24), supra note 17, at 363 (recording the
appointment of the committee of detail). The Committee was charged not only with
considering the resolutions of the Convention to date, but also the New Jersey and
Pinckney Plans. See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 6), supra note 17, at 375–76. However, the
Capitation Tax Clause is not found in those two plans because neither of them allowed
for any capitation tax. See supra notes 34, 39 and accompanying text.
This power (without the uniformity requirement) appeared in proposed Article VII, Section 1, Clause 1. Madison’s Notes (Aug. 6), supra note 17, at 376–82.
See id. at 379. The tax clauses were then in Article VII of the proposed draft: the Direct
Tax Clause was Section 3; the Clause Prohibiting Export Taxes and Import Taxes on
Slaves was Section 4; and the Capitation Tax Clause was Section 5.
That the Importation-of-Slaves Clause (now Article I, Section 9, clause 1) was viewed as a
twin of the Capitation Tax clause is evidenced by the fact that, after a heated discussion of
the possibility of an import tax on slaves, both clauses were referred to an ad hoc committee. See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 22), supra note 17, at 457–461. The report of this committee allowed slaves to be imported for a period and a modest duty to be imposed thereon.
See id. (Aug. 24) at 470–71. Another indication that the two clauses were a pair (that pertained to slavery) is the fact that Article V prohibits any constitutional amendment to
both of these clauses prior to 1808. U.S. CONST. art V. This prohibition was added on
September 10 as a friendly amendment to Madison’s motion on the process of constitutional amendment. The two clauses in question were referred to by the mover, Mr. Rutledge, as “the articles relating to slaves.” Madison’s Notes (Sept. 10), supra note 17, at
532. Einhorn claims that this clause was attributable to a statement by Gen. Pinckney noting that he would vote against any constitution that did not have “some security to the
Southern States against an emancipation of slaves.” Id. (Gen. Pinckney, July 23, 1787) at
357; EINHORN, supra note 27, at 175.
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gust 25, after a long debate about the Importation-of-Slaves Clause.
Thus, one purpose of this clause was to assure that a slave tax, either
299
as a property (direct) tax or as a capitation tax, was covered (without any doubt) by the rule of apportionment. A second purpose of
the clause was to require that the rule of apportionment for capitation (i.e., slave) taxes be according to the future census, and not according to the specified interim allocation of representation or any
300
attempt by Congress to estimate the population of the states. Thus,
no capitation (slave) tax could be imposed prior to the census.
The Capitation Tax Clause was amended in the waning days of the
301
Convention to apply also to “other direct” taxes.
The mover,
George Read of Delaware, explained that the amendment’s purpose
was to prevent the Confederation-period quotas from being altered
by statute or made to conform to the pre-census allocation of repre302
sentation. The amendment elicited no response or debate. Thus,

298
299

300

301

302

Madison’s Notes (Aug. 25), supra note 17, at 478.
Whether slaves were to be considered as persons or property was disputed. See id. (July 9)
at 289 (recording Patterson arguing that slaves were property, and therefore not entitled
to representation); id. (Aug. 21) at 461 (recording Sherman’s opposition to a tax on importation of slaves as implying that slaves were property).
Accord SELIGMAN, supra note 113, at 554 (noting that Southerners feared that Congress
would make an estimate of population to saddle the South with an undue share of taxation through a tax on slaves); Bullock, Part I, supra note 23, at 238–39 (same). The Representation Clause only said that direct taxation (and representation) was to be apportioned “by numbers.” Only representation was to be apportioned by the interim
allocation described in supra note 289. Thus, the mode of apportionment of direct taxes
during the interim period was left unresolved. The addition of the original version of the
Capitation Clause settled that issue, but only for capitation taxes.
See Madison’s Notes (Sept. 14), supra note 17, at 545. This move was anticipated by the
following: as already noted, the Committee on Detail had split off the clause requiring
apportionment of direct taxes from the Representation Clause. See id. (Aug. 21) at 451–
53 (recounting the debate over Gerry’s proposal). The Direct Tax Clause was taken up
by the Convention on August 20, and it was then that Rufus King inquired about the
meaning of direct taxation (and received no answer). Id. Immediately following, Gerry
again proposed that from the time of the first meeting of Congress until the first census,
direct taxes should be apportioned according to the number of representatives specified
for the House prior to the census. Id. It was again doubted that this interim allocation
accorded with population, and the motion again failed. Id. at 453. Failure of this motion
left unresolved the apportionment scheme for pre-census direct taxes.
In proposing this amendment, Read stated that he “was afraid that some liberty might
otherwise be taken to saddle the states with a readjustment, by this rule, of past requisitions of Congress.” See id. (Sept. 14), supra note 17, at 545. In the absence of the
amendment, direct taxes (other than capitation taxes) might have been apportionable
according to an estimate by Congress of state populations (“numbers”). The Confederationperiod statutes imposing the requisitions were based on the 1775 estimation of state populations, and apparently Read thought that those quotas could be changed by statute or
by a new estimate of numbers. See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 169. (This fear seems mis-
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the final version of the Capitation Tax Clause turned the original
Gerry amendment on its head by effectively prohibiting the laying of
all direct taxes—including capitation taxes and requisitions—during
303
the pre-census period.
On the basis of the foregoing, it must be the case that the Capitation Tax Clause has “expired” because all of its purposes have been
fulfilled. First, its principal purpose with respect to a tax on slaves
terminated with the abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amend304
ment. Second, the purpose relating to the laying of capitation and
direct taxes prior to the census expired with the taking of the census
(thereafter, apportionment of representatives and direct taxes is required by the Representation Clause to be according to the census).
The third purpose of making sure that a capitation tax (especially a
slave tax) was considered to be a form of direct tax was, at most,
merely for emphasis, as capitation taxes were always considered to be
305
direct taxes.
The fourth purpose of precluding the re-adjustment
of Confederation requisition quotas has long expired.

303

304

305

placed in light of an earlier discussion on the inherent invalidity of retroactive legislation.
See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 22), supra note 17, at 462–63 (recording James Wilson’s statements and others)). Ackerman views Read’s motion as protecting Delaware by making
the apportionment principle retroactive. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 13. This reading is
contradicted by Read’s statement that he was opposing “readjustments” of prior requisitions. Before Read’s amendment, the Capitation Tax Clause prevented only a capitation
tax during the interim period. After the Read amendment, no direct tax could be imposed during this period. Thus, whatever the true aim of Read might have been, it surely
expired after the census was taken.
See Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser, 14 January 1791, reprinted in 14 FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS, supra note 109, at 237 (reporting House debate of January 6, 1791, in which
Madison doubted that a direct tax can be laid prior to the first census).
Einhorn (astonishingly) claims that this clause abolished the three-fifths rule for direct
taxes (including capitation taxes). EINHORN, supra note 27, at 169. This appears incorrect on several grounds. First, the clause itself refers to the “Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, which is a cross-reference to
the entire scheme of determining “numbers” (including the three-fifths rule). Second,
the Representation Clause containing the three-fifths rule for direct taxes was retained. It
is implausible to suppose that the Convention intended to have contradictory rules in the
same document. Third, the stated rationale for extending the capitation tax rule to direct taxes only pertained to readjusting Confederation-period requisition quotas prior to
the taking of the census. Fourth, it is unlikely that a motion to undo an important deal
would have provoked no discussion whatsoever. In any event, this purpose (if it existed)
also expired with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix A (recording
Mr. Ellsworth’s assumption that poll taxes are direct taxes). All three of the Justices writing in Hylton v. United States express the view that a capitation tax (being capable of apportionment) is a “direct tax” without regard to the Capitation Tax Clause. 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 171 (1796).
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2. Did the Fourteenth Amendment Repeal the Original Representation
Clause?
Assuming that there is such a thing as a doctrine of “expiration” of
a constitutional provision, the Capitation Tax Clause would now be
considered to be “out of the way,” and, it would follow that any actual
repeal of the Representation Clause by Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would have had the effect of wiping the Constitution
clean of any tax apportionment requirement. Unfortunately, this
two-step argument appears to have never been made, and it is too late
to make it now. No branch of government has ever treated the apportionment requirement as having expired or having been abolished. The Thirteenth Amendment effectively eliminated the threefifths rule, but that had the ironic effect of increasing the representation (upon re-admission to the Union) of former slave states. The
first sentence of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment merely
codifies the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment upon the issue of
representation in the House. That sentence overrides the equivalent
sentence in the Representation Clause only to the extent the two are
inconsistent, namely, with respect to the three-fifths rule. There is no
inconsistency with respect to direct-tax apportionment itself, since
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment makes no reference to direct taxes. The main purpose of Section 2 is found in the second sentence, which conditions such (expanded) representation upon the
states’ extending the franchise to ex-slaves, without taking control
306
over the franchise away from the states.
The discussion in Congress of the proposed Section 2 negates any
implication that the direct-tax apportionment requirement was being
307
abolished.
In 1909, the framers of the Sixteenth (income tax)
306

307

See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141–42 (1866). The initial version of this provision was moved by Representative Blaine on January 8, 1866. Senator Sumner objected to
its references to race. Id. at 673. Senator Fessenden complained that it intruded too
much on the power of states over suffrage. Id. at 703. The Blaine version was not accepted by the Senate, and the current “compromise” version was crafted with an eye on
the obtaining of ratification. Id. at 2459–60.
See id. at 961. Senator Buckalew noted that the draft of section two of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not affect the rule of apportionment of direct taxes. Senator Henderson
expressed a preference for the apportionment of taxes by wealth, but viewed section two
of the proposed amendment as continuing the old formula. Id. at 3033. Senator Doolittle noted that amendments offered to section two would have apportioned direct taxes
according to property rather than population. Id. at 2942. This would imply that appor-
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Amendment operated under the same assumption, and expressly declined the opportunity to wholly repeal the apportionment require308
ment. Neither the executive nor the judiciary has ever questioned
309
the continued existence of the apportionment rule for direct taxes.
B. Did the Abolition of Slavery Operate as an Implied Repeal of the
Apportionment Requirement?
Bruce Ackerman has argued that the abolition of slavery in 1865
by the Thirteenth Amendment should be viewed as an implied repeal
310
of the apportionment requirement.
Ackerman, along with Robin
311
Einhorn and Calvin Johnson, assert that direct-tax apportionment
was introduced on July 12 solely to resolve the dispute over the inclusion of slaves in the representation formula. Therefore, Ackerman
argues, the abolition of slavery removed the sole purpose of the ap312
portionment rule.

tionment would otherwise continue to be in proportion to population. Other discussion
of section two is wholly devoid of references to direct-tax apportionment. See id. at 2459,
2462, 2464, 2467, 2468, 2502, 2511, 2530, 2535, 2538, 2539, 2542–43, 2766–67, 2700,
2939, 2986–87, 3026 (Representatives Stevens, Garfield, Thayer, Boyer, Kelley, Raymond,
Elliot, Randall, Eckley, Rogers, Farnsworth, and Bingham, and Senators Howard, Stewart,
Hendricks, Sherman, and Johnson). On this point, the legislative history speaks with one
voice.
308

See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 33–38.

309

Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916) (noting that the purpose of Sixteenth Amendment was to abolish the apportionment requirement for income taxes).
The most recent case of note was Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
where the court held that treating emotional harm awards as gross income was valid as an
indirect tax, even if such awards were not “income.”

310

See Ackerman, supra note 6. This argument was made earlier in Bullock, Part I, supra note
23, but only for the purpose of discrediting the rationales offered up by the majority opinions in Pollock.

311

EINHORN, supra note 27, at 164–66 (seconding the historical claim without drawing any
legal conclusion); Johnson, supra note 123, at 168. Einhorn argues that the uniformity
requirements in state constitutions originated in a desire to avoid a tax on slaves, and
hints that the uniformity principle in the federal Constitution has a similar purpose.
EINHORN, supra note 27, at 202–04. But the link cannot be made, because the federal uniformity requirement does not apply to taxes and slaves and does not bar different rates
for different subjects. Instead, it only barred different rates for different ports. Indeed,
import duties from the beginning of the Republic have been rife with this kind of subjectmatter discrimination.

312

Ackerman, supra note 6. The argument that the purpose of the apportionment requirement related to slavery does not necessarily lead to the conclusion of implied repeal.
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Courts are very reluctant to entertain implied-repeal arguments,
especially where (as here) the later enactment dealt with a different
subject matter. In the federal-taxing-power area, the Sixteenth
Amendment, which did deal with an issue arising under the appor314
tionment rule, has never been held to abolish the rule itself. Here,
all the objections to the actual-repeal argument, discussed supra, can
be raised again. Even if the implied-repeal argument were allowed, it
would be persuasive only if slavery were the sole motivation for adopting the apportionment requirement. But (to sing the refrain) appor315
tionment was not conjured up on July 12, 1787; it was there all
316
It is true that, prior to July 12, the Virginia Plan had been
along.
amended so as to eliminate the reference to “quotas of contribution,”
but that move was made only because it was thought that actual tax
revenues were too uncertain and variable standard for fixing repre317
sentation.
The plausible candidates for apportioning representa-

313

314
315

316

317

See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2532–33
(2007). Courts would be less likely to apply such a doctrine to the Constitution, which is
supposed to be “permanent” until amended by the stipulated procedure therein.
See supra notes 306 and 308 and accompanying text.
See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 165–66. Einhorn’s version of the story is that everybody
thought that the new government would subsist only on imposts, so that apportioned taxes would not be necessary. Thus, apportionment of direct taxes is viewed as being a new
feature introduced on July 12. Id. However, at no point was the ambition to empower
the federal government to only lay imposts. The tax power was always intended to be
plenary, first implicitly under the Virginia Plan, and later explicitly under the report of
the Committee on Detail. There was no serious debate in the Convention over the scope
of the taxing power. See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 21), supra note 17, at 453 (indicating that
Luther Martin’s motion to restrict direct taxation only to requisitions was not debated
and was defeated, with only one state in favor and one state divided). In the ratifying
conventions, the proponents of ratification were unyielding on this point. See, e.g.,
FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 213–20, reprinted in Appendix
B.
See supra text accompanying note 71. The only alternative to formula apportionment
would have been a rule providing that states, as equals, should pay equal taxes, a notion
that apparently had one or two adherents. See Letter of Luther Martin to the State of
Maryland Legislature (Jan. 27, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 344, 365.
The Virginia Plan had proposed that representation be proportioned to the “quotas of
contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem
best in different cases.” See Madison’s Notes (May 29), supra note 17, at 127. Rufus King,
of Massachusetts, stated that the revenue (i.e., from imposts and excises) might not be
traceable to particular states and, even if it could be, it would not be proportional to
population or wealth. Madison agreed. There seemed then to be an emerging consensus
that representation be equitably proportioned, but George Read, favoring a one
state/one vote rule, threatened a walk-out of the Delaware delegation, at which point the
issue was postponed. See id. (May 30) at 134–35. The issue was later re-opened, King repeated his earlier point, and a vague equitable-ratio motion then passed. See id. (June 11)
at 178–81. The equitable-ratio principle (shorn of any reference to taxes) was revisited in

Apr. 2009]

FEDERAL TAXES SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT RULE

911

tion, wealth and population, happened to be the twin candidates for
318
The iniapportionment of taxes under the Confederation system.
tial Morris motion of July 12 only stated that taxation should be apportioned according to representation (to be determined by the legislature according to wealth and numbers), which reversed the
Virginia Plan provision that representation should accord with tax
contributions. The Morris motion was immediately amended so as to
apply only to “direct taxes,” because it was understood that imposts,
duties, and excises were not really capable of geographical apportionment. There was no motion, on July 12 or thereafter, to remove
319
the apportionment rule altogether.
The Morris motion left open the issue of whether representation
(and direct taxes) were to be apportioned according to wealth or
population. Since slaves would automatically have been included in
assessments of wealth, it is understandable that, once population was
decided upon as the apportionment principle, the South would insist
that slaves be included in the enumeration, especially as the enumeration was being advanced as a proxy for wealth. Moreover, counting slaves as three-fifths for taxation purposes had already been
agreed on in principle as early as 1783, and the same rule had been
320
agreed to for representation purposes as early as June 11, 1787.
The move before July 12 of counting slaves only for representation purposes had irked the North, but counting slaves for both purposes was
enough to get the North to sign onto the final deal concerning rep-

July, and a committee presented (on July 9) an interim allocation coupled with a grant of
power to the legislature to apportion representation according to wealth and numbers.
Objections were made to the interim allocation, the indecision over wealth versus numbers, and leaving it up to the legislature. A mandatory allocation according to the census
was advanced on July 7, and it was at this point that the controversy arose over counting
slaves, and that in turn raised the wealth versus numbers issue). See id. (July 9–11) at 287–
302.
318

The Confederation rule referred to wealth, but apportionment according to population
was the more favored option (agreed to by eleven states), and failed of adoption only because of the unanimity rule for amending the Articles of Confederation. Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 302–03.

319

An argument to the contrary is dealt with in infra text accompanying note 321. Eldridge
Gerry did note that “the principle of it [apportionment] could not be carried into execution, as the states were not to be taxed as states.” Oliver Ellsworth followed by stating that
poll-taxes could be apportioned, although there probably would be none, and that otherwise state quotas would be levied “according to the plan used by the state in raising its
own supplies.” See Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 305, reprinted in Appendix
A.

320

Madison’s Notes (June 11), supra note 17, at 181.
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321

resentation. In sum, the events of July 12 and the succeeding days
only forged together various fragments that were already at hand;
neither apportionment of taxes nor counting slaves as three-fifths
were at all new.
Supporters of the thesis that apportionment was introduced on July 12 only to deal with the problem of slaves cite a statement by Gouverneur Morris on July 24 expressing the wish to strike out the clause
proportioning direct taxation to representation on the ground that
he had introduced the motion only for the purpose of overcoming
322
the earlier dispute over representation. It is highly likely that Morris (a strong nationalist) personally did not favor apportionment (or,
for that matter, any kind of deference to the states), but the fact is
that Morris’s personal view did not prevail. Indeed, the fact that
Morris’s statement was neither supported nor debated in the Convention is far more significant than the fact that Morris made the statement. Morris’s wish as expressed on July 24 was likewise ignored by
the Committee on Detail, which (having been constituted immediately following Morris’s remark) produced separate clauses appor323
tioning representation and taxes. In addition, the dispute over representation was multifaceted, and (apart from slaves) implicated the
issues of wealth versus population, the role of the legislature, the
method of determining numbers, the interim (i.e., pre-census) allocation, and the length of the interim period. The Morris motion did
not mention slaves. It only reestablished the link between taxation
and representation as a prod for moving the Convention towards resolving the representation issue.
Morris was involved in another colloquy regarding direct taxes in
the Convention on September 13. An understanding of this colloquy
requires some background. On August 8, the Representation Clause
as drafted by the Committee on Detail was amended so as to crossreference the apportionment formula contained in the separate di-

321

See Johnson, Foul-Up, supra note 7, at 89–92 (noting the awkwardness of treating slaves as
“inhabitants” for tax purposes).

322

See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 168–69 (arguing the same general idea). The full entry in
Madison’s Notes (July 24), supra note 17, at 362–63, is: “Mr. Gouverneur Morris hoped
the committee [on detail, about to be constituted] would strike out the whole of the
clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He had only meant it as a bridge
to assist us over a certain gulf: having passed the gulf, the bridge may be removed. He
thought the principle laid down with so much strictness liable to strong objections.”
(footnote omitted)).

323

See infra text accompanying notes 294 and 300.
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324

rect-tax clause. The entire draft constitution was eventually sent to
the Committee on Style, which presented a near-final version on Sep325
tember 12. It was the Committee on Style that re-combined the representation and direct tax apportionment rules into what is now the
Representation Clause. (The Capitation Tax Clause remained separate, and did not then refer to “other direct” taxes.) On September
13, a motion was made to drop the reference in the Representation
Clause to direct taxes on the ground that the subject did not belong
326
in a provision dealing with representation. Morris made a remark
to the effect that the insertion was made to counter the impression
that “negroes” were to be counted only for purposes of representa327
328
tion. Immediately the question was put, and the motion failed.
It might be claimed that Morris’s September 13 remark demonstrates that the apportionment requirement for direct taxes was “inserted” only to deal with the slavery issue. This reading is not only
wrong on the merits, since Morris’s July 12 motion said nothing
about the formula for apportionment, but it also ignores the September 13 context. All of the important decisions had been made
prior to referral to the Committee on Style. The Convention proceedings on September 13 and the days following dealt only with
style, and not substance (which had already been agreed on). The
September 13 motion was simply to move the apportionment rule for
direct taxes out of the section dealing with representation, not to remove it altogether. (The latter motion would have been out of or329
der.)
Morris’s remarks are in explanation of the Committee on

324
325
326

327

328
329

Madison’s Notes (Aug. 8), supra note 17, at 391.
Id. (Sept. 12) at 536.
See id. (Sept. 13) at 540 (“Mr. DICKINSON and Mr. WILSON moved to strike out ‘and
direct taxes’ from article 1, sect. 2, as improperly placed in a clause relating merely to the
constitution of the House of Representatives.”).
See id. (“The insertion here was in consequence of what had passed on this point; in order
to exclude the appearance of counting the negroes in the representation. The including of
them may now be referred to the object of direct taxes, and incidentally only to that of
representation.”) Although this statement is not a model of clarity, it would seem to refer
to what had transpired on August 8. See Madison’s Notes (Aug. 8), supra note 17, at 391.
The original resolution (that originated on July 12) provided that representation should
be proportioned to direct taxation, and the apportionment formula was located in the direct tax clause. The same organization appears in the Report of the Committee on Detail, as amended on August 8. In both cases the aim (presumably) was to emphasize the
burden (to the South) of counting slaves as three-fifths, rather than the benefits. The
Committee on Style basically combined what had theretofore been separate clauses.
Madison’s Notes (Sept. 13), supra note 17, at 540.
See id. (“The report from the committee of style and arrangement was taken up . . . to receive the final corrections and sanction of the Convention.”).
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Style’s decision. Morris was not only a member of this five-man
committee, but was the principal author of its product, and would
330
have defended its actions. Morris’s remarks were in opposition to the
motion, as is demonstrated by the fact that Morris’s comment closed
the debate, and the motion thereupon failed by a wide margin.
Moreover, Morris’s comment here related only to the counting of
slaves in the apportionment formula, not the principle of apportionment itself as it applied to taxes. If Morris opposed apportionment of taxes in principle, at this point he was reconciled to defeat.
C. Is Apportionment Dead Because Its Premises Are Obsolete?
The argument considered here is that the apportionment requirement should be considered obsolete, except for requisitions,
because its premises have been seriously eroded, if not completely
washed away. The premise is that states, either as governments or as
collectivities of inhabitants, are the subjects both of representation in,
and of taxation by, the federal government. This premise was over331
sold from the beginning and subsequently diluted by the following:
(1) the practice of electing U.S. representatives by districts; (2) the
total abstinence from the laying of requisitions; (3) the abandonment
of apportioned direct taxes after the Civil War (and rare prior use);
(4) the view that the federal government is “of” the people of the na332
tion and not the states; (5) the outcome of the Civil War (denying
the states the right to secede from the Union); (6) the Civil War
amendments to the Constitution (abolishing slavery and limiting the
power of states over the franchise); (7) the Sixteenth Amendment
(removing income taxes from the apportionment requirement); (8)
the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of U.S.
senators); (9) the Nineteenth Amendment (prohibiting the federal
government and the states from denying women the right to vote);
(10) the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (denying the states the power to
impose poll taxes as a condition for exercising the franchise); (11)

330

The other members were Hamilton, Madison, Rufus King, and William Samuel Johnston.
Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 29, at 295; see also Letter from James Madison to Mr. Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 507 (noting
that Morris was the author of the final draft). Morris participated in discussions of virtually every issue raised by the report from the committee of style.

331

See Madison’s Notes (June 28), supra note 17, at 253 (recording Wilson’s argument ridiculing the notion of the representation of corporate bodies).

332

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402–05 (1819) (noting that the ratification was by conventions, not by state legislatures).
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the unanimous practice among states of choosing presidential electors by popular vote; (12) the unanimous practice among states of
eliminating property ownership as a qualification for voting; and (13)
the decision by the Supreme Court invalidating all fees and financial
333
qualifications for state elections. About all that is left of the states
in the manner of their representation (as states) in the federal government is: (1) the (largely unexercised) power of state governments
334
in the procedure for the election of the President; (2) the remaining power of state governments over the federal franchise (which is
basically the power to determine, within limits, the boundaries of
335
House Districts or to abolish districting altogether); and (3) the
practice whereby U.S. senators are elected by the voters of an entire
state.
It is conceivable that there may be some residual attachment to
the view that the states are (to some extent) political constituents of
the federal government, although it would be hard for a pollster to
frame this question in a way that would eliminate partisan and interest-group calculation. At the same time, it is inconceivable that anybody would think of states (or state populations as quasi-corporate
bodies) as federal taxpayers. Requisitions have been extinct for over
200 years. The notion of “no taxation without representation” does
not require any intermediation by states on the taxation side of the
equation. It is hard to imagine that anyone would think that their
federal tax rates should depend on their state of residence.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it is hard to imagine that the
courts would limit the apportionment requirement to requisitions
and capitation taxes on the grounds that its underlying assumptions
are now passé. There is no doctrine stating that legislative or constitutional text is void because it is based on obsolete or defective idea336
tional premises. Legal text survives flawed origins.
333

334
335
336

See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that a state’s conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
For restrictions on districting generally, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, 2 AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-7, -8, -9 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing restrictions on districting).
Guido Calabresi has argued that courts should entertain the possibility that statutory text
can become obsolete with the passage of time and changing conditions, but, to my knowledge, this invitation has not been accepted by the judiciary. Even Calabresi does not argue that a doctrine of statutory obsolescence should be carried over to constitutional interpretation. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Of
course, this point would also apply to the argument concerning the “expiration” of the
Capitation Tax clause. See supra text accompanying notes 303–04.
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D. Is Apportionment Dead on the Ground that Nothing Is Reasonably
Capable of Apportionment?
Calvin Johnson argues that only requisitions and capitation taxes
can be direct taxes, because they are the only taxes that are “reasonably capable of apportionment”—which is the test allegedly set out in
337
Hylton.
According to Johnson, even an ad valorem real estate tax
would flunk the “reasonably capable” test, because the tax rate would
be different in different states (and the higher rates would apply to
338
the poorer states).
Johnson’s position is not a correct distillation of the Hylton opinions. The Chase opinion cites a situation where the rates bear a ratio
339
of ten to one. The Iredell opinion cites the situation where the sub340
ject of the tax might not exist at all in one or more states.
The
Paterson opinion, although expressing the view that apportionment
only made conceptual sense for requisitions, conceded the possibility
that any broad-based tax might be reasonably capable of apportion341
ment. All three opinions flatly stated that real estate taxes were direct taxes, and all three views of apportionment would accommodate
such taxes.
If Hylton is interpreted to mean that any tax not reasonably capable of apportionment does not need to be apportioned, then it would
have followed that a tax on slaves was not required to be apportioned
because slaves were non-existent or scarce in Northern states. But
such an interpretation would have been contrary to the understanding of everybody. The “reasonably capable of apportionment” idea
simply restates the reason for excluding the kinds of imposts, duties,
and excises familiar to the Framers from the requirement of apportionment. It does not erase the terms “capitation tax” or “direct tax”
from the Constitution.
The phrase “reasonably capable of apportionment” is not the
same as Johnson’s mutated version thereof, which essentially is a
337
338

339
340
341

Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7. My view of Hylton, as an excise tax case, is set forth
in infra Part V.E.
See Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 7, at 309–14, 351 (“Hylton got it right: a tax that
cannot reasonably or naturally be apportioned is not a direct tax because apportionment
is the defining characteristic of direct tax.”).
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
Id. at 182 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
Id. at 177–80 (opinion of Paterson, J.); cf. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433,
439–40, 446 (1868) (upholding a tax on insurance company gross premiums and invoking the Hylton test in a hypothetical that assumed that some states might have no resident
insurance companies).
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principle of fair apportionment. A tax is minimally “capable” of apportionment if the subject(s) can be located in every state. Any tax
on the economic attributes of a person (e.g., a wealth tax or an income tax) is “capable” of apportionment among the states in accordance with population because the economic qualities that are attributed to a person can be attributed to the state in which the
person resides.
Johnson unjustifiably views “reasonably” as requiring near-uniform
rates across the nation. That cannot be right, because “uniformity” is
necessarily defeated by “apportionment according to population.”
The kind of national consciousness that underlies the uniformity
principle only originated during the Framing period. As a political
document, the aim was to achieve equity among the states (or the
people, taken collectively, of the various states), and an apportioned
tax would certainly have been seen as fair according to that perspective. Moreover, taxation of the states was explicitly linked to representation of states. In sum, the norm of fairness among individuals
across the nation cannot underlie the apportionment requirement,
because apportionment is explicitly based on the different and in342
compatible concept of fairness among states (or state populations).
343
Apportionment was anything but a “mistake.” It was merely an error of judgment.
V. CONFINING APPORTIONMENT TO TAXES ON TANGIBLE PROPERTY
The arguments made so far, although not sufficient to eliminate
the apportionment requirement altogether, are arguments for construing it narrowly. This part argues, from various angles, that “direct
tax” (apart from requisitions and capitation taxes) should be limited
to taxes on real estate and tangible personal property. Adoption of
this position would mark a change in the current doctrinal under-

342

George Nicholas of Virginia clearly understood how the apportionment requirement operated, but from his point of view the national-perspective inequity was a good thing because favorable to Virginia (a richer state). Virginia Debates (Mr. Nicholas, June 10,
1788), supra note 10, at 243, reprinted in Appendix C. George Mason observed, id. (Mr.
George Mason, June 15, 1788) at 457–58, that apportionment would result in inequity at
the individual level if the specified subject of the tax were narrow.

343

Curiously, a book on constitutional mistakes, with forty-one contributing authors, makes
no suggestion that the apportionment requirement was a mistake. CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson,
eds. 1998). Perhaps this omission only reflects the myopia of constitutional scholars
when it comes to taxes.
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standing, which is that all property taxes are subject to apportionment.
A. A Critique of Pollock II
There is unanimous agreement in historical sources, legislative
and executive practice, and judicial doctrine that “direct tax” encompasses taxes on real estate. The only plausible instrumental motives
for apportionment relate only to real estate (including slaves). As to
what, apart from real estate, might be subject to apportionment,
there are only scattered statements and opinions, often based on conflicting principles, principles that cannot be dispositive, or no princi344
ples at all. The only exception is the five to four majority opinion
in Pollock II, which held that a tax on personal property is subject to
apportionment:
Nor can we perceive any ground why the same reasoning [that treats
a tax on income as a tax on the underlying property] does not apply to
capital in personalty held for the purpose of income or ordinarily yielding income, and to the income therefrom. . . . The Constitution does not
say that no direct tax shall be laid by apportionment on any other property than land; on the contrary, it forbids all unapportioned direct taxes;
and we know of no warrant for excepting personal property from the exercise of the power, or any reason why an apportioned direct tax cannot
be laid and assessed, as Mr. Gallatin said in his report when Secretary of
the Treasury in 1812, “upon the same objects of taxation on which the
direct taxes levied under the authority of the State are laid and assessed.”
Personal property of some kind is of general distribution . . . .
The Congress of the Confederation found the limitation of the
sources of the contributions of the States to “land, and the buildings and
improvements thereon,” . . . so objectionable that the article was
amended April 28, 1783, so that the taxation should be apportioned in
345
proportion to [population] . . . .

The reasons given in Pollock II for extending “direct tax” to a tax
on intangible personal property are not persuasive, given a century of
settled understanding that the term referred only to taxes on real es346
tate (and perhaps related tangible personal property).
Because
Hylton (1796) had upheld an unapportioned tax on tangible personal
property as a non-direct tax, Pollock II would appear to have overruled

344
345
346

It is hard to discern any principle of what should be apportioned from the WOLCOTT,
supra note 88.
158 U.S. 601, 628 (1895).
See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541–44 (1868) (stating that “direct tax”
does not include a tax on personal property).
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Hylton. But the majority opinion in Pollock II dismisses Hylton as being
“badly reported” and distinguishes it as having only held that the car347
riage tax was an excise. Although a court is allowed to recharacterize its prior decisions, it should be pointed out that none of the
judges in Hylton unequivocally stated that the carriage tax was an ex348
cise.
For starters, framing the issue as being one of defining “direct tax”
begs the question, because the issue of what taxes are subject to apportionment cannot be answered without also asking the question of
what taxes are exempt from apportionment, namely, imposts, duties,
and excises, and possibly other indirect taxes. At least Hylton was on
the right track in posing the issue as one of apportionment. Since
the carriage tax in Hylton looks like a property tax in having been an
annual tax (as opposed to a transactional tax), the Pollock II majority
opinion should have explained why it was not a property tax. If the
carriage tax was a property tax, then the Pollock II majority needed to
explain how a tax on intangible investment property was distinguishable from a tax on tangible business or personal-use property, or, for
that matter, how a tax on such property might differ from a real es349
tate tax.
The first portion of the quoted passage from Pollock II relies on
the position advanced by Pollock I, namely, that a tax on income is a
350
tax on the underlying property.
One cannot deploy the “income”
concept to determine what kind of property falls under the rubric of
“direct tax,” a term that predated any income tax and pre-dated the
widespread availability of income-producing intangible personal
property. Here, the Pollock II majority arbitrarily selects a feature of
property that unites some real estate and some personal property,
while ignoring features that differentiate them, such as mobility or
use. Decisively, this rationale for Pollock II has since been repudiated
351
by the Supreme Court and leaves the status of non-incomeproducing property in limbo.
347
348
349

350
351

Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 623–27.
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
The Framers might have thought that real estate taxes were sui generis, as the Physiocrats
and Locke—both influential in the eighteenth century—thought that all wealth derived
from land and its fruits. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 16–18.
Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 628.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text. A related problem is that the carriage tax in
Hylton was on carriages held either for personal use or for hire. Although the taxpayer in
Hylton owned only personal-use carriages, it is hard to imagine that the result would have
been different if he had owned carriages for hire, because the unanimous rationale was
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The second point made in the quoted passage is that the Framers
could have specified a tax on “real estate,” but did not. However, the
Framers could equally have specified a tax on “property,” but did not.
In either case, “direct tax” extends to the non-property modes of requisitions and capitation taxes, and, as argued below, to taxes on tangible personal property as well. However, it appears that the distinctions between tangible and intangible, and among business,
investment, and personal-use property, were not current in the late
352
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Thus, the Framers
lacked an appropriate vocabulary with which to encapsulate their intention. Any specific reference to “real estate,” “lands,” or “property”
might, at worst, have been inaccurate expressions of intention, and,
at best, would have raised further issues as to what was encompassed
353
within such terms.
Moreover, the Framers had a difficult enough
time dealing with representation and taxation and would have had
no appetite to haggle further over the precise meaning of terminol354
ogy that was inherently vague and not of pressing importance.
The Gallatin statement quoted by the Pollock II majority was made
twenty-five years after the framing of the Constitution. Gallatin did
not attend the 1787 Convention, and his acceptance of the proposed
355
constitution was lukewarm at best. He supported the Whisky Rebellion of 1791 to 1794, which resisted collection of the 1791 excise tax
356
on whisky.
Eventually, Gallatin became Secretary of the Treasury
from 1801 to 1814 under Jefferson (and later Madison), and in that
capacity Gallatin opposed all internal taxes. However, Gallatin can

352

353

354

355

356

that apportionment would not make sense on account of concerns about geographical
distribution. Thus, the carriage tax (on income-producing tangible property) would appear, from the perspective of the Pollock II Justices, to be indistinguishable from a tax on
intangible investment property.
Adam Smith uses the term “stock” to include all property and money deployed in a profitseeking activity. See SMITH, supra note 77, at 372–75. The Wolcott Report basically follows
Smith’s terminology. See WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 439.
It would have been debatable whether a tax on homes, farm animals, unharvested crops,
and/or farm implements would have been required to be apportioned. A related issue
would be whether state law definitions of “real property” would control.
The term “direct tax” appeared spontaneously on July 12 as a floor amendment by Morris
to his own motion. Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302, reprinted in Appendix
A. Rakove, on the basis of a failure to answer a query on this point, opines that the ambiguity was deliberate. RAKOVE, supra note 212, at 179.
Gallatin signed the Harrisburg petition of Sept. 3, 1788, that proposed numerous weakening amendments, including one that direct taxes could be used only as a back-up to an
unfilled requisition quota. Pennsylvania Debates (Sept. 3, 1788), supra note 91, at 545.
EINHORN, supra note 27, at 188–94 (recounting Gallatin’s role in federal tax politics before becoming Treasury Secretary).
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hardly be viewed as a spokesman for the Framers or the original understanding of “direct tax.” Moreover, the term “direct tax” in the
state context (denoting all internal taxes) cannot be defined in the
constitutional sense (as being expressly exclusive of duties, imposts,
and excises). Tax modes that the states would use to fulfill requisition quotas do not become direct taxes if used by the federal government just because the requisitions themselves are direct taxes.
The few casual statements made during the ratification period that
357
might appear to lend support to Pollock II do not really do so.
The switch in the apportionment formula (noted in the second
358
paragraph of the quoted passage) from land values to population
was made only because population was viewed as a proxy for real estate wealth, which had been the Confederation rule of apportion359
ment. The dissatisfaction with using property wealth as the index of
apportionment stemmed solely from problems of administration.
The switch to population (as a proxy for wealth) was an administrative shortcut, but the principle was the same. The Framers even had
an economic theory for correlating real property wealth with population, namely, that free migration would increase demand (and pric360
es) for low-value property.
The theory does not work with respect
to personal property because prices (values) are independent of geography. Thus, there is no reason to think that the value of debt obligations, for example, would correlate with state populations. The
Pollock II majority feebly attempted to deal with that issue by the
357

See Virginia Debates (Mr. Monroe, June 10, 1788), supra note 10, at 215–16 (suggesting
that a tax on “all property” would be a direct tax). Monroe was an Anti-Federalist, who
opposed federal taxes other than imposts and requisitions. A speech by Alexander Hamilton at the New York Ratifying Convention begins with a statement that “a poll tax is a tyrannical tax,” continues with the observation that in time of war the government might
need “to lay hold of every resource,” cited an example where “[t]he United Netherlands
were obliged, on an emergency, to give up one twentieth of their property to the government,” and continued with sundry other observations about the exercise of a taxing
power, including the constraints of apportionment and politics. New York Debates (Mr.
Hamilton, June 28, 1788), supra note 118, at 364–65. This passage might be construed to
imply that Hamilton thought that a comprehensive wealth tax was either a capitation tax
or a direct tax, but it could also be interpreted as only offering an example (in addition
to a poll tax) of an unpopular emergency tax that would be rescinded when the emergency had ended. In any event, a wealth tax would include real estate in the tax base, and
therefore would be subject to apportionment.

358

Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 628 (1895).

359

Many Framers held the view that population was a reasonably accurate index of the private wealth within a state, but this view was not undisputed. See Johnson, Foul-Up, supra
note 7, at 33–34.

360

See Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 299–300 (explaining why population was a
good enough proxy for wealth in a nation where labor and capital could move freely).
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throwaway line at the end of the first quoted paragraph to the effect
361
This may be
that personal property was of general distribution.
true, but the 1894 income tax only implicated income-producing personal property, which might not have been of general distribution in
1895 (and probably was less so from 1787 to 1789). But at least attention can now be focused on the crux of the matter, namely, the relation of property to geography (states).
B. “Direct Tax” as a Tax on the Thing Itself Because of Its Geographical
Location
Can “direct tax” be given a meaning, compatible with ordinary us362
age, that encompasses requisitions, head taxes, and taxes on real estate, while excluding duties, imposts, and excises? The key is to link
“direct tax” to its legal consequences, namely, apportionment among the states.
Apportionment among states requires that any item subject to the tax have a
definite geographical location in a state, because the tax rate for a state is
the state’s quota divided by the value (or quantity) of the subject of
the tax within the state. A definition that fits all of the necessary requirements is this: a direct tax is a tax directly on objects having geographical locations. Capitation taxes, requisitions, and taxes on tangible
property all satisfy this definition, because in all three cases, the subjects are taxed because they are “there” (as opposed to because of
what they do), and all are geographically located.
It might be objected to that the proposed definition of direct tax
is formalistic and without substance. However, competing definitions
363
364
of direct tax are either equally formalistic or unworkable. Indeed,
formalism is necessary in distinguishing modes of taxation from one
another, since the boundaries among them are blurry as a matter of
substance. The carriage tax in Hylton can be viewed as either an “ex365
If “excise” refers to “personal
cise” or a “personal property tax.”
use,” then taxes on homes, collectibles, pets, vehicles, and so on are

361
362
363
364

365

Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 628.
See cases cited supra note 90.
Formalistic definitions include “internal taxes” and “tax on a person.”
As previously mentioned in the text accompanying notes 88–96, “not able to be passed
on” is unworkable. “General distribution” is also unworkable, because there is no standard of how proportional to population the distribution must be.
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 672–73
(4th ed. 1952) (citing old authority—including Blackstone—emphasizing the “personal
use” aspect of excises); supra text accompanying notes 344–45.
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366

excises.
If “excise” refers to “any use,” then virtually all taxes are
excises. If an excise is defined by a subject having a finite duration,
then it includes taxes on buildings, non-renewable natural resources,
livestock, tools of the trade, and intellectual property. The one essential characteristic of a property tax would appear to be periodicy (tax367
ing the same thing annually), but the carriage tax that was upheld
368
in Hylton was a periodic tax.
If one takes the position that the es369
sential characteristic of a property tax is valuation, then a low-rate
tax on investment property is hard to distinguish from an income
370
tax, because the market value of property can be described in terms
of the present value of its future net yield. Similarly, a tax on personal-use property can be described as an excise tax, because the
market value of personal-use property is the present discounted value
371
of future net use. The only difference between an income tax and a
tax on aggregate personal consumption relates to differences in ac372
counting for capital expenditures and borrowing. The only difference between a classic excise, like a retail sales tax on personal consumption items, and a consumption tax, or between a property tax
and a wealth tax, is aggregation and the resulting possibility of a progressive rate structure. Finally, the distinction between a tax on the
property itself and a tax on the person who owns such property is

366

367
368
369

370
371

372

The Wolcott Report treated a tax on homes as an excise, WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 440,
but the 1798 apportioned federal tax on real estate included a progressive tax on dwelling houses. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597, 598.
Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3(c) (2007) (defining “personal property tax” as a tax imposed
annually).
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) (noting that the tax was imposed annually).
Cf. I.R.C. § 164(b)(1) (2000) (defining “personal property tax” as an ad valorem tax).
Whether valuation is a legal litmus test is unclear because no non-apportioned federal ad
valorem tax has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. I propose that valuation be a
litmus test only for tangible personal property. See infra Part V.E.
See SMITH, supra note 77, at 377 (stating that periodic property taxes are really taxes on
income from property).
Pollock I equated a tax on property income with a tax on the property itself, but not on the
basis of present-value analysis as such. Nevertheless, Pollock I may simply have applied a
cruder (non-mathematical) version of present-value analysis, as the Court stated that
property has no real value apart from its economic yield. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan
and Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 580–81 (1895). The Court later had to recant the
substance-over-form approach of Pollock. See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S.
308, 314 (1937) (discussing the difference between property tax and tax on income from
property).
See Zelenak, supra note 267, at 845–55 (arguing that broad-based consumption taxes are
modified income taxes).
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meaningless in terms of substance, because in either case the owner
373
has to pay the tax or lose the property.
Formalism has its upside in the present context, because it posits a
relatively clear definition of “direct tax” that does not radically undermine long-standing doctrine or practice and cannot be perverted
by legislation.
C. Real Estate Taxes and Geography
The “inherently attributable to states” test is clearly satisfied by
real estate taxes, whether the tax base is determined by value or by
some other quantitative measure, such as number of acres. Land is
immovable and “there” for all to see. Slaves were legally considered
to be real estate by reason of being “attached to the land.” Buildings
are relatively fixed. If they are movable at all, the costs of doing so
are substantial.
Attributing “real estate tax” as the hard-core meaning of “direct
tax” makes good sense. First, since the value of real estate is largely a
function of population density, tax rates would tend to equalize
across states. The lower the population density in a given geographi374
cal area, the lower the per-acre value would tend to be. Thus, suppose that, as of 1787, Pennsylvania and South Carolina had the same
geographical area, but Pennsylvania had twice the population (and
twice the apportionment quota) as for South Carolina. But if the peracre price in Pennsylvania is twice that of South Carolina, the tax
375
rates would be the same. This analysis underlays the widely-held assumption in the Framing period that population was a reasonable, if
376
not perfect, proxy for land values.
Even if rate differentials would

373
374

375

See Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (finding no meaningful distinction between recourse and nonrecourse acquisition debt).
Land values are not necessarily rock-bottom in low-population large-area states such as
Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Nevada, as large amounts of land are government-owned or set aside as Indian reservations.
Suppose the state’s quota is $1 billion for every 2.5 million inhabitants:
TABLE 2: APPORTIONMENT AND LAND VALUES

376

Population

Quota

Acres

Value/p.a.

Total Value

Pennsylvania

10 million

4 billion

100 million

$100

1000 billion

4%

South Carolina

5 million

2 billion

100 million

$50

500 billion

4%

See supra notes 356–57 and accompanying text.

Tax Rate
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377

exist under an apportioned federal real estate tax, such differentials
would not have been perceived as being grossly inequitable. State
property taxes are not considered to be inherently “unfair” just because of state-to-state differences in rates. An apportioned federal real
estate tax can be made to look like a state tax in every respect but the
identity of its collectors. In addition, rates on property taxes are so
low (usually below 1 percent) that rate differentials are hardly perceptible. Any unpopularity of the early federal apportioned real estate taxes does not appear to have been on account of the inequities
of rates among states but rather on account of inconvenience and
378
high transaction costs.
Second, apportioned federal real estate taxes can also be fair with379
in states, as the rates determined for a state can be applied uniformly within a state. In contrast, state real estate taxes often suffer
from inequities resulting from different rates being set by different
political subdivisions.
Third, in contrast to apportioned excises where an the entire
380
state’s quota could be borne by a few non-wealthy individuals, a fed-

377

378

379

380

See EINHORN, supra note 27, at 159 (noting that apportionment of an income tax according
to state populations would have resulted in a maximum rate differential of 9.2% (Connecticut, the richest) to 17.9% (Mississippi, the poorest)). If the four highest and lowest
states were thrown out, the range would be a tolerable 11.1% to 16.2%. Einhorn does
not attempt a similar exercise for an ad valorem property tax, as one would need to know
aggregate state real estate values. This would be extremely difficult, as no apportioned
federal real estate tax has been laid since the Civil War, and state property tax regimes
use different valuation systems.
Henry Carter Adams does not attribute the unpopularity of these taxes to the rate inequities (which was a concern more of the Treasury). Adams, supra note 134, at 54–59, 64–68.
The debates of the ratification period demonstrated that such taxes were unpopular
without reference to inter-state inequities, partly because such taxes had to be paid out of
the property owner’s own pocket, partly because the administration was cumbersome,
and partly because a federal real estate tax was perceived as encroaching on state “turf.”
Charles J. Bullock’s study of direct taxes provides figures on the inequitable operation of
the 1861 apportioned property tax. Bullock, Part II, supra note 23, at 464–80. By then,
discrepancies among states in per-capita land values had actually widened (relative to the
1789–1916 period), and Adams (along with other commentators cited therein) bemoaned the inequities resulting from apportionment. However, it is not claimed that the
inequities as such were a cause of unpopularity in the poorer states that suffered by reason of the apportionment rule.
A tax structure in which the entire burden is borne by only one person (or a handful of
persons) resembles (in a structural sense) a “taking” more than a “tax.” See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (discussing what a “taking” is).
The Justices in Hylton v. United States invoked scenarios in which the subject of the tax was
either nonexistent in a state or present in small quantities relative to population. 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
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eral ad valorem real estate tax would impact as many persons as there
are landowners. Even in a state where there are very few landowners,
they would be sufficiently wealthy (on account of the landholdings
themselves) that the tax would not be disproportionate to ability to
381
pay.
D. Intangible Property and Geography
The proposed definition of direct taxes excludes acknowledged
non-direct taxes, that is, taxes on receipts, transfers, uses, privileges,
immunities, enjoyment, or activities. It happens that the locations of
the subjects of indirect taxes are geographically ambiguous. Thus, a
transaction (or other subject of an indirect tax) could be sourced to
any of: (1) the location of the seller, (2) the location of the buyer,
(3) the location of the owner, (4) the location (if any) of the thing,
(5) the location of an intermediary, (6) the place where title is legally
transferred or registered, or (7) the place stipulated in a contract or
other governing instrument. The mere possibility that a subject could
be assigned to geography is not sufficient to characterize a tax thereon as a “direct tax,” because the operative rules—that would dictate the end
results—would be produced only by implementing legislation and not by the
Constitution itself. A rule that would be so subject to manipulation
provides no guarantee or certainty, and therefore defeats the entire
382
purpose of placing it in the Constitution.
Intangible property has no inherent location in the same ways that
the subjects of non-direct taxes lack inherent location. Any assignment of an intangible to a state can only occur pursuant to a legislative rule, since no such rules exist in nature or under the Constitution. Shares of stock, for example, could be sourced to any of: (a)
383
the state of incorporation, (b) the state of the owner, (c) the state
of the location of the stock-certificate, or (d) the state of the location
of the transfer agent. (Actually, some or all of these locations could
be outside of the United States.) Patent rights and copyrights cannot
be assigned to states at all, because the legal rights inherent in them

381

382

383

The Constitution does not require that an apportioned real estate tax be based on values
or applied uniformly across states or uniformly within states. However, these possible deformities would raise strong political opposition.
There were several comments that the enumeration be done through a precise standard
(the census) rather than being left to the legislature, and a motion to that effect was
adopted. Madison’s Notes (July 11), supra note 17, at 294–95, 297, 298.
Cf. I.R.C. § 861(a)(2) (2000) (sourcing dividends by nationality of corporation).
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are granted by the federal government. Apportionment can work only if the same item cannot be “counted” in more than one state.
E. Tangible Personal Property and Geography; Hylton Reconsidered
Like real estate and individuals, tangible personal property, although sometimes moveable, has a single location at any point in
time by reason of its physical existence. Tangible personal property
can be hidden, but that goes only to the administrative difficulty of
enforcing any such tax.
Treating a tax on tangible personal property as being subject to
apportionment eliminates the problem of what constitutes a real estate tax. Thus, any tax (imposed periodically by reason of ownership
and according to value) on farm equipment, livestock, minerals,
crops, and timber, whether or not harvested or extracted, would be
384
subject to apportionment.
The federal tax on carriages that was held exempt from the rule
of apportionment might be characterized as either a tangible personal property tax or as an excise tax by reason of being a tax on
385
use. If Hylton is characterized as having upheld a tangible personal
property tax, then its holding is incompatible with the thesis that
such a tax should be subject to apportionment.
The 1796 carriage tax at issue in Hylton was an annual tax but not
an ad valorem tax: the tax amount was keyed to the physical characteristics of the carriage. The tax was imposed only on carriages sub386
ject to certain uses, as opposed to ownership per se. Imposing the
tax on use rather than ownership appears to have been done pre387
ceisely to overcome constitutional objection.
Today such a tax is

384

385
386

387

Compare Virginia Debates (Mr. John Marshall, June 10, 1788) supra note 10, at 229–31,
reprinted in Appendix C (stating that a tax on farm equipment and livestock was a direct
tax), with supra text accompanying note 172 (Justice Paterson expressing doubt on this
point and Justice Iredell suggesting that “direct tax” is limited to taxes on real estate or
things “affixed to the land”).
See sources cited supra notes 159–61. Only Justice Paterson stressed the excise-tax point,
quoting Adam Smith. See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180–81.
The uses were personal use, being let out for hire, or for the conveying of passengers.
Farm use and carrying goods and wares were excluded uses. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 373, 374, repealed by Act of May 28, 1796, ch. 37, 1 Stat. 478.
See supra text accompanying note 76 (colloquy between Madison and Fisher Ames in the
House).
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called a license fee, and license fees (as taxes on uses) are considered
388
to be excises, which are expressly exempt from apportionment.
Since tangible personal property is a human artifact produced for
use, there is inherent difficulty in deciding whether such taxes are
property taxes or excise taxes. A test to resolve this problem that is
simple and easy to apply is this: a tax on tangible personal property is
a “property” tax if it is imposed periodically on the value of the item.
Since the carriage tax in Hylton was not imposed according to valuation, it was an excise (rather than a tangible personal property tax)
under this test. This “excise” interpretation of Hylton is paralleled in
the regulations under section 164 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which define “personal property taxes” (but not “real property tax389
es”) as requiring valuation. In contrast, valuation need not be a requirement for real estate taxes. Real estate is easy to identify on account of being immovable. Real estate taxes of necessity are capable
of reaching unimproved land that is not used for anything, because
such land exists in nature and is not a human artifact. Under this
approach, a per-acre land tax would still be subject to apportionment
by reason of being a real estate tax, as the Framers intended, despite
the absence of valuation.
The “reasonably capable” test of direct tax that is commonly attributed to Hylton is not suitable as a legal principle, unless it is taken
to refer the ability to unequivocally locate the tax subjects in states.
If, as actually used in Hylton, it refers to the inequity of state rate differentials caused by an erratic distribution of the item, then the test
390
391
refers to matters of degree, not kind.
Courts are not wellequipped to apply this kind of test. Carriages were not so erratically
distributed among the states relative to population that a handful of
person would be subject to astronomical tax rates in one or more

388
389

390
391

See Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899) (discussing the privilege of making sales and
trades).
I.R.C. § 164(a)(2) (2000) allows a deduction for state and local personal property taxes,
but an automobile license fee is not viewed as a personal property tax unless it is assessed
according to value. Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3(c) (2007). Interestingly, the definition of real
property taxes in subsection b of the same regulation does not require valuation. Id.
§ 1.164-3(b).
Compare supra note 374, with supra note 389, which list rate differentials for the 1798
carriage tax and the 2000 income tax, if both had to be apportioned.
Apportionment would be impossible only if there is at least one state in which the item is
not found at all.
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392

states.
Does Hylton mean that any single-item tax would flunk the
reasonably-capable test? What if the class were broad enough, such as
business-use property, inventory, or home furnishings, so that distri393
bution in relation to population were not expected to be erratic?
The “reasonably capable” test also raises the issue of the role of factfinding: would the litigants in a case challenging such a tax have to
introduce evidence concerning the distribution of the item? It would
seem that the rule would require it, but no case has relied on such a
fact-finding, and developing the facts on a case-by-case basis would be
very costly. In contrast, requiring apportionment of ad valorem tangible personal property taxes would be an easy rule to apply, as no factfinding would be required.
394
This reinterpretation of Hylton as an excise tax case is virtually
cost-free to the federal government, which is wholly ill-equipped to
administer ad valorem tangible personal property taxes in any event.
It appears that no existing federal tax would be affected. For example, the federal taxes on alcoholic beverages include per-gallon taxes
and occupational-license taxes, and none of these are subject to the
395
rule of apportionment.
F. Geography, Federalism, and Taxes
The apportionment requirement for direct taxes has operated to
institutionalize a modus operandi under which the federal government,
in practice, cedes “jurisdiction” to the states to tax real estate (and, in
my view, tangible personal property), subject to an exception for cases of
national emergency. The cession is institutionalized by giving states a
political interest—pro or con—in the federal use of apportioned taxes. The interest resides in the tax rates applicable in any state relative
to the rates applicable in other states. The justification for this cession is that, as a matter of both fairness and administration, it is pru-

392

393
394
395

Einhorn used the actual yield of the carriage tax in 1796 to construct a table in which the
per-carriage rates ranged from $0.73 (Delaware) to $5.69 (Georgia). EINHORN, supra
note 27, at 161.
See note 380.
Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2362–63, also interprets Hylton as an excise tax
case, as did Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 623–27 (1895).
See I.R.C. §§ 5001, 5041, 5051 (2000) (imposing a tax on distilled spirits, wine, and beer).
These are one-time taxes on production or importation. Occupational taxes are assessed
at a fixed annual amount on producers, etc. See id. §§ 5081, 5111, 5121 (imposing a tax
on alcohol proprietors). The federal excise tax on tobacco products is a one-time tax by
weight. See id. §§ 5701, 5703(b) (laying out the rates of the tobacco tax).
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dent for the federal government not to encroach on matters that are
inherently local and state-connected.
The state-connectedness of real estate, and taxes thereon, is indicated foremost by the fact that the real estate in a state is coterminous
with the territory and legal jurisdiction of the state. Second, real estate located in one state cannot be located in any other state, nor can
it be moved to another state, and real estate markets tend to be local.
Third, real estate is considered inherently local for all legal purposes
396
apart from taxation. Fourth, all states had experience with real es397
tate taxes. Fifth, real estate taxes are typically administered according to appraisals, and appraisals require knowledge of local condi398
tions. Sixth, a person is likely to gauge the fairness of a real estate
tax by how his neighbors are taxed with respect to the same subject,
not by how real estate is taxed in another state. Seventh, real estate
taxes can be collected from the property itself by levy and execution,
and identification of and jurisdiction over the owner is not necessary.
The apportionment requirement can find policy support in the
notion of comparative advantage, which can be approached by asking, “Which tax modes are best tailored to the position of states, as
opposed to the federal government?” The chief problem facing the
states, vis-à-vis other states, is the dilution of their tax base by the shifting of economic activity into lower-tax jurisdictions. Taxes on real estate are immune to mobility. Head taxes are the next best taxes from
this angle, as the monetary and psychological costs of changing residence are high compared to that of moving economic activity. The
399
most easily avoided state taxes by far are taxes on intangibles, and
396

397
398

399

It is hornbook law that the situs of real estate determines the law to be applied to questions concerning its ownership, succession, and disposition. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 223, 277, 278 (1971) (land conveyances and land
trusts).
The various kinds of real estate taxes used by the states are listed in WOLCOTT, supra note
88, at 437.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B; Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.). However, appraisals did not become universal until the nineteenth century. For a brief history of state
property taxation, see generally Glenn W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United
States, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA, Sept. 30, 2002, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/
fisher.property.tax.history.us.
Adam Smith recognized this crucial distinction between real estate taxes and intangibles.
SMITH, supra note 77, at 373; see also Kirk J. Stark, State Tax Shelters and U.S. Fiscal Federalism, 26 VA. TAX REV. 789 (2007) (discussing income from intangibles under state corporate income taxes). The ability to move intangible investments offshore is a major problem for international taxation generally. See I.R.C. §§ 951(a), 954(c), 1291–1297 (2000)
(setting forth the taxation of foreign passive income of U.S. citizens and residents); see al-

Apr. 2009]

FEDERAL TAXES SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT RULE

931

here it would be the federal government that would possess a clear
comparative advantage, just as it does with personal taxes on annual
income or consumption, because (1) source or situs is not a legal
400
constraint on federal taxing jusrisdiction, and (2) the lack of geographical location is not much of a practical constraint on admini401
The federal government would also have a comparative
stration.
402
advantage with respect to transactional excises on big-ticket items
403
because state taxes of this type are easily avoided.
Tangible personal property, although movable, is mostly bound to
such locations as homes and business premises. Although wholesalers can stockpile inventory (and collectors can stash collectibles) in
states with low (or no) tangibles taxes, the situs states would be able
tax such property if they so desired. A tangibles tax requires a bureaucracy that can enter business premises and warehouses. States
will want to make judgment calls as to what kinds of tangibles are
worth taxing given the administrative and political costs. The federal
government labors under a comparative disadvantage in this area relative to the states.
The relative comparative advantages are reflected in the fact that
404
all states impose real estate taxes, but practically none impose taxes
405
State taxes on tangible personal property (other
on intangibles.
than household goods) are fairly common, but they vary considerably
from state to state.

400
401
402
403

404
405

so id. § 871(a) (conceding virtual impossibility of trying to tax non-real-estate capital gains
of non-resident aliens). In contrast, the situs country can effectively tax real estate income and capital gains of owners who are non-resident aliens. See id. § 897 (taxing gains
on real property interests located in the United States).
See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (holding that Congress had power to tax U.S. citizen residing in Mexico on foreign-source income).
For example, stocks and bonds are mostly registered as to ownership. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 163(f) (2000) (denying interest deductions on certain unregistered bonds).
It is unlikely that people would go to serious efforts to avoid sales taxes on routine consumer purchases.
Sales of goods are exempt from situs-state sales tax if the buyer is out-of-state, and use
taxes (on buyers) imposed by the state of residence are not enforced because enforcement would entail invasion of the home. (Use taxes are similar to tangible personal
property taxes on personal-use items in this respect.) Even if the situs state could tax all
sales, sales could be shifted to lower-tax states, as occurs in international taxation. See
I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 865 (2000) (giving sellers considerable ability to choose from where
their sales income will be sourced).
See generally SUSAN PACE HAMILL, AS CERTAIN AS DEATH: A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF STATE
AND LOCAL TAX LAWS (2007) (describing revenue sources for all states).
It appears that only Mississippi and Pennsylvania attempt to tax intangibles to any significant degree. See id. at 262, 414.
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***
To conclude this Part, apportionment should be required of taxes
on real and personal tangible property only, excluding taxes on intangible property. Treating federal taxes on tangible personal property as direct taxes would be inconsequential because such taxes can
easily be structured as excises, as was the case with the 1794 carriage
tax.
VII. APPLICATIONS
Apportionment of a federal tax is required only for a direct tax
that is not an income tax. Limiting “direct tax” to requisitions, capitation taxes, and taxes on tangible property (real and personal) does
not solve all issues of current interest.
A. Can Ad Valorem Property Taxes Be Characterized as Income Taxes?
It has been suggested that, notwithstanding all that has been said
to this point, a federal ad valorem property tax is valid under the Sixteenth Amendment as an “income tax,” the theory being that a tax on
the value of the property that is less than the “natural interest rate” is
406
in substance a tax on the income yield from the property.
However, substance-over-form arguments generally do not work under the
taxing clauses of the Constitution because then, as noted earlier, all
407
distinctions collapse.
In addition, the Supreme Court after Pollock
has acknowledged that income and property taxes are not the same
408
in substance. An income tax—especially a “realization” income tax
- is a tax on economic outcomes and requires accounting for actual
409
(relevant) events, namely, receipts and costs. A property tax, even
406

407
408
409

See GEORGE COOPER, TAKING WEALTH TAXATION SERIOUSLY 29 (Ass’n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y. 1979); Schenk, supra note 4, at 441 (“To pass constitutional muster, the
wealth tax proposed here easily could be reframed as an income tax with a base equal to
the risk-free return to certain assets.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 362–69.
See sources cited supra notes 189–90.
Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(3), (b)(2) (2008) (stating that “income tax” for purposes of
the foreign tax credit entails realizations and receipts). Incidentally, a mark-to-market income tax would probably be valid under the Sixteenth Amendment as embodying a particular means of accounting for receipts and costs. The Supreme Court has consistently
given Congress broad discretion over income tax accounting issues. See Burnet v. Sanford
& Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931) (explaining that the Sixteenth Amendment does
not require Congress to adopt a certain income tax scheme); Cottage Sav. Ass’n v.
Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (deferring to the Commissioner’s reasonable regulatory in-
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under the proffered analysis, is (at best) a tax on the potential earnings of a hypothetical amount of capital (equal to the value of the
property) that might be invested so as to produce a certain minimum
net cash yield.
B. Personal Wealth Taxes
According to the analysis heretofore, a personal wealth tax would
be unconstitutional at least to the extent that the value of real estate
410
and tangible property is included in the tax base. A possible argument against this result might be that such a tax is really an excise tax
on the privilege of property ownership. The Supreme Court has held
on various occasions that a federal tax on a “privilege” is an “excise”
411
not subject to apportionment. However, the kinds of privileges involved in these cases involve discrete positive-law benefits conferred
by government, such as licenses, charters, limited liability, immunities, and rights of succession. Extending the concept to “basic” rights

terpretation of the Internal Revenue Code because power had been delegated to him by
Congress).
410

Jensen appears to argue that all personal taxes are capitation taxes or direct taxes by reason of the aggregation of economic attributes to the person. See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 5, at 2392–93, 2407. Adam Smith included personal wealth taxes in the category of “capitation” taxes, but he used them to refer only to certain taxes paid out of
pocket, as opposed to taxes payable out of rents, profits, or wages. See SMITH, supra note
77, at 382. However, Smith attached no particular consequence to this terminology.
Most property taxes in Smith’s scheme were not capitation taxes but taxes on cash or inkind rents. See id. at 362–72. There is no evidence that the Framers used “capitation tax”
in the way Smith used it. References to capitation taxes in the Convention and ratification debates were uniformly to head taxes (poll taxes). See sources cited supra note 232
(explaining why these kinds of taxes were relatively common in the colonies); see also supra note 216 and accompanying text. “Capitation tax” in Article I, Section 9, Clause 4,
was clearly meant to cover a tax on slaves and poll taxes. Although the Wolcott Report of
1796 observed that four states had primitive personal wealth taxes, that Report did not refer to them as “capitation taxes.” Taxes on trades and professions (which were forerunners of income taxes and taxes on wages) were likewise not considered capitation taxes
either by Smith or in the colonies, nor apportionable direct taxes by the Wolcott Report.
WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 439. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (8th ed. 2004)
(cross-referencing capitation tax with “poll tax,” which means fixed per-person tax). The
categorization of any tax should not be altered simply on the basis of aggregating economic attributes to the person. Aggregation is only relevant as an accounting device that
renders graduated rate schedules possible. Rate schedules have nothing to do with what
is a “direct tax.”

411

See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (holding an income tax on the privilege of doing business as a corporation as an excise); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41
(1900) (holding a tax on the privilege of succession as an excise); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S.
509 (1899) (holding a tax on the privilege of making sales and trades on an exchange as
an excise).
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held by everyone would open up the “excise” concept to the point
where all other tax categories (except possibly requisitions and capitation taxes) would be swallowed up. Since “excises” stands besides
“imposts,” “duties,” and “direct taxes” in the constitutional text, such
a view is untenable.
Ackerman concedes that a federal real estate tax might be a “direct tax” but contends that a tax on a person’s aggregate net wealth
412
would not be a direct tax on the ground that a personal wealth tax
413
(unlike a classic property tax) would be net of liabilities. However,
414
415
For
possible subtractions from a tax base do not define the tax.
example, per-person fixed-dollar exemptions under any tax do not
convert the tax into a capitation tax. In addition, subtractions are
simply the negative (mirror) of the gross tax base. Negative wealth
would be subtracted only because the tax base is initially constituted
by positive wealth. Only positive net tax bases matter.
C. Taxing Imputed Income
The term “imputed income” has traditionally been used to refer
to the rental value of an asset owned by the taxpayer that is held for
personal use. Many commentators argue that net imputed income
416
from homes should be taxed like other investments, and taxes of

412
413

414

415

416

See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 56.
See id. at 56–57. The other reason offered by Ackerman is that the Hylton justices “selfconsciously” refused to define direct tax as a comprehensive wealth tax. But why take on
an irrelevant issue? It was enough for the Hylton justices to distinguish the carriage tax
from a real estate tax.
Allowing liabilities to reduce the tax base would open up tax-avoidance possibilities, such
as the incurring of phantom debt or debt used to purchase cash or assets that can be readily concealed. Thus, it is likely that any wealth tax would contain rules disallowing deductions for certain liabilities. Indeed, allowing deductions for liabilities is no more an
inevitability under a wealth tax as it would be under a property tax.
Deductions and exemptions did not cause any problem for the Pollock holdings that taxes
on rents and investment income were direct taxes. In a similar vein, I argue that an “income tax” (at least under the Sixteenth Amendment) is a tax on gross receipts. See Joseph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of NonExcludible Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369, 391–407 (2007); Zelenak, supra note
267, at 847–55 (arguing persuasively that a cash-flow consumption tax cannot be distinguished from an income tax on the basis of tax treatment of borrowing and capital expenditures).
See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 139–43 (2d ed. 1976) (analyzing the
tax exemption for interest on government-issued bonds); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION, 110–24 (1938) (discussing the pros and cons of non-taxation of home
ownership).
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417

this type are not unprecedented. The constitutionality of such a tax
could be a meaningful issue. Unfortunately, the answer is not clear.
Although economists refer to such a tax as being on “income,” the
benefits obtained from home ownership are not income in a tax
sense. Economists sometimes define “income” as a flow of psychic sa418
tisfactions or the power to obtain such a flow, but pure psychic enjoyment is not income in the tax sense, and pure psychic pain is not
negative income. Although home ownership allows one to avoid the
costs of paying rent, the avoidance of costs is also not income in the
tax sense, especially since the amount of foregone rent is uncertain.
Income in the tax sense means an increase in material wealth (cash,
419
property received in kind), or the equivalent thereof.
However, a provision of the income tax that imposes a (nonapportioned) tax on non-income is valid if the effect of the provision
420
is to impose an indirect tax. A tax on the “imputed income” from
owner-occupied homes could be valid as an excise on the ground that
it is a tax on “use,” rather than ownership, and many early authorities
421
can be cited for such a proposition.
Also, the Wolcott Report (although not a legal opinion) considered a “homes tax” to be outside
422
of the apportionment requirement.
417
418

419

420
421

422

See SIMONS, supra note 416, at 112 n.3, 116–17 (citing examples from several countries).
See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, reprinted in 4
READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 59 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds.,
1959).
See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (citing “accession to wealth”
as the core of the gross income concept); accord Thomas Chancellor, Imputed Income and
the Ideal Income Tax, 67 OR. L. REV. 561 (1988). Positive income tax law generally taxes
consumption by disallowing deductions for consumption outlays. See I.R.C. § 165(c)
(2000) (limiting deductions to trade or business losses, losses in profit-seeking activity,
and certain casualty losses); id. § 167(a) (disallowing depreciation deductions on personal-use property); id. § 262 (denying a deduction for personal expenses). Consumption received in-kind is taxed only in cases (such as employee fringe benefits and prizes)
where the transaction as a whole can be viewed as the receipt of cash followed by the
spending of the cash. Otherwise, psychic benefits and intangible economic benefits are
not taxed. See United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that for
something to be considered income, “[t]here must be an economic gain”). Finally, the
consumption attributable to homes is taxed: the purchase price (present value of future
net use value) is taxed by never being deductible. Those who advocate taxing imputed
income really want consumer durables to be taxed the same as income-producing investments.
See cases cited supra note 192.
See SMITH, supra note 77, at 370 (equating a tax on habitations as a tax on consumption);
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.) (viewing a tax on use as an excise); supra note 61 (Representative Fisher Ames in debating the
1794 carriage tax in the House).
WOLCOTT, supra note 88, at 440.
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A tax on imputed income from homes might also be considered a
property tax. The apportioned federal tax of 1798 was on homes, as
423
A tax on a percentage of a property
well as on lands and slaves.
item’s value has been held to be a direct tax not only by lower
424
courts but also by the Supreme Court, if without discussion, in the
425
famous case of Eisner v. Macomber. The Supreme Court has stated in
dictum that an unapportioned federal tax on imputed income is not
426
valid.
The Hylton case is not clearly to the contrary, since the carriage tax was not assessed on the basis of value.
It is awkward to view a tax as being both an excise tax and a direct
tax, because a tax cannot satisfy the uniformity and apportionment
requirements at the same time and because there is no constitutional
427
tie-breaker. If “direct tax” and “excise” are defined independently
428
of each other there could be gaps (as well as overlaps) in the consti429
tutional scheme, but that would lie contrary to the settled doctrine

423
424

425

426

427
428

429

Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597.
Indep. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 757 (1929), aff’d, 67 F.2d 470 (6th Cir.
1933), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371
(1934).
252 U.S. 189, 217–19 (1920) (holding that a tax on a pro-rata stock dividend, which is a
tax on a percentage of the value of the taxpayer’s stock ownership in a company, is an
unapportioned direct tax).
Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co. considered a provision relating to the taxation of
insurance companies that disallowed certain deductions relating to real estate unless the
taxpayer included in gross income an amount equal to four percent of its value. 292 U.S.
371, 375 (1934). The Board of Tax Appeals held that imputed income was not “income”
under the Sixteenth Amendment, and that a tax on a percentage of the value of real
property is a direct tax. See Indep. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 757 (1929),
aff’d, 67 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1933). The Supreme Court, although assuming that a tax on a
percentage of the value of the property would be a direct tax, reversed on the ground
that the provision in question was essentially a deduction-disallowance rule (akin to I.R.C.
§ 265(a)), and therefore valid. 252 U.S. at 380–81. Thus, it can be said that the Supreme
Court has not directly considered the excise tax theory.
Since apportionment and uniformity are incompatible, it has to be decided, for any given
tax, which one of these principles controls.
It appears that no Supreme Court case has held an excise to be also a direct tax. Justice
Chase’s opinion in Hylton suggested the possibility of both overlap and non-coverage, Pollock I hints at a priority for direct-tax characterization in case of overlap, and Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co. hints at just the opposite, but ultimately the doctrine has settled on the proposition that an excise cannot also be a direct tax and vice versa. See 220 U.S. 107 (1911)
(upholding unapportioned corporate income tax as an excise).
Overlap is avoided only if (a) one category includes all taxes (with the other category being a subset)—an untenable position here—or (b) one category is the negative of the
other. Otherwise, the two categories would be defined independently of each other, resulting in overlaps and gaps.
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that all federal taxes should be subject to one geographic non430
discrimination principle or the other.
If “use” were determinative of excise status, then about the only
clear direct tax would be one on unused land, contrary to the intent
of the Framers. In addition, “use” is a poor legal test, because it requires fact-finding, and would create incentives for fraud and perjury.
A much cleaner approach (that avoids any fact-finding) is that which
limits “direct tax” to requisitions, capitation taxes, and tangible property taxes. The definitions of “real estate tax” and “tangible personal
property tax” offered earlier are not dependent on the concept of
use: the touchstone for real estate taxes is attachment to the land,
and the touchstone for tangible personal property taxes is valuation
and periodic imposition. Moreover, ownership is prior to use, because use derives from, and is an incident of, ownership. Although
the “legislative history” of “direct tax” excludes taxes on “consump431
tion,” that term was probably used by the Framers as a shorthand
term that would encompass imposts, duties, and excises. In any
event, an annual tax on a percentage of the value of property is not a
tax on actual consumption, but only on a hypothetical monetary return. Treating imputed income as consumption would erase the significance of ownership, whereas viewing imputed income as an incident of ownership would not erode the concept of taxable
consumption, which can be easily reached by one-time taxes on
spending for consumption and in-kind consumption benefits received from third parties.
Therefore, I conclude that a tax on imputed income from tangible property should be treated as being subject to the rule of apportionment. Such a proposition is of negligible consequence, since a
political system that cannot swallow a tax on the unrealized appreciation of publicly-traded securities would hardly have an appetite for a
tax on hypothetical income from non-liquid tangible assets. Moreover, apportionment can be avoided by license fees not keyed to
value, as was the case in Hylton.

430

See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (holding that all non-direct taxes
are subject to the uniformity requirement).

431

See text accompanying supra note 52, reprinted in Appendix A; THE FEDERALIST NO. 36
(Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in Appendix B.
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D. Taxing Personal Endowment
An endowment tax, as distinguished from a wealth tax, is a tax on
432
a person’s human capital, or wage-earning capacity.
There being, apparently, no authority or even speculation on the
constitutional status of a federal endowment tax, the issue will be approached indirectly by examining whether endowment taxes are
closer to excises or taxes on tangible property. Like a property tax, a
tax on personal endowment is a tax on income-producing potential,
as opposed to economic uses or outcomes. A person can allow human capital to lie fallow just as in the case of real estate. In both cases, the subject of the tax is not intrinsically linked to the means of
paying it. Like property taxes, a tax on personal endowment as such
is a tax on “being” rather than “becoming,” “potentiality” rather than
“actualization,” and “existence” rather than “use.” Personal endowment resembles property in that its possessor has the right to exclusive use. Also, it is viewed as “capital” that, if used, produces income.
Although property is inherently transferable and human capital is
not, this difference only describes an added barrier to liquidity in the
case of an endowment tax. In Smithian terms, an endowment tax is
not a means of indirectly taxing some other economic attribute, such
as income, wealth, or consumption, nor is its incidence shiftable.
Approaching the matter from the notion of apportionment, a tax
on human capital is capable of apportionment because of the fact
that personal endowment is attached to individuals and because individuals can be geographically linked to states. Moreover, human capital is probably allocated among states in rough proportion to population because genetic endowment, education, and family status,
which are major components of human capital, are likely to be randomly distributed among population groups, so that such a tax would
be “reasonably” capable of apportionment among the states in accordance with population.

432

Discussion of taxation of endowment is found in David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1057 (2007); Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX
JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr, eds.,
2002); Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to Endowment Taxation, 18 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 47 (2005); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145 (2006) (critiquing earning-capacity concept of endowment as too narrow); Linda Sugin, Let the Beachcomber Drown: Why Taxing Endowment Is
Unjust (Fordham Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 959710, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102370.
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Thus, althought it is hard to discern any state interest or capability
to be served by the apportionment of an endowment tax, it cannot
simply be assumed that such a tax, if enacted, would be exempt from
the rule of apportionment. But even if a personal endowment tax
were held to be a direct tax, the revenue-raising ability of the federal
government would not be seriously disabled, because various components of endowment are reachable under taxes that would not need
to be apportioned. For example, occupational license fees are clearly
excises, as are taxes on inherited wealth. From the big-picture perspective, the constitutional values of individual liberty and autonomy
433
are undermined by a personal endowment tax, and, if apportionment were to render such a tax more difficult to enact at the federal
level, then (ironically) the apportionment requirement, deemed to
be useful in preserving that one social institution that wholly negated
434
liberty, would operate to preserve liberty.

433

The tax would force one to work or, if the tax were high enough, to force one to work at
a job she would dislike. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:
TAXES AND JUSTICE 123 (2002) (explaining that endowment taxation restricts one’s
choices of work); Sugin, supra note 432, at 36–37.

434

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections invalidated payment of a slight, but universal, head tax
as a qualification for voting on the grounds that payment of a head tax bore no rational
relation to voting qualifications. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Similarly, an endowment-type capitation tax could be invalidated if it were found to impinge on one’s liberty interest of
shaping one’s vocational life plan. See generally TRIBE, supra note 335, at § 15-14 (discussing right to pursue a vocation). Because an endowment tax operates without regard to
specific taxpayer actions or economic outcomes, it amounts to a penalty on “status” or
“selfhood.” Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (invalidating as cruel
and unusual punishment a criminal conviction for the status of being a drug addict). A
policy of curbing a fundamental right in itself cannot count as a valid government interest, and the government interest in raising revenue can be satisfied by other means that
are less intrusive on liberty interests. See Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967) (explaining the lessrestrictive-alternative principle and advocating for its expanded use by the Supreme
Court).
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APPENDIX A
THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
BY JAMES MADISON

435

THURSDAY. JULY 12. IN CONVENTION
r

r

M . GOV . MORRIS moved to add to the clause empowering the
Legislature to vary the Representation according to the principles of
wealth & number of inhabts. a “proviso that taxation shall be in proportion to Representation.”
r
M . BUTLER contended again that Representation Sd.. be according to the full number of inhabts. including all the blacks; admitting
the justice of Mr. Govr. Morris’s motion.
r
M . MASON also admitted the justice of the principle, but was
afraid embarrassments might be occasioned to the Legislature by it.
It might drive the Legislature to the plan of Requisitions.
r
r
M . GOV . MORRIS, admitted that some objections lay agst. his
motion, but supposed they would be removed by restraining the rule
to direct taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports & imports &
on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable. Notwithstanding
what had been said to the contrary he was persuaded that the imports
& consumption were pretty nearly equal throughout the Union.
General PINKNEY liked the idea. He thought it so just that it
could not be objected to. But foresaw that if the revision of the census was left to the discretion of the Legislature, it would never be carried into execution. The rule must be fixed, and the execution of it
enforced by the Constitution. He was alarmed at what was said yesterday, concerning the negroes. He was now again alarmed at what
had been thrown out concerning the taxing of exports. S. Carola. has
in one year exported to the amount of £600,000 Sterling all which
was the fruit of the labor of her blacks. Will she be represented in
proportion to this amount? She will not. Neither ought she then to
be subject to a tax on it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the
system, restraining the Legislature from taxing Exports.
r
M . WILSON approved the principle, but could not see how it
could be carried into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation.
435

Madison’s Notes (July 12), supra note 17, at 302–06 (footnotes omitted). There was no
Rhode Island delegation, and the delegations from New Hampshire and New York were
absent on this date.
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M . GOV . MORRIS having so varied his Motion by inserting the
word “direct.” It passd. nem. con. as follows—”provided the always
that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to representation.”
r
M . DAVIE, said it was high time now to speak out. He saw that it
was meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any
share of Representation for their blacks. He was sure that N. Carola.
would never confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least
as 3/5 . If the Eastern States meant therefore to exclude them altogether the business was at an end.
r
D . JOHNSON, thought that wealth and population were the true,
equitable rule of representation; but he conceived that these two
principles resolved themselves into one; population being the best
measure of wealth. He concluded therefore that ye. number of people ought to be established as the rule, and that all descriptions including blacks equally with the whites, ought to fall within the computation. As various opinions had been expressed on the subject, he
would move that a Committee might be appointed to take them into
consideration and report thereon.
r
r
M . GOV . MORRIS. It has been said that it is high time to speak
out, as one member, he would candidly do so. He came here to form
a compact for the good of America. He was ready to do so with all
the States. He hoped & believed that all would enter into such a
Compact. If they would not he was ready to join with any States that
would. But as the Compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain for the
Eastern States to insist on what the Southn. States will never agree to.
It is equally vain for the latter to require what the other States can
never admit; and he verily believed the people of Pena. will never
agree to a representation of Negroes. What can be desired by these
States more than has been already proposed; that the Legislature
shall from time to time regulate Representation according to population & wealth.
Gen. PINKNEY desired that the rule of wealth should be ascertained and not left to the pleasure of the Legislature; and that property in slaves should not be exposed to danger under a Govr. instituted for the protection of property.
The first clause in the Report of the first Grand Committee was
postponed.
r
M . ELSEWORTH. In order to carry into effect the principle established, moved to add to the last clause adopted by the House the
words following “and that the rule of contribution by direct taxation
for the support of the Government of the U. States shall be the number of white inhabitants, and three fifths of every other description in
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the several States, until some other rule that shall more accurately ascertain the wealth of the several States can be devised and adopted by
the Legislature.”
r

M . BUTLER seconded the motion in order that it might be
committed.
r

M . RANDOLPH was not satisfied with the motion. The danger
will be revived that the ingenuity of the Legislature may evade or pervert the rule so as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged in
the first instance. He proposed in lieu of Mr. Elseworth’s motion,
“that in order to ascertain the alterations in Representation that may
be required from time to time by changes in the relative circumstances of the States, a census shall be taken within two years from the
1st. meeting of the Genl. Legislature of the U.S., and once within the
term of every year afterwards, of all the inhabitants in the manner &
according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution
of the 18th day of Apl. 1783; [rating the blacks at 3/5 of their number] and, that the Legislature of the U.S. shall arrange the Representation accordingly.”—He urged strenuously that express security
ought to be provided for including slaves in the ratio of Representation. He lamented that such a species of property existed. But as it
did exist the holders of it would require this security. It was perceived
that the design was entertained by some of excluding slaves altogether; the Legislature therefore ought not to be left at liberty.
r

M . ELSEWORTH withdraws his motion & seconds that of Mr.
Randolph.
r

M . WILSON observed that less umbrage would perhaps be taken
agst. an admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if it
should be so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient
in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation:
and as representation was to be according to taxation, the end would
be equally attained. He accordingly moved & was 2ded. so to alter
the last clause adopted by the House, that together with the amendment proposed the whole should read as follows—provided always
that the representation ought to be proportioned according to direct
taxation, and in order to ascertain the alterations in the direct taxation which may be required from time to time by the changes in the
relative circumstances of the States. Resolved that a census be taken
within two years from the first meeting of the Legislature of the U.
States, and once within the term of every years afterwards of all the
inhabitants of the U.S. in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18.1783; and
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that the Legislature of the U. S. shall proportion the direct taxation
accordingly.”
r
M . KING. Altho’ this amendment varies the aspect somewhat, he
had still two powerful objections agst. tying down the Legislature to
the rule of numbers. 1. they were at this time an uncertain index of
the relative wealth of the States. 2. if they were a just index at this
time it can not be supposed always to continue so. He was far from
wishing to retain any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the
Republic. If justice was not the basis of the connection it could not
be of long duration. He must be shortsighted indeed who does not
foresee that whenever the Southern States shall be more numerous
than the Northern, they can & will hold a language that will awe them
into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case injury shall be
done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual, when force
shall back their demands. Even in the intervening period, there will
no point of time at which they will not be able to say, do us justice or
we will separate. He urged the necessity of placing confidence to a
certain degree in every Govt. and did not conceive that the proposed
confidence as to a periodical readjustment, of the representation exceeded that degree.
r
M . PINKNEY moved to amend Mr. Randolph’s motion so as to
make “blacks equal to the whites in the ratio of representation.” This
he urged was nothing more than justice. The blacks are the labourers, the peasants of the Southern States: they are as productive of pecuniary resources as those of the Northern States. They add equally
to the wealth, and considering money as the sinew of war, to the
strength of the nation. It will also be politic with regard to the
Northern States, as taxation is to keep pace with Representation.
l
Gen . PINKNEY moves to insert 6 years instead of two, as the period computing from 1st. meeting of ye. Legis—within which the first
census should be taken. On this question for inserting six instead of
“two” in the proposition of Mr. Wilson, it passed in the affirmative
Masts. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. Divd. Md. ay. Va. no.
N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no.
On a question for filling the blank for ye. periodical census with
20 years, it passed in the negative.
Masts. no. Ct.ay. N.J.ay. P.ay. Del.no. Md.no. Va.no. N.C.no.
S.C.no. Geo.no.
On a question for 10 years, it passed in the affirmative.
Mas. ay. Cont.no. N.J.no. P.ay. Del.ay. Md.ay. Va. ay. N.C.ay.
S.C.ay. Geo.ay.
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On Mr. Pinkney’s motion for rating blacks as equal to Whites instead of as 3/5—
Mas.no. Cont.no. [Dr Johnson ay] N.J.no. Pa.no. [3 agst. 2.]
Del.no. Md.no. Va.no. N.C.no. S.C.ay. Geo—ay.
r
M . RANDOLPH’s proposition as varied by Mr. Wilson being read
for question on the whole.
r
M . GERRY, urged that the principle of it could not be carried into execution as the States were not to be taxed as States. With regard
to taxes in imports, he conceived they would be more productive.
Where there were no slaves than where there were; the consumption
being greater—
r
M . ELSEWORTH. In case of a poll tax there wd. be no difficulty.
But there wd. probably be none. The sum allotted to a State may be
levied without difficulty according to the plan used by the State in
raising its own supplies. On the question on ye. whole proposition; as
proportioning representation to direct taxation & both to the white
& 3/5 of black inhabitants, & requiring a Census within six years—&
within every ten years afterwards.
Mas.divd. Cont.ay. N.J.no. Pa.ay. Del.no. Md.ay. Va.ay. N.C.ay.
S.C.divd. Geo.ay.
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APPENDIX B
EXCERPT FROM: FEDERALIST NO. 36
Concerning the General Power of Taxation. Tuesday January 8,
1788.
HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York:
***
. . . It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the
national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well
from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as
from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of
the particular States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge
seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the counties, which
demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt
from the information of the members of the county. Cannot the like
knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who
will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree
of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the
knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute
topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams,
highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance
with its situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and
industry?
Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular
kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single
men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards
passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature.
Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere
best qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for
revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind
can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local
circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation.
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT
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and those of the INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made to
both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former
branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood
duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended. The
knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be
procured from any well-informed man, especially of the mercantile
class. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one
State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be
comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would be to
avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the
use of a particular State; and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. This could always be known from the
respective codes of laws, as well as from the information of the members from the several States.
The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and
lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in
this view it will not bear a close examination. Land taxes are commonly laid in one of two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical, or by OCCASIONAL assessments, at the discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose
duty it is to make them. In either case, the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of commissioners or
assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the government for
the purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the persons or
to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their
numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their
powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be
performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature? The
attention of either can only reach to general principles; local details,
as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the
plan.
But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be
placed that must be altogether satisfactory. The national legislature
can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT
STATE. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in
each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government.
Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be
left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be deter-
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mined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the first article. An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the
door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of taxation
seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection.
In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that
“all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the
United States.’’
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of
internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment
to be really inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear
the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of
answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource?
Two solid answers may be given. The first is, that the exercise of that
power, if convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the
experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. The second answer is, that the
existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the
Union can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their part.
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its
members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense,
interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems. An effectual
expedient for this purpose will be, mutually, to abstain from those objects which either side may have first had recourse to. As neither can
CONTROL the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest
in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an IMMEDIATE
common interest, we may safely count upon its operation. When the
particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come
to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of
interference will vanish. A small land tax will answer the purpose of
the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource.
Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and
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the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been
played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain.
As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no
room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing
the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties
on imports; the other, where the object has not fallen under any State
regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes,
or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid
any occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people.
At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that
evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.
As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence,
it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but
the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to
the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers
as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State
influence into the channels of the national government, instead of
making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current.
But all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished from the consideration of the great question before the people.
They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The
wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be
done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be
done by that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to be
paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union that the capital
resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient
branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will
render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and
with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a
disposition to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the
means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed point of policy in
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the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to
diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society.
Happy it is when the interest which the government has in the preservation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the
public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the
community from oppression!
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of
them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those
[New England] States which have uniformly been the most tenacious
of their rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice
under the national government. But does it follow because there is a
power to lay them that they will actually be laid? Every State in the
Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of
them they are unknown in practice. Are the State governments to be
stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this power? If they are
not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge
against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to
its adoption? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I
still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it
ought to exist in the federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of
things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal.
And the government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought
ever to have the option of making use of them. The real scarcity of
objects in this country, which may be considered as productive
sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the
discretion of the national councils in this respect. There may exist
certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a
poll tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing
to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that
have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every
project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed
for the general defense and security.
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APPENDIX C
EXCERPTS FROM DEBATES IN THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING
CONVENTION (1788) [Emphasis added.]
436

Gov. Randolph (June 7) :
The difficulty of justly apportioning the taxes among the states,
under the present system, has been complained of; the rule of apportionment being the value of all lands and improvements within the
states. The inequality between the rich lands of James River and the barrens
of Massachusetts has been thought to militate against Virginia. If taxes could
be laid according to the real value, no inconvenience could follow; but, from a
variety of reasons, this value was very difficult to be ascertained; and an error
in the estimation must necessarily have been oppressive to a part of the community. But in this new Constitution, there is a more just and equitable rule
fixed—a limitation beyond which they cannot go. Representatives and taxes
go hand in hand: according to the one will the other be regulated. The
number of representatives is determined by the number of inhabitants; they have nothing to do but to lay taxes accordingly. I will illustrate it by a familiar example. At present, before the population is actually numbered, the number of representatives is sixty-five. Of this
number, Virginia has a right to send ten; consequently she will have
to pay ten parts out of sixty-five parts of any sum that may be necessary to be raised by Congress. This, sir, is the line. Can Congress go
beyond the bounds prescribed in the Constitution? Has Congress a
power to say that she shall pay fifteen parts out of sixty-five parts?
Were they to assume such a power, it would be a usurpation so glaring, that rebellion would be the immediate consequence. Congress is
only to say on what subject the tax is to be laid. It is a matter of very little consequence how it will be imposed, since it must be clearly laid on the most productive article in each particular state. I am surprised that such strong objections should have been made to, and such fears and alarms excited by, this
power of direct taxation, since experience shows daily that it is neither inconvenient nor oppressive. A collector goes to a man’s house; the man pays him
with freedom, or makes an apology for his inability to do it then: at a future
day, if payment be not made, distress is made, and acquiesced in by the party.
What difference is there between this and a tax imposed by Congress? Is it nor
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done by lawful authority? The distinction is between a Virginian and Continental authority. Yet, in both cases, it is imposed by ourselves, through the
medium of our representatives. When a tax will come to be laid by Congress, the collector will apply in like manner, and in the same manner
receive payment, or an apology; at a future day, likewise, the same
consequences will result from a failure. I presume, sir, there is a manifest similarity between the two cases. When gentlemen complain of
the novelty, they ought to advert to the singular one that must be the
consequence of the requisitions—an army sent into your country to
force you to comply. Will not this be the dissolution of the Union, if
ever it takes effect? Let us be candid on this subject: let us see if the
criterion here fixed be not equal and just. Were the tax laid on one uniform article through the Union, its operation would be oppressive on a considerable part of the people. When any sum is necessary for the general government, every state will immediately know its exact proportion of it, from the
number of their people and representatives; nor can it be doubted that the tax
will be laid on each state, in the manner that will best accommodate the people
of such state, as thereby it will be raised with more facility; for an oppressive
mode can never be so productive as the most easy for the people.
437

John Marshall (June 10) :
The objects of direct taxes are well understood: they are but few:
what are they? Lands, slaves, stock of all kinds, and a few other articles of domestic property. Can you believe that ten men selected
from all parts of the state, chosen because they know the situation of
the people, will be unable to determine so as to make the tax equal
on, and convenient for, the people at large? Does any man believe
that they would lay the tax without the aid of other information besides their own knowledge, when they know that the very object for
which they are elected is to lay the taxes in a judicious and convenient manner? If they wish to retain the affections of the people at
large, will they not inform themselves of every circumstance that can
throw light on the subject? Have they but one source of information?
Besides their own experience—their knowledge of what will suit their
constituents—they will have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the state legislature. They will see in what manner the legislature of Virginia collects its taxes. Will they be unable to follow their
example? The gentlemen who shall be delegated to Congress will
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have every source of information that the legislatures of the states can
have, and can lay the taxes as equally on the people, and with as little
oppression, as they can. If, then, it be admitted that they can understand how to lay them equally and conveniently, are we to admit that
they will not do it, but that, in violation of every principle that ought
to govern men, they will lay them so as to oppress us? What benefit
will they have by it? Will it be promotive of their reëlection? Will it
be by wantonly imposing hardships and difficulties on the people at
large, that they will promote their own interest, and secure their
reëlection? To me it appears incontrovertible that they will settle
them in such a manner as to be easy for the people. Is the system so
organized as to make taxation dangerous? I shall not go to the various checks of the government, but examine whether the immediate
representation of the people be well constructed. I conceive its organization to be sufficiently satisfactory to the warmest friend of freedom. No tax can be laid without the consent of the House of Representatives. If there, be no impropriety in the mode of electing the
representatives, can any danger be apprehended? . . . To procure
their reëlection, it will be necessary for them to confer with the people at large, and convince them that the taxes laid are for their good.
If I am able to judge on the subject, the power of taxation now before
us is wisely conceded, and the representatives are wisely elected.
438

George Nicholas (June 10) :
The gentleman relies much on the force of requisitions. I shall
mention two examples which will show their inutility. They are fruitless without the coercion of arms. If large states refuse, a complete
civil war, or dissolution of the confederacy, will result. If small states
refuse, they will be destroyed, or Obliged to comply. From the history of the United Netherlands, the inutility of requisitions, without
recurring to force, may be proved. The small provinces refused to
comply, Holland, the most powerful, marched into their territories
with an army, and compelled them to pay. The other example is
from the New England confederacy. Massachusetts, the most wealthy
and populous state, refused to contribute her share. The rest were
unable to compel her, and the league was dissolved. Attend to a resolution of the Assembly of Virginia in the year 1784.
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***
We are next terrified with the thought of excises. In some countries excises are terrible. In others, they are not only harmless, but
useful. In our sister states, they are excised without any inconvenience. They are a kind of tax on manufactures. Our manufactures
are few in proportion to those of other states. We may be assured
that Congress will make such regulations as shall make excises convenient and easy for the people.
Another argument made use of is, that ours is the largest state,
and must pay in proportion to the other states. How does that appear? The proportion of taxes are fixed by the number of inhabitants, and not regulated by the extent of territory, or fertility of soil.
If we be wealthier, in proportion, than other states, it will fall lighter upon us
than upon poorer states. They must fix the taxes so that the poorest states can
pay; and Virginia, being richer, will bear it easier.
439

Madison (June 11) :
Let us consider the alternatives proposed by gentlemen, instead of
the power of laying direct taxes. After the states shall have refused to
comply, weigh the consequences of the exercise of this power by
Congress. When it comes in the form of a punishment, great clamors
will be raised among the people against the government; hatred will
be excited against it. It will be considered as an ignominious stigma
on the state. . . . The general government, to avoid those disappointments which I first described, and to avoid the contentions and
embarrassments which I last described, will, in all probability, throw
the public burdens on those branches of revenue which will be more
in their power. They will be continually necessitated to augment the
imposts. If we throw a disproportion of the burdens on that side,
shall we not discourage commerce and suffer many political evils?
Shall we not increase that disproportion on the Southern States,
which for some time will operate against us? The Southern States,
from having fewer manufactures, will import and consume more.
They will therefore pay more of the imposts. The more commerce is
burdened, the more the disproportion will operate against them. If
direct taxation be mixed with other taxes, it will be in the power of
the general government to lessen that inequality. But this inequality
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will be increased to the utmost extent, if the general government
have not this power.
There is another point of view in which this subject affords us instruction. The imports will decrease in time of war. . . . At present,
our importations bear a full proportion to the full amount of our
sales, and to the number of our inhabitants; but when we have inhabitants enough, our imposts will decrease, and as the national demands will increase with our population, our resources will increase
as our wants increase. The other consideration which I will submit
on this part of the subject is this: I believe that it will be found, in
practice, that those who fix the public burdens will feel a greater degree of responsibility, when they are to impose them on the citizens
immediately than if they were to say what sum should be paid by the
states. If they exceed the limits of propriety, universal discontent and
clamor will arise. Let us suppose they were to collect the taxes from
the citizens of America; would they not consider their circumstances?
Would they not attentively consider what could be done by the citizens at large? Were they to exceed, in their demands, what were reasonable burdens, the people would impute it to the right source, and
look on the imposers as odious.
It has been said that ten men deputed from this state, and others
in proportion from other states, will not be able to adjust direct taxes,
so as to accommodate the various citizens in thirteen states.
. . . My honorable friend over the way, (Mr. Monroe,) yesterday,
seemed to conceive, as an insuperable objection, that, if land were
made the particular object of taxation, it would be unjust, as it would
exonerate the commercial part of the community; that, if it were laid
on trade, it would be unjust, in discharging the landholders; and that
any exclusive selection would be unequal and unfair. If the general
government were tied down to one object, I confess the objection
would have some force in it. But if this be not the case, it can have no
weight. If it should have a general power of taxation, they could select the most proper objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner as that they should fall in a due degree on every member of the
community. They will be limited to fix the proportion of each state,
and they must raise it in the most convenient and satisfactory manner
to the public.
The honorable member considered it as another insuperable objection, that uniform laws could not be made for thirteen states, and
that dissonance would produce inconvenience and oppression. Perhaps it may not be found, on due inquiry, to be so impracticable as
he supposes. But were it so, where is the evil for different states to
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raise money for the general government? Where is the evil of such
laws? There are instances in other countries of different laws operating in different parts of the Country, without producing any kind of
opposition. . . . There is a land tax in England, and a land tax in Scotland; but the laws concerning them are not the same. It is much
heavier, in proportion, in the former than in the latter. The mode of
collection is different; yet this is not productive of any national inconvenience. . . . .
I will make another observation on the objection of my honorable
friend. He seemed to conclude that concurrent collections under
different authorities were not reducible to practice. I agree that,
were they independent of the people, the argument would be good.
But they must serve one common master. They must act in concert,
or the defaulting party must bring on itself the resentment of the
people. If the general government be so constructed that it will not
dare to impose such burdens as will distress the people, where is the
evil of its having a power of taxation concurrent with the states? The
people would not support it, were it to impose oppressive burdens.
Let me make one more comparison of the state governments to this
plan. Do not the states impose taxes for local purposes? Does the
concurrent collection of taxes, imposed by the legislatures for general purposes, and of levies laid by the counties for parochial and
county purposes, produce any inconvenience or oppression? The
collection of these taxes is perfectly practicable, and consistent with
the views of both parties. The people at large are the common superior of the state governments and the general government. It is reasonable to conclude that they will avoid interferences, for two
causes—to avoid public oppression, and to render the collections
more productive.
440

Madison (June 12) :
He compares resistance of the people to collectors to refusal of
requisitions. This goes against all government. It is as much as to
urge that there should be no legislature. The gentlemen, who favored us with their observations on this subject, seemed to reason on
a supposition that the general government was confined, by the paper on your table, to lay general, uniform taxes. Is it necessary that
there should be a tax on any given article throughout the United States? It is
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represented to be oppressive, that the states which have slaves, and make tobacco, should pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states, which
have them not, would escape. But does the Constitution on the table admit of
this? On the contrary, there is a proportion to be hid on each state, according
to its population. The most proper articles will be selected in each state. If one
article, in any state, should be deficient, it will be laid on another article. Our
state is secured on this foundation. Its proportion will be commensurate to its
population. This is a constitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar
against disproportion, and ought to satisfy all reasonable minds. If
the taxes be not uniform, and the representatives of some states contribute to lay a tax of which they bear no proportion, is not this principle reciprocal? Does not the same principle hold in our state government in some degree? It has been found inconvenient to fix on
uniform objects of taxation in this state, as the back parts are not circumstanced like the lower parts of the country. In both cases, the reciprocity of the principle will prevent a disposition in one part to oppress the other.
441

Madison (June 15) :
The census in the Constitution was intended to introduce equality
in the burdens to be laid on the community. No gentleman objected
to laying duties, imposts, and excises, uniformly. But uniformity of
taxes would be subversive of the principles of equality; for it was not
possible to select any article which would be easy for one state but
what would be heavy for another; that, the proportion of each state
being ascertained, it would be raised by the general government in
the most convenient manner for the people, and not by the selection
of any one particular object; that there must be some degree of confidence put in agents, or else we must reject a state of civil society altogether.
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